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IMPEDING REENTRY:
AGENCY AND JUDICIAL OBSTACLES TO LONGER
HALFWAY HOUSE PLACEMENTS
S. David Mitchell*
Over 700, 000 prisoners were released into their communities in 2008, at least
50,000 of those from federal custody. Once an obscure cause, nearly everyone
agrees that prisoner reentry-the process by which former prisoners return to their
communities-is of national importance. Absent adequate attention to transitional
services, ex-offenders are often homeless, unemployed, and suffer from untreated
substance abuse addictions.
Accordingly, President Obama and his two predecessors have devoted considerable
attention to the issue. Congress passed the Second Chance Act in 2007. The Act
increased the time that inmates may spend in halfway houses to improve their
transition from incarceration to law-abiding citizenry and required individualized
inmate assessments prior to placement. Nevertheless, the Bureau of Prisons is
ignoring both mandates by categorically limiting the inmates' time in halfvay
houses. By presuming that six months is a satisfactory length of time to spend in a
halfway house, the Bureau of Prisons fails to comply with its statutory authority
and thus should not pass hard look review under Chevron v. NRDC.1
Federal inmates who have sought judicial review of the Bureau of Prisons' policy
have been denied generally judicial access because of two doctrines: exhaustion and
mootness. Courts are refusing to hear inmates' challenges either because the inmates
have failed to exhaust their remedies under the Bureau's three-tiered administrative
remedy process, or because the petition is moot. Inmates have invoked various
exceptions to both doctrines and have had mixed success. Given official Bureau of
Prisons statements, legal action is inevitable. Because legal action is a certainty, the
time lost awaiting an administrative decision diminishes the amount of time that an
inmate would be able to spend in a hafiway house. The Bureau of Prisons should
amend its policy, as the six-month placement absent an extradordinary justification
faiLs to give proper effect to Congress' intent with regard to reentry.
* Associate Professor, University of Missouri, School of Law. J.D. University of
Pennsylvania. I would like to thank the University of Missouri Law School Foundation
whose research support provided me the opportunity to write on this issue. I would also
like to thank my colleagues Chris Wells, Phil Harter, and Michelle Cecil whose feedback
was invaluable. I would also like to thank my wife, Enid, and my son, Langston, for allow-
ing me the space to work on this Article during our family time together last summer.
1. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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"It dja-vu, all over again."
-Yogi Berra2
INTRODUCTION
Shawn Woodall was arrested for possession of a controlled substance
approximately twelve days after serving forty-six months' imprisonment
for alien smuggling and escaping from federal prison.3 The following facts,
which the government did not dispute, were introduced at Woodall's sen-
tencing:
[Thirty] days before his release [Woodall] had asked to have his
probation moved from California-where he had no ties-to
Oklahoma where his family lived. He claims that he spoke
with a correctional center authority and wrote a letter to the
probation department claiming "I am about to get out of pris-
on ... It's on a Friday. I do not want to be released in the
community with no assets. No money. Just the clothes on my
back. No identification. No nothing." However, he received no
assistance. Woodall wrote a letter to his sentencing court, ex-
pressing his concern. He sought halfway house placement, or
money, neither of which he obtained. Woodall states that once
he was released, with no money or housing, he went to his
probation department to explain that he was homeless and
needed a transfer or assistance. He was told that his probation
officer was on vacation and was given no assistance. He
claimed that "on April 7th, I am on the streets living in a blan-
ket on the streets in San Diego on a sidewalk with nothing.
After 46 months of imprisonment with not a penny in my
pocket. I am in a drug infested neighborhood."
4
Woodall is not alone.5 Over 700,000 prisoners were released into their
communities in 2008, at least 50,000 of those from federal custody.6 Ab-
sent adequate attention to transitional services such as housing,
employment, and substance abuse treatment, empirical research has
2. YOGI BERA, THEYOGI BOOK 30 (Workman Publ'g 1998).
3. Woodall v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 432 F3d 235, 238 (3d Cir. 2005).
4. Id. at 238 n.1.
5. See WILLIAM J. SABOL, HEATHER C. WEST & MATTHEW COOPER, BUREAU OF Jus-
TICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BULL. No. NCJ 228417, PISONERS IN 2008 1 (Dec.
2009, rev.June 30, 2010), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/p08.pdf.
6. Id. at 3.
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indicated that approximately two-thirds of released offenders will recidi-
vate within three years.7
Once an obscure cause, nearly everyone agrees that prisoner
reentry-the process by which former prisoners return to their commu-
nity8-is of national importance.9 Accordingly, President Obama and his
two predecessors have devoted considerable attention to the issue.'" Build-
7. PATRICK A. LANGAN & DAVID J. LEVIN, BUREAU oF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T
OF JUSTICE, PUB. No. 193427, SPECIAL REPORT: RECIDIVISM OF PRISONERS RELEASED IN
1994 1 (2002) [hereinafter LANGAN & LEVIN] (finding that over two-thirds of prisoners
released in fifteen states in 1994 were rearrested within three years). See also Jeremy Travis,
Anna Crayton & Debbie A. Mukamal, A New Era in Inmate Reentry, CORRECTIONS TODAY,
Dec. 2009, at 38, 39 ("[T]he recidivism rate of returning prison inmates is very high. If
recidivism is defined as one or more arrests for new crimes over a period of time, then,
according to BJS data, the three-year recidivism rate for individuals leaving state prisons is
more than two-thirds. And about one-half of returning inmates are reincarcerated within
that three-year period.").
8. See Todd R. Clear, Elm Waring & Kristen Scully, Communities and Reentry: Con-
centrated Reentry Cycling, in PRISONER REENTRY AND CRIME IN AMERICA 179 (Jeremy Travis
et al. eds., 2005).
9. Former Attorney General Janet Reno referred to prisoner reentry as "one of the
most present problems we face as a nation."Janet Reno, U.S. Att'y Gen., Remarks at John
Jay College of Criminal Justice on the Reentry Court Initiative (Feb. 10, 2000), http://
www.usdoj.gov/archive/ag/speeches/2000/doc2.htm. See Mitchel Herckis & Katie See-
ger, One Year After Second Chance Act: New Funds to Stop the Prison Cycle, NATION'S CITIES
WKLY., Mar. 9, 2009, at 9 ("Once a cause with few advocates, the need for transitional
services for ex-offenders has become glaring with an estimated 650,000 people released
from prison and another 10 to 12 million people released from local jails each year."). A
number of local, state and national organizations are dedicated to prisoner reentry. See, e.g.,
BOONE CNTY OFFENDER TRANSITION NETWORK, http://bcotn.org/ (last visited Feb. 5,
2011); RE-ENTRY PRISON AND JAIL MINISTRY RES. CTR., http://reentry.org/ (last visited
Feb. 5,2011); Missouri Reentry Process, Mo. DEP'T OF CORR., http://doc.mo.gov/mrp/irp.php
(last visited Feb. 5, 2011); Reentry, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, http://www.reentry.gov/
(last visited Feb. 5, 2011); Reentry Resource Map, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS,
http://www.reentryresources.ncjrs.gov/ (last visited Feb. 5, 2011); Reentry Policy Council,
JUSTICE CTR., http://reentrypolicy.org/ (last visited Feb. 5, 2011); The National Reentry
Resource Center, JUSTICE CTR., http://www.nationalreentryresourcecenter.org/ (last visited
Feb. 5, 2011); THE SENTENCING PROJECT, http://www.sentencingproject.org/telplate/
index.cfin (last visited Feb. 5, 2011).
10. Herckis & Seeger, supra note 9 ("President Obama is also supportive of reentry
programs and included $75 million for the Second Chance Act in his FY 2010 budget
proposal"); President George W Bush, Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the
State of the Union (Jan. 20, 2004), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=2004-presidential documents&docid=pd26ja04_txt-10 ("This year,
some 600,000 inmates will be released from prison back into society. We know from long
experience that if they can't find work, or a home, or help, they are much more likely to
comnit crimes and return to prison. So tonight, I propose a 4-year, $300 million Prisoner
Re-Entry Initiative to expand job training and placement services, to provide transitional
housing, and to help newly released prisoners get mentoring, including from faith-based
groups."); Anthony C. Thompson, Navigating the Hidden Obstacles to Ex-Offender Reentry, 45
B.C. L. REV. 255, 260 (2004) ("In the 2000-2001 federal budget, then President Bill Clin-
ton included $60 million for 'Project Reentry,' a federal program designed to encourage
[VOL. 16:235
HeinOnline  -- 16 Mich. J. Race & L. 238 2010-2011
Impeding Reentry
ing on this national awareness, Congress passed the Second Chance Act,"
with the goals of decreasing recidivism and increasing public safety. To
accomplish these twin goals, Congress created new programs and re-
vamped existing ones in a concerted effort to improve offender reentry.
One notable change was the clarification of the Bureau of Prisons' inmate
placement authority, which specified where an inmate can be placed and
for how long.
Under the Second Chance Act, Congress required the Bureau of
Prisons to ensure that a prisoner spends as much of his last twelve months
as possible "under conditions that will afford [them] a reasonable oppor-
tunity to adjust to and prepare for the reentry ... into the community,
[and that such] conditions may include a community correctional facili-
ty."'2 This clarification did two things. First, it settled the question of
whether the Bureau of Prisons is allowed to place inmates in community
correctional facilities such as halfway houses. Second, it increased the
length of time that inmates are eligible to spend in such facilities to up to
twelve months. However, the Bureau of Prisons promulgated a new rule
that effectively ignored Congress' intent and once again categorically lim-
ited inmates' time in halfway houses, a course of action that some courts
previously found violated the agency's statutory authority.1
3
The Bureau of Prisons' new rule limits an inmate's halfway house
placement to six months, unless there is an extraordinary justification re-
quiring a longer placement and the inmate has received prior written
approval from the Regional Director where the inmate is housed 4
parental responsibility among offenders, job training for parolees, and the establishment of
reentry courts.").
11. Second Chance Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-199, 122 Stat. 657 (2008) (codified
in scattered sections of 18 and 42 U.S.C.), not to be confused with Second Chance for
Ex-Offenders Act of 2009, H.R. 1529, 111th Cong. (2009) (permitting the expungement
of records for certain nonviolent criminal offenses).
12. Second Chance Act of 2007 § 251. Community Correctional facilities or
Community Corrections Centers ("CCCs") are also known as halfway houses and Resi-
dential Reentry Centers ("RRCs"). In this Article, I use the term halfway house. Federal
Prisoner Reentry and the Second Chance Act Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Justice, Science
and Related Agencies and the Comm. on Appropriations US House of Representatives, 111th
Cong. (2009) (statement of Harley G. Lappin, Director, Federal Bureau of Prisons) [here-
inafter Lappin statement of March 10, 2009].
13. See infra Part II.B.
14. Memorandum from Joyce K. Conley, Assistant Dir. Corr. Programs Div. & Kath-
leen M. Kenney, Assistant Dir./Gen. Counsel to Chief Exec. Officers, Pre-Release
Residential Re-Entry Center Placements Following the Second Chance Act of 2007
§ III(D)(Apr. 14, 2008)[hereinafter Conley & Kenney Memo] ("While the [Second
Chance] Act makes inmates eligible for a maximum of 12 months pre-release RRC
placements, Bureau experience reflects inmates' pre-release RRC needs can usually be
accommodated by a placement of six months or less. Should staff determine an inmates'
pre-release RRC placement may require greater than six months, the Warden must obtain
the Regional Director's written concurrence before submitting the placement to the
Community Corrections Manager.").
SPpaNG 2011]
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(hereinafter extraordinary justification exception rule).'" The promulga-
tion of this rule is not the first time that the Bureau of Prisons limited an
inmate's halfway house placement.
In 2002, following a review of its longstanding "open transfer"' 6 pol-
icy, the Bureau of Prisons adopted a rule limiting an inmate's halfway
house placement to six months." In 2005, responding to legal challenges,
the Bureau of Prisons announced a rule as a "categorical exercise of dis-
cretion"'18 that also limited halfway house placement to six months.'9
Several courts, applying Chevron and hard look review, concluded that the
six-month time limit was impermissible then, and remains impermissible
now.2 In the immortal words ofYogi Berra, "It's d~ja vu all over again."'"
15. Pre-Release Community Confinement, 73 Fed. Reg. 62440 (Oct. 21, 2008)
(codified at 28 C.F.R. § 570.20-22 (2008)). The Bureau of Prisons amended Communi-
ty Corrections Center (CCC) Utilization and Transfer Procedure to inform its personnel
of how to comply with the changes required by the Second Chance Act of 2007. FED.
BUmEAu oF PRISONS, U.S. DEP'T. OF JUSTICE, PROGRAM STATEMENT 7310.04, COMMUNITY
CORRECTIONS CENTER UTILIZATION AND TRANSFER PROCEDURE (Dec. 16, 1998).
16. See infra Part I.A. for an in-depth discussion of the Bureau of Prisons' open
transfer policy and the subsequent rule changes.
17. Memorandum from Michael B. Cooksey, Assistant Dir. Corr. Programs Div.
and Christopher Erlewine, Assistant Dir./Gen. Counsel to Chief Exec. Officers, Com-
munity Confinement Procedure Changes (Dec. 20, 2002) [hereinafter Cooksey &
Erlewine Memo] ("Pre-release programming CCC designations are limited in duration to
the last 10% of the prison sentence, not to exceed six months.").
18. Community Confinement, 69 Fed. Reg. 51213 (Aug. 18, 2004) (codified at 28
C.F.R. § 570.20-21 (2008) ("[T]he Bureau of Prisons (Bureau) proposes new rules an-
nouncing its categorical exercise of discretion for designating imnates to community
confinement when serving terms of imprisonment ... The proposed rules would, as a
matter of policy, limit the amount of time that inmates may spend in community con-
finement (including Community Corrections Centers (CCCs) and home confinement) to
the last ten percent of the prison sentence being served, not to exceed six months."). See
also Woodall v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 432 F.3d 235, 240 (3d Cir. 2005) ("In response to
decisions such as Elwood and Goldings, on August 18, 2004, the BOP proposed new regu-
lations 'announcing its categorical exercise of discretion for designating inmates to
community confinement when serving terms of imprisonment.' ") (referring to Goldings
v. Winn, 383 F.3d 17 (1st Cir. 2004) and Elwood v. Jeter, 386 F.3d 842 (8th Cir. 2004));
Levine v. Apker, 455 F.3d 71, 75-76 (2d Cir. 2006) ("On August 18, 2004, the BOP...
promulgated a new rule. This rule had the effect of imposing the same durational limita-
tions on prisoner's CCC confinements as the BOP had implemented in its December
2002 Policy. It did so now... pursuant to the BOP's broad discretion to place inmates in
community confinement .....
19. 69 Fed. Reg. 51213.
20. SeeWedelstedt v.Wiley, 477 E3d 1160 (10th Cir. 2007); Fults v. Sanders, 442 F3d
1088 (8th Cir. 2006); Woodall v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 432 F3d 235 (3d Cir. 2005). A
final decision on whether the BOP could properly exercise such discretion was not heard
because the 2005 Rule became moot with the passage of the Second Chance Act of 2007.
21. BERRA, supra note 2, at 30.
[VOL. 16:235
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Unlike prior rule changes, 2  under this new rule federal inmates
have been overwhelmingly denied judicial review because the federal
courts adhere strictly to two doctrines-exhaustion 23 and mootness.24 The
courts' unwillingness to apply longstanding exceptions2' to either doc-
trine, or to recognize a public importance exception 26 to the mootness
doctrine, has prevented federal inmates from effectively challenging
whether the extraordinary justification exception rule was a proper exer-
cise of agency discretion. This Article analyzes the Bureau of Prisons' ex-
extraordinary justification exception rule under Chevron and the federal
courts' application of the exhaustion and mootness doctrines. It concludes
that, the extraordinary justification exception rule, once again is an im-
permissible exercise of agency discretion.
Part I of this Article details the Bureau of Prisons' rules and policies
governing inmate placement, including the most recent iteration. Part II
examines Chevron7 and the Bureau of Prisons' extraordinary justification
exception rule. Part III turns to the threshold matter of obtaining judicial
access to challenge the Bureau of Prisons' new rule, with Part III.A argu-
ing that the federal courts should relax their standards when faced with
22. See infra Part I for an in-depth discussion of the numerous rule changes.
23. The exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine requires an individual to
submit a grievance to the agency's administrative remedy process before seeking relief
from the courts. McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 145 (1992). There are a number of
recognized exceptions to the doctrine: (a) statutory exceptions; (b) irreparable harm; (c)
reconsideration or administrative appeals; (d) express or implied waiver; (e) futility; (g)
manifest violation of constitutional rights; (h) purely legal issue; (i) procedural challenge;
(j) challenge of bias or prejudgment; (k) exercise ofjudicial discretion; and (i) unreasonable
delay 33 CHARLEs ALAN WRIGHT & CHARLEs H. KOCH, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCE-
DURE § 8398 (2006). See infra Part IVA.
24. The moomess doctrine prevents courts from deciding cases where a real contro-
versy no longer exists and the court is unable to provide the effective relief being sought.
Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 67 (1997) ("To qualify as a case fit
for federal-court adjudication, 'an actual controversy must be extant at all stages of review,
not merely at the time the complaint is filed.'" (quoting Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395,
401 (1975))); see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 125 (1973); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Ha-
worth, 300 U.S. 227, 241 (1937). See infra Part IVB.
25. See infra Part III, for a discussion of the exceptions that the courts have denied.
26. This exception has been adopted in state courts. See e.g., State Bd. of Chiroprac-
tic Exam'rs v. Stjernholm, 935 P.2d 959 (Colo. 1997); Curless v. Cnty. of Clay, 395 So. 2d
255 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); In re Adoption of Walgreen, 710 N.E.2d 1226 (Ill. 1999);
Marquette v. Marquette, 686 P.2d 990 (Okla. Ct. App. 1984). See also 1A C.J.S. Actions § 81
(2005) ("The courts construe narrowly the public interest exception to the nooness
doctrine, which allows a court to resolve an otherwise moot issue if the question present-
ed is of a public nature, the circumstances are likely to recur, and an authoritative
resolution of the question is desirable for the purpose of guiding public officers."). Given
the national importance of reentry, the federal courts should consider adopting this excep-
tion. See infra Part III.B.2 for a discussion of this exception and why the federal courts
should adopt it.
27. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984).
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exceptions to the exhaustion requirement and Part III.B arguing for the
adoption of a federal public importance exception to the mootness doc-
trine. The Article concludes that these changes will further Congress' dual
purposes for passing the Second Chance Act: decreasing recidivism and
increasing public safety.
I. HALFWAY HouSE PLACEMENT POLICIES AND CHALLENGES
The Bureau of Prisons has changed its halfway house placement
policy several times over the last decade. A detailed recounting of the Bu-
reau of Prisons' policies, rules and challenges is below.
A. The Bureau of Prisons' Open Transfer Policy28
The Bureau of Prisons' longstanding open transfer policy for half-
way house placement consisted of two practices: early transfers and direct
judicial placements.29 With early transfers, an eligible inmate was placed in
a halfway house at any point during his imprisonment and for any length
of time30 after spending a portion of his sentence in a federal prison.With
direct judicial placement, an inmate was placed directly in a halfway house
to serve his entire sentence, upon the recommendation of the sentencing
court.3 While the open transfer policy appeared to give the Bureau of
28. The author of this Article has coined the phrase "open transfer policy" to refer-
ence the lack of temporal constraints only.
29. See Todd Bussert, Peter Goldberger & Mary Price, New Time Limits on Federal
Halfway Houses: Why and How Lawyers Challenge the Bureau of Prisons' Shift in Correctional
Policy-And the Courts' Response, 21 CRiM.JJST. 20, 22 (2006). Direct judicial placement is
also referred to as "front-end" placement.
30. Levine v. Apker, 455 F.3d 71, 75 (2d Cit. 2006) ("Prior to the policy change in
December 2002, the BOP interpreted its governing legislation such that the agency's gen-
eral authority to designate places of imprisonment was 'not restricted by § 3624(c) in
designating a CCC for an inmate and [that it could] place an inmate in a CCC for more
than the "last ten per centum of the term," or more than six months, if appropriate.'");
Woodall v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 432 E3d 235, 240 (3d Cir. 2005); Goldings v.Winn, 383
F.3d 17, 19-21 (1st Cir. 2004); Elwood v.Jeter, 386 E3d 842, 844-45 (8th Cir. 2004); see
also Amy L. Codagnone, Case Comment, Administrative Law--Bureau of Prisons Statutory
Mandate Permits Creation of Categorical Rules to Guide Prison Placement Discretion-Muniz v.
Sabol, 517 F3d 29 (1st Cir. 2008, cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 115 (2008), 42 SUFFOLK U. L.
REV. 285 (2009).
31. Jennifer Borges, The Bureau of Prisons' New Policy: A Misguided Attempt to Further
Restrict a Federal Judges Sentencing Discretion and to Get Tough on Wzite-Collar Crime, 31 NEW
ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 141, 142 (2005); John W. Roberts, The Federal Bu-
reau of Prisons: Its Mission, Its History, and Its Partnership with Probation and Pretrial Services, 61
FED. PROBATION 53, 55 (1997) ("lJ]udges are able to provide the BOP with rationales for
particular sentencing decisions and even to recommend that inmates be designated to
specific institutions or to institutions with specific types of progranmming.... Judicial rec-
ommendations are taken very seriously by the Bureau of Prisons as it makes decisions on
[VOL. 16:235
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Prisons unfettered discretion when designating an inmate's place of im-
prisonment, two statutes have guided the agency's practice. 2
Congress specifically required that the Bureau of Prisons, under
3621(b), designate an inmate's place of imprisonment, 3 but granted the
agency the discretion to determine the appropriate facility.34 In making a
facility determination, the Bureau of Prisons must consider five factors:
"(1) facility resources; (2) the nature and circumstances of the offense; (3)
the prisoner's history and characteristics; (4) statements by the sentencing
court about the purpose of the sentence or recommending an appropriate
facility; and (5) any pertinent policy statement issued by the Sentencing
Commission.'"'3 By requiring consideration of these factors, Congress en-
sured that each inmate received an individualized assessment prior to
being designated to a facility to serve his sentence. 36 The Bureau of Pris-
ons interpreted its discretion under the statute to allow an inmate to be
transferred at any time or placed directly in a halfway house.
To illustrate, assume that an inmate with a substance abuse problem
and a history of prior convictions has been convicted of assaulting a fed-
eral officer. The Bureau of Prisons assesses whether there is a facility in a
high security institution that has an opening, thus considering factors one
through three. The Bureau of Prisons would also review any statements
made by the sentencing court or any policy goals of the Sentencing
Commission, thus considering factors four and five. After reviewing all of
designations and programming. In fact, the BOP complies with about 80 percent of the
judicial recommendations it receives."). But d: Adam J. Kolber, Essay, The Subjective Experi-
ence of Punishment, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 182, 195 (2009) ("Sentencing decisions are usually
made by judges while decisions about conditions of incarceration are usually made by
prison bureaucrats (under conditions that are generally less open, accountable, and review-
able than they are in the courtroom). Judges can recommend prison assignments, but at
least in the federal system, the Bureau of Prisons is under no obligation to follow their
recommendations. By giving primary responsibility for sentencing decisions to judges and
primary responsibility for decisions about conditions of confinement to prison bureau-
crats, we dramatically limit opportunities to calibrate punishments.").
32. 18 U.S.C. § 3621 (2010); 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c) (2010). See generally Ira P. Rob-
bins, Legal Dimensions of Private Incarceration, 38 AM. U. L. REv. 531 (1989) (discussing
how The Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1839
(1984), replaced 18 U.S.C. § 4082 with 18 U.S.C. § 3621.).
33. 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b) (2010) ("The Bureau of Prisons shall designate the place of
the prisoner's imprisonment.").
34. Id. ("The Bureau may designate any available penal or correctional facility that
meets minimum standards of health and habitability established by the Bureau, whether
maintained by the Federal Government or otherwise and whether within or without the
judicial district in which the person was convicted, that the Bureau determines to be ap-
propriate and suitable ...."').
35. Id. See also Robbins, supra note 32 at 759 ("Section 3621(b) merely sets forth
certain additional factors that must be considered when the Bureau of Prisons selects a
facility for a particular prisoner.").
36. COMMITTEE REPORT ON SENTENCING REFORM ACT, S. REP. No. 98-225, at 141
(1983) (footnotes omitted), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3324-25 (1984).
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the information, the Bureau of Prisons identifies an appropriate facility
for the inmate.3" If the Bureau of Prisons determines that an inmate is
better served in a halfway house, then according to its interpretation of
§ 3621(b), it is permitted either to transfer or to place that inmate directly
into such a facility.
The other statute that governs halfway house placement, § 3624(c),
focuses on the inmate's reentry back into the community.38 This provision
required the Bureau of Prisons to provide a set of conditions that would
ensure that an inmate was prepared to reenter society upon release.39 This
statutory mandate, or "qualified" obligation,40 required the Bureau of
Prisons to assist an inmate in his reentry effort, but it neither dictated the
extent of that effort nor provided a detailed reentry program. The Bureau
of Prisons, interpreting this section as not limiting its discretion regarding
where an inmate could be placed,' concluded that an inmate's placement
in a halfway house was therefore not restricted.
To illustrate, assume that an inmate with an original sentence of for-
ty months has only four months remaining and that the Bureau of Prisons
has neither placed the inmate in a halfway house nor provided the inmate
with a program designed to improve the inmate's chances of successfully
37. The same process also occurs when the Bureau of Prisons honors a judicial
recommendation for direct placement to a halfway house. See Borges, supra note 31, at 173
("The BOP places great emphasis on the judicial recommendation and ... [accepts] judi-
cial recommendations about eighty percent of the time ... which might explain why
judges were so outraged when the DOJ announced that the BOP is no longer allowed to
honor judicial recommendations.").
38. COMMITTEE REPORT ON SENTENCING REFORM ACT, supra note 36, at 141.
39. 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c) (2010); Crime Control Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647,
2902, 104 Stat. 4789, 4913 (1990). See also Goldings v.Winn, 383 F.3d 17, 23 (1st Cir.
2004) ("By its plain language, § 3624(c) provides that the BOP 'shall take steps' to 'assure'
that prisoners serve a reasonable part of the last ten percent of their prison terms 'under
conditions that afford the prisoner a reasonable opportunity to adjust to and prepare for
the prisoner's re-entry into the community.' This language imposes an affirmative obliga-
tion on the BOP to take steps to facilitate a smooth re-entry for prisoners into the outside
world.").
40. Goldings, 383 E3d at 23 ("It is true that this obligation is qualified. Section
3624(c) does not mandate placement in a CCC prior to release, and it requires the BOP
to assure that a prisoner spends the last part of his sentence under pre-release conditions
only if practicable.").
41. Prows v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 981 E2d 466, 469 (10th Cit. 1992) ("While
there is mandatory (albeit qualified) language employed in the statute [S 3624(c)(1984)], it
relates only to the general direction to facilitate the prisoner's post-release adjustment
through establishment of some unspecified pre-release conditions. Nothing in § 3624(c)
indicates any intention to encroach upon the Bureau's authority to decide where the pris-
oner may be confined during the pre-release period."); Ferguson v. Ashcroft, 248 F Supp.
2d 547, 572 (M.D. La. 2003) ("The statute [section 3624(c)] clearly emphasizes the Bu-
reau's duty to ensure a reasonable opportunity for a period of adjustment. It aims to relieve
the burdens of direct release on our communities, the inmates, and their families. This
section does not shrink the discretion granted the Bureau in 18 U.S.C. 5 3621(b).").
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reentering society. If the agency assesses the inmate according to the five
factors enumerated above and determines that the inmate is ineligible to
be transferred because no facility is available, then the Bureau of Prisons is
not forced to place the inmate in a particular facility. The statute empha-
sizes that the agency must ensure that an inmate receives reentry
programming "to the extent practicable." 42 If this is not practicable, then
no set of reentry conditions are required, including placement in a half-
way house.
43
The Bureau of Prisons' open transfer policy operated for a substan-
tial period of time,4 4 but was changed abruptly following a determination
that the policy was invalid.
B. Seismic Shifi in the Bureau of Prisons' Placement Policy
Prompted by a request from the Deputy Attorney General, 4 the Of-
fice of Legal Counsel ("OLC") found the Bureau of Prisons' exercise of
42. 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c) (2010).
43. Elwood v. Jeter, 386 E3d 842, 846-47 (8th Cir. 2004) ("Section 3624(c) clearly
states that the BOP 'shall"assure' that each prisoner spends a reasonable part of the last ten
percent of his or her term 'under conditions that afford the prisoner a reasonable oppor-
tunity to adjust to and prepare for the prisoner's re-entry into the community' to the
extent that this is practicable ... We emphasize ... that 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c) does not re-
quire placement in a CCC [or Community Corrections Center] ... [T]he obligation is
qualified by the phrase 'to the extent practicable: Security concerns or space limitations in
a CCC near the prisoner's home are among the factors that may make it impractical to
transfer a prisoner to a CCC for all or even part of the transition period."). See also Gold-
ings, 383 F3d at 23.
44. lacaboni v. United States, 251 F. Supp. 2d 1015, 1017 (D. Mass. 2003) ("In mak-
ing the recommendations for community confinement, the court relied upon the
definition of the BOP's scope of discretion as set forth in § 3621(b). It also relied upon
explicit instructions, regularly provided to judges in various formats, to the effect that
community confinement is a proper sentencing option for offenders serving relatively
modest terms of imprisonment. Finally, the court had in mind the fact that recommenda-
tions to community confinement have been made in thousands of cases by hundreds of
judges continuously since at least 1965, and in nearly all instances accepted by the BOP");
Borges, supra note 31, at 142 ("Since at least 1965, federal judges have been allowed to
make recommendations to the Bureau of Prisons to have prisoners serve their term of
imprisonment in community confinement facilities, a practice that was almost always
honored by the BOP").
45. The Deputy Attorney General stated that he requested the review of the open
transfer policy to determine whether it was legal.
It has come to my attention that the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) has a
policy of accommodating judicial requests (and occasionally acting on its
own) to place low-risk, non-violent offenders with short terms of impris-
onment in a community corrections center (CCC), even where such
placement expressly contravenes the United States Sentencing Guidelines ...
I asked the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) to assess the legality of [the]
BOP's practices.
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discretion in placing inmates in halfway houses to be in error. 6 According
to the OLC, the Bureau of Prisons incorrectly interpreted the statutes
governing inmate halfway house placement. It noted that the Bureau of
Prisons lacks the "general authority" either to transfer an inmate early or
to place an inmate directly in a halfway house based upon a judicial rec-
ommendation. 47 To do so, the OLC contended, would be contrary not
only to the agency's statutory authority48 but also to the Federal Sentenc-
ing Guidelines. 9
Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Attorney General, to Kathleen Hawk
Sawyer, Director Federal Bureau of Prisons (Dec. 16, 2002), http://www.justice.gov/
dag/readingroom/imprisonment/htm [hereinafter Thompson Memo]. It has been suggest-
ed that the inquiry was in response to concerns that the Bureau of Prisons' placement
policy favored white-collar offenders. See Bussert et al., supra note 29, at 22-23. ("Thomp-
son added that '[alnother concern regarding BOP's CCC placement policies is its
potentially disproportionate, and inappropriately favorable, impact on so-called 'white-
collar' criminals,' concluding ... '[The] BOP's current placement practices run the risk of
eroding public confidence in the federal judicial system. White-collar criminals are no less
deserving of incarceration, if mandated by the Sentencing Guidelines, than conventional
offenders."').
46. Bureau of Prisons Practice of Placing in Community Confinement Certain
Offenders Who have Received Sentences of Imprisonment, Op. O.L.C., 2002 WL
31940146, at *5 (Dec. 13, 2002) [hereinafter OLC Memo] ("[S]ection 3621(b) gives
BOP broad discretion to designate as 'the place of the prisoner's imprisonment' 'any
available penal or correctional facility that meets minimum standards of health and habita-
bility ... [and] that [BOP] determines to be appropriate and suitable.' But the authority
to select the place of imprisonment is not the same as the authority to decide whether the
offender will be imprisoned.").
47. Id., 2002 WL 31940146, at *1.
48. Id. ("Your office [the Office of the Attorney General] has asked us to advise you
whether the BOP has general authority, either upon judicial recommendation or other-
wise, to place such an offender [low-risk, nonviolent] directly in community confinement
at the outset of his sentence or to transfer him from prison to community confinement
during the course of his sentence.... Community confinement does not constitute im-
prisonment for purposes of a sentencing order, and [the] BOP lacks clear general statutory
authority to place in conmunity confinement an offender who has been sentenced to a
term of imprisonment. [The] BOP's practice is therefore unlawful."). See also Bussert et al.,
supra note 29, at 22.
49. The Office of Legal Counsel determined that the Bureau of Prisons was not
permitted to place inmates into halfway houses because it would be a disharmonious in-
terpretation of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984. "Both [the] BOP's authority under
title 18 to implement sentences of imprisonment and the federal courts' sentencing au-
thority under the Guidelines were conferred by the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984. It is
therefore especially appropriate that they be construed to produce a harmonious interpre-
tation." OLC Memo, supra note 46. In reaching this conclusion, the Office of Legal
Counsel noted that "[Flederal courts violate the Guidelines if they order ... that an of-
fender sentenced to a ... simple sentence of imprisonment serve his sentence in
community confinement, or ... that an offender sentenced to a ... split sentence serve the
imprisonment portion of his sentence in community confinement." Id. This conclusion
was reached because under section 5C1.1 of the United State Sentencing Guidelines,
community confinement does not constitute imprisonment. See United States v. Adler, 52
E3d 20, 21 (2d Cir. 1995) (discussing the difference between imprisonment and commu-
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Specifically, the OLC asserted that the Bureau of Prisons' interpreta-
tion of § 3621(b) as an authorization of "unlimited placements" s0 in
halfway houses rendered the time limits provided in § 3624(c) "meaning-
less."'" Apart from the Bureau of Prisons' misguided statutory
interpretation, the OLC also noted that a halfway house did not qualify as
a place of imprisonment. 2 The language of § 3621(b), "any penal or cor-
rectional facility,' s3  appears to include halfway houses as proper
designations for an inmate. The OLC disagreed, noting that the question
of whether a halfway house was a place of imprisonment had not been
settled. 4 Based on these reasons, the OLC determined that the Bureau of
nity confinement); United States v. Swigert, 18 F3d 443, 445 (7th Cir. 1994) (stating that
the Sentencing Guidelines distinguish between imprisonment and community confine-
ment); United States v. Voda, 994 F2d 149, 152 (5th Cir. 1993) (stating that "the term
community corrections facility does not refer to jails .... "); United States v. Latimer, 991
F2d 1509, 1513 (9th Cir. 1993) (remarking that the division between imprisonment and
community confinement is made plain in section 5C 1.1).
50. See 69 Fed. Reg. 51213 (Aug. 18, 2004) (codified at 28 C.ER. S 570.20-21
(2009)).
51. Id. ("[The] OLC concluded that, if the Bureau designated an offender to serve a
term of imprisonment in a [Community Corrections Center], such designation unlawfully
altered the actual sentence imposed by the court, transforming a term of imprisonment
into a term of community confinement. [It] concluded that such alteration of a court-
imposed sentence exceeds the Bureau's authority to designate a place of imprisonment.
[The] OLC further opined that if section 3621(b) were interpreted to authorize unlinited
placements in CCCs, that would render meaningless the specific time limitations in 18
U.S.C. 3624(c).").
52. OLC Memo, supra note 46.
53. See Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 62 (1995) (referring to the FED. BUREAU OF
PRISONS, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, PROGRAM STATEMENT 7310.02, (Oct. 19, 1993) "interpreting
18 U.S.C. § 3624(c) to allow BOP to place sentenced prisoners in community corrections
centers, since such centers meet 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b)'s definition of a 'penal or correctional
facility' "); Ferguson v. Ashcroft, 248 F Supp. 2d 547, 566-67 (M.D. La. 2003) ("It is ...
obvious, without going far, that a community corrections center is a penal or correctional
institution .... [A] penal facility is a facility to which people are conmmitted as a form of
punishment .... [T]he court finds that CCCs are facilities for the purpose of punishment,
rehabilitation, or correction."); U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION & FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRIS-
ONS, JOINT REPORT TO CONGRESS: MAXIMUM UTILIZATION OF PRISONS RESOURCES, 9-10
(June 30, 1994); Statutory Authority to Contract With the Private Sector for Secure Fa-
cilities, 16 Op. O.L.C. 65, 69, 1992 WL 479543, at **3 (Mar. 25, 1992) ("[T]here is
evidence in the legislative history of section 3621(b) that at least after a 1965 amendment
Congress specifically anticipated that [the] BOP would designate privately operated facili-
ties as places of incarceration. In 1965 Congress amended the designation provision to
allow designation of a 'facility'. . .The word 'facility' was defined to 'include a residential
community center.' ") (citation omitted).
54. Goldings v. Winn, 383 E3d 17, 32 (1st Cir. 2004) (noting that a prior Office of
the Legal Counsel opinion had not addressed whether a CCC is a 'place of... imprison-
ment') (citing OLC Memo, supra note 46). But see Goldings, 383 E3d at 28 ("[T]he OLC's
interpretation of'place of imprisonment' as exclusive of CCCs relied primarily on a line
of cases in which courts have held that confinement in a CCC is not imprisonment as that
term is used in 5C1.1 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines, which governs the
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Prisons' policy was unlawful, and recommended a new rule, which the
Department ofJustice ("DOJ") readily adopted."5
1.The 2002 Policy
The DOJ informed the Bureau of Prisons that it needed to "take all
steps necessary to ensure that its sentencing placement decisions are in full
compliance with the governing law."5 6 More importantly, the DOJ in-
formed the Bureau of Prisons that its policy gave the perception that
white-collar offenders were receiving preferential treatment either by
being transferred early during their imprisonment" or by being placed
directly in halfway houses. Both practices were considered to be in direct
conflict with a significant purpose of the Sentencing Guidelines, i.e., the
removal of bias from federal sentencing practices.18 "On this basis, it was
kinds of sentences that may be imposed by courts for offenders within Zone C or D of
the Guidelines. Although we recently joined this line of authority, we cautioned that 'our
interpretation of imprisonment does not necessarily apply to provisions [of the Sentencing
Guidelines] other than 5 5C1 1.' ... [T]o the extent that § 3621(b) conflicts with a section
of the Sentencing Guidelines, the Guidelines must yield. ... [The Guidelines] do not ad-
dress the BOP's use of its discretion as the custodian of federal prisoners to designate the
appropriate place of imprisonment.") (citations onitted).
55. 69 Fed. Reg. 51213 (Aug. 18, 2004) (codified at 28 C.FR. § 570.20-.21 (2008)
("By memorandum dated December 16, 2002, the Deputy Attorney General adopted the
OLC memorandum's analysis and directed the Bureau to conform its designation policy
accordingly.").
56. Thompson Memo, supra note 45. In addition to the prospective change in poli-
cy, the Department ofJustice also required the Bureau of Prisons to apply the new policy
retroactively and return all inmates that had been transferred to halfway houses back to
federal facilities. "In addition, [the] BOP should transfer to an actual prison facility all
federal offenders currently residing in a [Community Corrections Center] who, as of to-
day [December 16, 2002], have more than 150 days remaining on the imprisonment
component of their sentence." Id.
57. Id. ("Another concern regarding Bureau of Prisons' CCC placement policies is
its potentially disproportionate, and inappropriately favorable, impact on so-called 'white
collar' criminals."). See also Borges, supra note 31, at 142-43 ("The goal of the new policy
was to help secure stricter penalties for white-collar offenders and to quash criticism that
the administration had been soft on corporate criminals."). But see Todd A. Bussert,
NACDL Helps Members Fight Changes in Bureau of Prisons Policy, CHAMPION, Mar. 2003, at
8, 8. Eric Lichtblau, Criticism of Sentencing Plan For White-Collar Criminals, N.Y TIMES, Dec.
26, 2002, at C2 ("The officials said that halfway houses have been used for nonviolent
offenders for at least 20 years. 'The point is that it's not just white-collar offenders who
have benefited from this longstanding practice,' said Judy Garrett, a spokeswoman for the
bureau. 'There are a lot of drug offenders, single moms and ordinary folks who aren't
wealthy people who have benefited from this. It's not just Enron types."').
58. OLC Memo, supra note 46 ("The Sentencing Guidelines were promulgated by
the U.S. Sentencing Comnuission pursuant to the mandate of the Sentencing Reform Act
of 1984, which sought to eliminate arbitrary discrepancies in federal sentencing."); Larry
M. Fehr, Statement Before the United States Sentencing Cormmfission, Northwest Re-
gional Hearing: The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984: 25 Years Later (May 28, 2009),
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concluded that this class of offenders was given more lenient treatment
than other offenders because of their socioeconomic status.
' 9
In 2002, the Bureau of Prisons responded. It adopted a new rule
(hereinafter the 2002 Rule) that incorporated three substantive changes to
its existing open transfer policy.6° First, the Bureau of Prisons maintained
that an inmate would not be transferred to a halfway house until he had
reached the final ten percent of his term of imprisonment. 61 Second, it
limited the maximum amount of time that an inmate could spend in a
halfway house to six months.62 Finally, it ended the practice of honoring
direct judicial placement recommendations.63
The response to the 2002 Rule was mixed.64 For example, some
courts, practitioners, and members of the public were outraged because
they viewed the 2002 Rule as an encroachment upon the sentencing
practices of federal judges. 5 Indeed, the new Rule spawned a flurry of
legal challenges by those who maintained that the it disrupted the
longstanding practices of early transfers and direct judicial placements. 66
available at http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative andPublicAffairs/Public-Hearingsand_
Meetings/20090527-28/Fehrtestimony.pdf (stating that a purpose of the Sentencing
Reform Act embodied in the guidelines was to decrease the disparity in sentencing based
upon the nature and type of the offense).
59. Thompson Memo, supra note 45.
60. There was some debate as to whether the 2002 Rule was a legislative rule or an
interpretive one. Courts have decided that the 2002 Rule was a legislative rule and not
interpretive. See Monahan v. Winn, 276 E Supp. 2d 196, 215 (1st Cir. 2003) ("This is no
mere effort at interpretive guidance but rather a rulemaking exercise designed to reshape
the scope of a statutory provision through an administrative statement of lawmaking.")
(citation omitted); id. at 215 n.14 ("It is of no consequence that the BOP's prior conclu-
sion that it could place offenders directly into community confinement ... was not a
'legislative' rule adopted through notice and comment. The prior practice did not 'bind'
anybody and simply announced the manner in which the BOP intended to exercise dis-
cretion under its statutory duty of designating offenders to facilities.... The new rule ...
purports to be legally binding and dramatically curtails the BOP's discretion in a way that
is not obvious in the law itself."); see also Ashkenazi v. Att'y Gen. of the United States, 246
E Supp. 2d 1, 6 n.9 (D.D.C. 2003) ("[I]rrespective of the BOP's characterization of its
policy, the new policy has the force of law and is not merely interpretive .... The new rule
is ... not flexible and does not permit BOP to exercise any discretion.").
61. Borges, supra note 31, at 175;Yana Dobkin, Note, Cabining the Discretion of the
Federal Bureau of Prisons and the Federal Courts: Interpretive Rules, Statutory Interpretation, and
the Debate over Community Confinement Centers, 91 CORNETLL L. REV. 171, 184 (2005).
62. Borges, supra note 31, at 175; Dobkin, supra note 61, at 184.
63. Borges, supra note 31, at 175.
64. 69 Fed. Reg. 51213 (Aug. 18, 2004) (codified at 28 C.ER. § 570 (2008)). ("The
Bureau's change was challenged in the Federal courts. District courts addressing the legali-
ty of the Bureau's changed policy have been sharply divided.").
65. Dobkin, supra note 61, at 174-75.
66. Bussert et al., supra note 29, at 20 ("Prisoners, lawyers, and judges reacted quick-
ly to the news that BOP would not honor judicial recommendations for halfway house
placements. BOP found itself defending a raft of lawsuits and attending resentencings.").
For courts that were dissatisfied with the prohibition against accepting direct judicial
SPRING 2011]
HeinOnline  -- 16 Mich. J. Race & L. 249 2010-2011
Michigan Journal of Race & Law
However, not all members of the judiciary viewed the 2002 Rule with
disfavor. A number of courts concluded that the 2002 Rule was a proper
exercise of agency discretion, reiterating the OLC's position that a halfway
house was not a place of imprisonment. 67 Federal inmates challenged the
new rule on the ground that the Bureau of Prisons' interpretation of its
two guiding statutes was erroneous.
6s
a. Challenging the 2002 Rule
The 2002 Rule changed the Bureau of Prisons' practice of transfer-
ring an inmate to a halfway house early during his sentence. For Morris
Goldings, who was convicted of tax fraud and sentenced to thirty-six
months, this change 'disturbed a well-established practice. 69 Approximately
three months into his sentence, the 2002 Rule was adopted 70 changing his
date of eligibility for transfer to a halfway house and reducing the length
of time that he could spend in a halfway house from six to three and a
half months. Goldings challenged the 2002 Rule on several grounds, most
importantly that it was an erroneous interpretation of % 3621(b) and
3624(c).7"
The respondents72 first argued that a halfway house was not a place
of imprisonment under § 3621(b), and therefore that the Bureau of Pris-
ons' statutory discretion did not extend to placing an inmate in a halfway
house "either at the outset or at the end of [a] prisoner's term. 7 3 Second,
they claimed that § 3624(c) alone governed an inmate's halfway house
placement.74 Finally, the Bureau of Prisons contended that the 2002 Rule
placements, see Monahan v.Winn, 276 E Supp. 2d 196, 199-200 (1st Cir. 2003); lacaboni v.
United States, 251 F Supp. 2d 1015, 1018 (D. Mass. 2003); Byrd v. Moore, 252 E Supp. 2d
293 (WD. N.C. 2003).
67. See, e.g., Cohn v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 302 E Supp. 2d 267, 272 (S.D.N.Y
2004) ("[TIhe Bureau of Prisons' interpretation that a [Community Corrections Center] is
not a place of imprisonment, and therefore not subject [to] Congress' general grant of
discretion to the Bureau of Prisons under § 3621(b), is at a minimum a permissible inter-
pretation of the statute."); Benton v.Ashcroft, 273 F Supp. 2d 1139,1141 (S.D. Cal. 2003).
68. See, e.g., Goldings v.Winn, 383 F3d 17, 20, 24 (1st Cir. 2004) (challenging the
application of the 2002 Rule as an Ex Post Facto violation); Elwood v.Jeter, 386 F3d 842,
847 (8th Cir. 2004); Monahan, 276 F Supp. 2d at 204; Moore, 252 E Supp. 2d 299; lacaboni,
251 F Supp. 2d at 1015.
69. Goldings, 383 F3d at 19.
70. Id. at 20.
71. Id. at 20-21 (noting that Goldings also challenged the new rule on the grounds
that it violated the Administrative Procedure Act because it was adopted without notice
and conmment, as well as the Ex Post Facto clause and Due Process clauses of the United
States Constitution because of its retroactive application).
72. The defendants in this case were the warden of the prison where Goldings was
housed and Attorney General John Ashcroft. Id. at 17.
73. Id. at 22.
74. Id.
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was an interpretive one, entitling it to an appropriate level of deference
and placing it beyond judicial review. 5
The district court dismissed the complaint, distinguishing it from
other challenges to the 2002 Rule. The court noted that those cases fo-
cused on the practice of direct judicial placements and not the early
transfers of an inmate. 6 On appeal, the First Circuit disagreed with the
lower court, concluding that it incorrectly relied on the respondents'
claim that § 3624(c) was relevant while § 3621(b) was not."
According to the First Circuit, the Bureau of Prisons' interpretation
rewrote the "unambiguous language of § 3621(b),"'' 8 which clearly gives
the agency the discretion to designate an inmate's place of imprisonment
to "any penal or correctional facility ' 9 In making this determination, the
First Circuit analyzed each statute under Chevron.80
Reviewing the plain language of § 3624(c), the First Circuit deter-
mined that the statute contained a qualified "affirmative obligation" that
required the Bureau of Prisons to provide reentry assistance to each
inmate.8 Section 3624(c) "operates as a legislative directive focusing on
the development of conditions to facilitate an inmate's adjustment to free
society, whatever the institution of pre-release confinement."87 This di-
rective permitted the Bureau of Prisons to place an inmate in a halfway
house earlier in his sentence if warranted.83 After determining that
§ 3624(c) did not bar an inmate's early transfer, the First Circuit conclud-
ed that the Bureau of Prisons had the discretion to effectuate such trans-
transfers under § 3621(b). 84
The first sentence of § 3621(b) required the Bureau of Prisons to
designate the place of imprisonment,85 which is statutorily defined as "any
75. Monahan v.Winn, 276 F Supp. 2d 196, 214 (1st Cir. 2003) ("Legislative rules are
shaped through notice and comment but thereafter are entitled to deference in the courts
under the principles of [Chevron]. Interpretative rules ... are subject to multiple layers of
review in agency adjudication and much more expansive review in the courts.")(citations
omitted). See also United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001) (confirming that
Chevron deference does not apply to non-legislative rules).
76. Goldings, 383 E3d at 22 (noting the District Court distinguished two other cases
decided in the district which criticized application of the BOP policy on the ground that
those cases involved assignments to a CCC at the beginning of a defendant's sentence and
were governed by 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b) and 3625. In contrast, Goldings involves transfer to
a CCC at the end of the sentence, and is accordingly governed by 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c)).
77. Id. at 22. On appeal, the defendants dropped this argument.
78. Id. at 23.
79. Id. at 25.
80. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
81. Goldings, 383 E3d at 23.
82. Id. (citing Prows v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 981 F2d 466, 470 (10th Cir. 1992)).
83. Id. at 24.
84. Id. at 25.
85. Id.
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available penal or correctional facility,"'86 for those who have been com-
mitted to its custody.8" The First Circuit explained that, because a halfway
house satisfies this open-ended definition of what constitutes a place of
imprisonment, the Bureau of Prisons was allowed to place an inmate in
such a facility "prior to the lesser of the last six months or ten percent of
his term of imprisonment."88
The First Circuit held that the Bureau of Prisons was authorized to
transfer an inmate at any time during his sentence and that the transfer
was not restricted to the time limits contained in § 3624(c).89 Other chal-
lenges focused on the 2002 Rules prohibiting direct judicial placements.
b. Challenging the Denial of Direct Judicial Placements
In Iacaboni v. United States,90 two of the petitioners were serving sen-
tences in a halfway house while another was waiting to be sentenced.9'
86. Id. (citing United States v. King, 338 E3d 794, 798 (7th Cir. 2003) ("Under 18
U.S.C. § 3621(b), the BOP is authorized to house a prisoner ... anywhere it deems ap-
propriate."); Prows, 981 E2d at 469 n.3 ("Under 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b), the Bureau of
Prisons ... may direct confinement in any available facility and may transfer a prisoner
from one facility to another at any time.")).
87. 18 U.S.C. § 3621(a) (2010) ("A person who has been sentenced to a term of
imprisonment ... shall be commnitted to the custody of the Bureau of Prisons .... ); id.
5 3621(b) ("The Bureau of Prisons shall designate the place of the prisoner's imprison-
ment.").
88. Goldings, 383 F3d at 26. See also Memorandum In Support ofAmended Petition
for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 11, Pierce v. Thomas, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55696 (D. Or.
July 1, 2009) (No. 08-705MA) [hereinafter Memorandum in Support of Amended Peti-
tion] ("Overwhelmingly, district courts granted relief, rejecting the OLC's erroneous
interpretation of § 3621(b) ... The courts held that, as a matter of statutory construction,
the plain language of § 3621(b) authorized placement and transfer of offenders to CCCs
at any time during their terms of imprisonment.").
89. Goldings, 383 F3d at 29.
90. lacaboni v. United States, 251 F Supp. 2d 1015 (D. Mass. 2003).
91. Id. at 1017 ("In making the recommendations for community confinement, the
court relied upon the definition of the Bureau of Prisons' scope of discretion as set forth
in § 3621(b). It also relied upon explicit instructions, regularly provided to judges in vari-
ous formats, to the effect that community confinement is a proper sentencing option for
offenders serving relatively modest terms of imprisonment. Finally, the court had in mind
the fact that recommendations to community confinement have been made in thousands
of cases by hundreds ofjudges continuously since at least 1965, and in nearly all instances
accepted by the Bureau of Prisons."); see also Ferguson v. Ashcroft, 248 E Supp. 2d 547, 572
(M.D. La. 2003) ("[B]oth the [Office of Legal Counsel] ... and [the] Government con-
clude that the section [3624(c)] demands that the Bureau never place anyone sentenced to
a term of imprisonment of any kind to a [Conmmunity Corrections Center] ... for more
than ten percent of her term of imprisonment and, even then, never for more than six
months ... This portion of the Government's rationale is almost worth preserving for the
marvelous irony it foists upon the world ... [T]the Govermnent would have the court
read this section as a stiff curb on the Bureau's ability to make such placements at all. The
court finds this reading to be implausible.").
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When the 2002 Rule was adopted, the Bureau of Prisons rescinded the
halfway house placement of the two inmates who had been transferred
and denied placement to the third. The inmates filed a petition claiming
that the Bureau of Prisons' new policy was unlawfu1. 92 The court, review-
ing the 2002 Rule under Chevron, agreed with the petitioners. 3
The court first looked at the statutory text.94 It found that the stat-
ute was clear and unambiguous, and that the Bureau of Prisons had
exceeded its statutorily granted discretion. 9 In addition to finding that
the Bureau of Prisons ignored its statutory mandate, the court looked at
the larger societal policy that the open transfer policy served and consid-
ered the benefits of placing an inmate in a halfway house for the offender,
the offender's family, and society at large.96
According to the court, placement in a halfway house provided the
inmate with an opportunity to maintain contact with his family.97 This was
important because such contact has been identified as a key factor not only
in reducing recidivism for the inmate, but also for allowing the inmate to
continue to take care of dependent family members and potentially helping
to prevent his children from offending.99 Moreover, the court recognized
the economic benefit that arises from halfway house placement. An inmate
92. lacaboni, 251 E Supp. 2d at 1017.
93. Id. at 1038-43 (holding that that the Bureau of Prisons' failure to allow for no-
tice and comment and the retroactive application of the policy change are also in error).
94. Id. at 1024-26.
95. Id. at 1037-38 ("It has defined the scope of its discretion, as a matter of law, in a
manner that is dramatically inconsistent with the plain language of the controlling statute.This is
emphatically not a situation where the BOP has merely announced how it will, as a matter of
policy, exercise its discretion by denying a designation. On the contrary, in two of the cases
before the court, it has already exercised its discretion, but reversed course based on an incorrect
assessment of the scope of its authority.The distinction is terribly important.The BOP may use
its discretion in various ways; it may not, through an erroneous interpretation of its powers,
attempt to divest itself of the discretion Congress has given it.")(emphasis added).
96. Id. at 1022-23 ("[F]or the defendant ... [i]mprisonment in a halfway house
usually means the inmate will be residing closer to his or her home community, can con-
tinue employment outside the facility during the day, and can maintain ties with
vulnerable family members, such as children or ailing parents .... When one remembers
that persons placed in conmmunity corrections are generally minor offenders, with minimal
or no criminal records, and no history of violence, the decision to entirely eliminate
community corrections as an optional imprisonment designation becomes even more
astonishing."); see also JEREMY TRAvis, BUT THEY ALL COME BACK: FACING THE CHALLENGES
OF PRISONER REENTRY ch. 6 (2005).
97. lacaboni, 251 F Supp. 2d at 1022-23; see also TRAvis, supra note 96, at ch. 6.
98. See TRAviS, supra note 96, at ch. 6; JOAN PETERSILIA, WHEN PRISONERS COME
HOME: PAROLE AND PISONER REENTRY 141-46 (2003); Stephanie J. Millet, Note, The Age
of Criminal Responsibility in an Era of Violence: Has Great Britain Set a New International
Standard?, 28 VAND.J.TRANsNAT'L L. 295, 332 n.241 (1995) ("Most studies show that fami-
ly contact helps to reduce recidivism rates.").
99. See lacaboni, 251 F Supp. 2d at 1022-23; TRAvis, supra note 96, at ch. 6; PETER-
SILIA, supra note 98, at 141-46.
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placed in such a facility can continue to provide financial support to his
family, thereby reducing the likelihood of future econonic burden on the
state and forestalling the possibility of the inmate's children being placed in
foster care.'- Apart from the benefits that accrue to the inmate and his
family, society also reaps the rewards of halfway house placement. Because
an inmate is required to work while in a halfway house, incarceration costs
are reduced and taxpayers save money."" Based upon these reasons, the
court determined that the 2002 Rule was misguided.
In response to these challenges, the Bureau of Prisons, pursuant to
its rulemaking authority, adopted a new rule10 2 that was substantively
identical to the 2002 Rule. '03
2.The 2005 Rule-A Categorical Exercise of Discretion
The Bureau of Prisons proposed an interim rule in 2005 that lim-
ited an inmate's halfway house placement to the final ten percent of his
sentence, not to exceed a maximum of six months.' In response to earli-
er court decisions, the Bureau of Prisons promulgated this new rule as a
categorical exercise of discretion (hereinafter the categorical exercise of
discretion rule or 2005 Rule).'05 Prior to it becoming final, the Bureau of
100. lacaboni, 251 E Supp. 2d at 1022-23 ("For innocent third parties, particularly
children, the economic and emotional devastation caused by a parent's distant incarcera-
tion can be, to some extent, palliated. With the inmate employed, families can stay off wel-
welfare; with a parent available, children can avoid placement in foster homes.").
101. Id. ("[T]he Number One beneficiary of community corrections is the American
Taxpayer, since the cost of community confinement, when it serves the interests ofjustice,
is far less than the price tag on more conventional forms of imprisonment.").
102. Fults v. Sanders, 442 E3d 1088, 1090 (8th Cir. 2006) ("In February 2005, in
response to Elwood and a similar decision from the First Circuit, Goldings v. Winn, ... the
BOP created new regulations governing the placement of inmates in CCCs.These regula-
tions state that the BOP was engaging in a 'categorical exercise of discretion' and choosing
to 'designate inmates to [CCC] confinement only ... during the last ten percent of the
prison sentence being served, not to exceed six months.'") (citations omitted). See also
Levine v. Apker, 455 E3d 71 (2d Cir. 2006) (noting that the Bureau of Prisons promulgat-
ed the 2005 Rule in response to legal challenges to the 2002 Policy).
103. 69 Fed. Reg. 51213 (Aug. 18, 2004) (codified at 28 C.ER. 5 570 (2008)). ("The
proposed rules would, as a matter of policy, limit the amount of time that inmates may
spend in community confinement (including Community Corrections Centers (CCCs)
and home confinement) to the last ten percent of the prison sentence being served, not to
exceed six months .... The Bureau announces these rules as a categorical exercise of dis-
cretion under 18 U.S.C. 3621(b).").
104. Id. (providing that a longer placement will be granted for certain statutory pro-
grams, such as substance abuse treatment. "The only exceptions to this policy are for
inmates in specific statutorily-created programs that authorize greater periods of conmu-
nity confinement (for example, the residential substance abuse treatment program (18
U.S.C. 3621(e)(2)(A)) or the shock incarceration program (18 U.S.C. 4046(c)).").
105. Muniz v. Sabol, 517 F3d 29, 36 (1st Cir. 2008); Wedelstedt v. Wiley, 477 F3d
1160, 1167 (10th Cir. 2007); Levine v.Apker, 455 F3d 71, 83 (2d Cir. 2006) ("The Febru-
[VOL. 16:235
HeinOnline  -- 16 Mich. J. Race & L. 254 2010-2011
Impeding Reentry
Prisons submitted the proposed rule for public notice and comment as
required by the Administrative Procedure Act."°6
None of the public comments that were submitted, many of which
questioned both procedural and substantive elements of the rule, endorsed
the Bureau of Prisons' prohibition against direct judicial placements or
the ten percent/six-month time limits on when an inmate was eligible to
be transferred. More importantly, the comments challenged the Bureau of
Prisons' categorical exercise of discretion as ignoring the statutory man-
date of§ 3621(b) requiring an individualized assessment of each inmate.
Criticism of the 2005 Rule ranged from a lack of process in its
promulgation to its impact on inmates and society at large. For example,
some denounced the 2005 Rule because the agency had failed to hold
"public hearings.""0 7 Others claimed that the 2005 Rule would have an
"unreasonable economic impact" on both the private sector'018 and the
government.' °9 Others suggested that the prescribed amount of time that
federal inmates were able to spend in a halfway house was insufficient to
provide an inmate with the skills needed to reenter society successfully."'
Although the Bureau of Prisons acknowledged these concerns,"' it did
not change the proposed rule that it eventually adopted as its final rule."2
Once again, the Bureau of Prisons was challenged on the grounds that it
violated its statutory mandate under § 3621(b). And once more, the result
was a circuit split." 3
ary 2005 Rule at issue in this case, published at 28 CER. 5 570.20 and § 570.21, was
announced as 'a categorical exercise of discretion under 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b).' As the agen-
cy explained when it proposed the rule: 'Because various courts have held that the Bureau
has discretion under 18 U.S.C. S 3621(b) to place offenders sentenced to a term of im-
prisonment in CCCs, the Bureau considers it prudent to determine how to exercise such
discretion.' ");Woodall v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 432 E3d 235, 240 (3d Cir. 2005).
106. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2011).
107. Community Confinement, 70 Fed. Reg. 1659 (Jan. 10, 2005) (codified at 28
C.F.R. pt. 570) (2008) ("Requests to hold a public hearing. Thirteen commenters re-
quested the Bureau to hold a public hearing on the rule.").
108. Id. ("The rule has an unreasonable economic impact. Several commenters com-
plained, both generally and specifically with regard to their particular community
corrections business (CCCs), that the rule had an unfair economic impact ... ").
109. Id. ("The rule will increase Bureau costs by increasing the number of inmates
housed in penal facilities.").
110. Id. ("The rule does not allow for inmates to have enough time to reintegrate
into the community before release. Several commenters [sic] raised this concern.").
111. Id.
112. 70 Fed. Reg. 1659 (Jan. 10, 2005) (codified at 28 C.ER. pt. 570 (2008)) ("The
Bureau published proposed rules on this subject on August 18, 2004 (69 FR 51213). In
the proposed rule document, we explained that these rules would, as a matter of policy,
limit the amount of time that inmates may spend in community confinement (including
Community Corrections Centers (CCCs) and home confinement) to the last ten percent
of the prison sentence being served, not to exceed six months.").
113. In stark contrast to the First Circuit Court of Appeals, the Third, Eighth and
Tenth circuits found that the Bureau of Prisons' actions constituted an impermissible
SNN 2011]
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3. Challenging the 2005 Rule
a. Impermissible Exercise of Discretion
In Woodall v. Federal Bureau of Prisons,"' the Third Circuit addressed
the question of whether the Bureau of Prisons' 2005 Rule was a proper
exercise of the agency's discretion."' The Third Circuit concluded that it
was not."6
Woodall was initially sentenced to thirty-seven months for alien
smuggling."7 After he pled guilty to an escape charge, the court added an
additional six months to his sentence."' Woodall was rearrested shortly
after being released for possession of a controlled substance."' At his sen-
tencing, Woodall asserted that his re-arrest was the direct result of being
released back into society with "no money, no identification and no assets,
into a community where he had no ties whatsoever."'2 ° He testified that
prior to being released, his requests to various agencies for assistance were
denied, thus contributing to his failure to reenter society without recidi-
vating.
The sentencing court, acknowledging the Bureau of Prisons' failure,
amended Woodall's sentence and recommended that he be placed directly
exercise of discretion. Compare Wedelstedt v.Wiley, 477 E3d 1160 (10th Cir. 2007), Fults v.
Sanders, 442 E3d 1088 (8th Cir. 2006), and Woodall v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 432 F3d
235 (3d Cir. 2005), with Muniz v. Sabol, 517 F3d 29 (1st Cir. 2008). See generally Codag-
none, supra note 30.
At the district court level, courts have been divided over whether the Bureau of
Prisons can limit the placement of inmates to the lesser of ten percent of the sentence or
six months. For cases upholding the policy, see, e.g., Cohn v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 302 F.
Supp. 2d 267 (S.D.N.Y 2004); Benton v. Ashcroft, 273 E Supp. 2d 1139 (S.D. Cal. 2003).
For cases rejecting the policy, see, e.g., Monahan v. Winn, 276 E Supp. 2d 196 (1st Cir.
2003)); lacaboni v. United States, 251 F Supp. 2d 1015 (D. Mass. 2003); Byrd v. Moore, 252
E Supp. 2d (WD. N.C. 2003).
114. See Woodall, 432 E3d 235.
115. The case is instructive not only because it represents the type of challenges to
the 2005 Rule but because it also highlights the importance of reentry prograrmning in
assisting inmates to be successful upon release and in preventing recidivism.
116. Woodall, 432 F.3d at 246 ("The Senate report [S. REP. No. 98-225 (1983),
reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3324-25] supports the proposition that Congress
did not intend to limit the BOP's overall placement discretion to 'designate the place of
[a] prisoner's imprisonment.' However, it is also clear that, before exercising that discre-
tion, the BOP 'should consider' each of the § 3621 factors. Because the 2005 regulations
do not allow the BOP to consider the factors enumerated in § 3621, they are invalid.").




121. Id. at 238 n.1.
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in a halfway house. 122 With the recent adoption of the 2005 Rule, the Bu-
reau of Prisons restricted his halfway house eligibility and length of stay
until the final ten percent of his sentence or six months, whichever was
less. 2 1 Challenging the 2005 Rule, Woodall claimed that the Bureau of
Prisons was impermissibly ignoring the sentencing court's recommenda-
tions,12 4 thus failing to give effect to the five factors in § 3621(b). The
Bureau of Prisons responded that it was entitled to judicial deference' 2s
under Lopez. 2 6 The agency argued further that, although it considered the
five factors when it promulgated the 2005 Rule,27 it was not required to
adhere to the factors because they were not mandatory.'28 Applying Chev-
ron, the Third Circuit disagreed, concluding that Lopez was not
controlling.'
21
In Lopez, the Court considered whether the Bureau of Prisons' in-
terpretation of § 3621(e)'30 was valid. Under that section, which focuses
on substance abuse treatment, the agency had the discretion to reduce the
period of incarceration for an inmate who successfully completed a sub-
stance abuse program, "' provided that the inmate had not been convicted
of a violent offense. 32 In its interpretation of the statute, the Bureau of
Prisons excluded all inmates who were convicted of firearm possession.
The Supreme Court held in Lopez that this interpretation was a
proper exercise of discretion because there was no clear legislative di-
rective defining the phrase "convicted of a nonviolent offense. 13 3 The
Court held that while Congress authorized the Bureau of Prisons to re-
duce an inmate's sentence upon the completion of a substance abuse
treatment program, Congress did not identify the specific "circumstance
in which the Bureau either must grant the reduction, or is forbidden to
do so." 1 34 Therefore, the Third Circuit reasoned that in Lopez, Congress
was concerned about releasing violent inmates early and decided to allow
122. Id. at 238 ("The Assistant United States Attorney on the case 'urged' that place-
nient.").
123. Id. For Woodall, that amounted to a maximum of eleven weeks.
124. Id. at 238-39.
125. Id. at 244.
126. Lopez v. Davis, 531 U.S. 230, 244 (2001) (concluding that the Bureau of Prisons
may "categorically exclude prisoners from substance abuse treatment programs based on
their preconviction conduct."); see also Stephanie Marino, Lopez v. Davis: Has the Bureau of
Prisons Exceeded its Discretionary Power over Early Release Programs Enacted by Congress?, 49
WAYNE L. REv. 1007 (2003).
127. Woodall, 432 F.3d at 249.
128. Id. at 244.
129. Id. at 246.
130. 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e) (2010).
131. Id. § 3621(e)(2)(B).
132. Id.
133. Lopez v. Davis, 531 U.S. 230, 242 (2001).
134. Id.
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the Bureau of Prisons to clarify the provision."' 3 The Third Circuit ex-
plained further that in Lopez, the Bureau of Prisons' interpretation
"reflect[s] [Congress'] concern and seem[s] to provide a way to advance
it.' 1 36 Thus, the Bureau of Prisons was entitled to judicial deference, and all
that remained for the Court was to assess whether the Bureau of Prisons'
interpretation was a reasonable one, which the Court found it to be.'
37
According to the Third Circuit, the Court's reasoning in Lopez did not
apply to 3621(b) because the 2005 Rule did not "further the factors in
the BOP's enabling statute-[it] reject[ed] them."'13 8
Congress provided the Bureau of Prisons with a set of factors in
3621(b) to use when determining an inmate's place of imprisonment.131
While these factors required the Bureau of Prisons to conduct an indi-
vidualized assessment of each inmate, § 3621(e)(2)(B)(the statute at issue
in Lopez) did not.4 ° When a statute lacks clarity, as was the case in Lopez,
the Bureau of Prisons is permitted to provide its interpretation of the
statute. The guiding statute for halfway house placement, unlike
§ 3621(e)(2), was not ambiguous. The Third Circuit concluded that the
Bureau of Prisons' actions directly contravened the express statutory lan-
guage of § 3621(b), and therefore that the 2005 Rule was not entitled to
judicial deference.The court added that the agency's assertion that the five
factors were considered prior to the promulgation of the 2005 Rule was
further proof that the Bureau of Prisons' actions were misguided and that
the court should not defer to the agency's judgment.
Congress enumerated the five factors in § 3621(b) with the express
purpose of requiring the Bureau of Prisons to consider them prior to des-
ignating an inmate's place of imprisonment. The Third Circuit concluded
that the Bureau of Prisons' argument, that the five factors were considered
at the time the rule was promulgated, was without merit because it disre-
garded the requirement for an individualized assessment. According to the
court,
The 2005 regulations do not allow the [Bureau of Prisons] to
consider the nature and circumstances of an inmate's offense
... [the] history and pertinent characteristics, or ... any state-
ment by the sentencing court concerning a placement
recommendation and the purposes for the sentence.... The
regulations are invalid because the [Bureau of Prisons] may not
categorically remove its ability to consider the explicit factors
135. Woodall v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 432 F3d 235,246 (3d Cir. 2005).
136. Id.
137. Lopez, 531 U.S. at 242.
138. Woodall, 432 F3d at 246.
139. Id. at 247.
140. Id.
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set forth by Congress in § 3621(b) for making placement and
transfer determinations. 4 '
The Bureau of Prisons' reliance upon a categorical exercise of discre-
tion as the basis for promulgating the 2005 Rule4 2 was erroneous. By
collapsing all five factors into one rule, the Bureau of Prisons created a
standardized placement policy. In other words, the agency made a one-size-
fits-all approach to determine halfway house eligibility and the length of
placement, thereby disregarding the five factors enumerated in § 3621(b).
The Bureau of Prisons therefore negated the statutorily mandated individu-
alized assessment when it proclaimed that it properly engaged in a
categorical exercise of discretion.'43 Under § 3621(b), the Third Circuit not-
ed that the Bureau of Prisons must consider the "particular circumstances of
individual inmates," and that the Bureau of Prisons cannot accomplish such
an assessment with a "blanket rule.""' Lastly, the court found that the re-
quirement to consider the five factors was not discretionary 4
According to Woodall, the Bureau of Prisons is allowed to consider
additional factors when making its placement determination. It is not
permitted, however, to ignore the five factors.'46 The Bureau of Prisons
may elect or refuse to transfer an inmate to a halfway house, relying upon
other factors that are not listed, but it cannot do so without contemplat-
ing at the very least the five factors in § 3621(b). The Third Circuit
explained that these factors are to be referenced whenever an inmate is
placed, including placement into a halfway house. 47 The First Circuit did
not agree, drawing the opposite conclusion.
b. Permissible Exercise of Discretion
In Muniz v. Sabol,148 the First Circuit, also applying Chevron, found
that the 2005 Rule was a valid exercise of the Bureau of Prisons' discre-
tion.'49
141. Id. at 244; but see id. at 251 (Fuentes, J., dissenting); Fults v. Sanders, 442 F3d
1088 (8th Cir. 2006) (RileyJ, dissenting).
142. Woodall, 432 E3d at 244; Fults, 442 F.3d at 1089-90.
143. Woodall, 432 E3d at 246-47.
144. Id. at 248.
145. Id. at 246-47.
146. Id. at 248-49.
147. Id. at 248.
148. Muniz v. Sabol, 517 F3d 29, 35 (emphasis in original) (1st Cir. 2008) ("Applying
Lopez, we discern no clear expression of congressional intent to foreclose rulemaking. As
an initial matter, the transfer provision in § 3621(b) leaves more to the BOP's discretion
than the assignment provision. But moreover, even the assignment provision lacks a clear
expression of congressional intent to forbid rulemaking that assists BOP in its individual-
ized determinations.")
149. Id. at 34-36. See also Miller v.Whitehead, 527 E3d 752,757 (8th Cir. 2008).
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Beginning with the plain language of the statute, the First Circuit
noted that there is no legislative guidance offered to determine whether
the Bureau of Prisons was entitled to use a categorical exercise of discre-
tion to promulgate a rule.' In the absence of clear congressional intent,
the First Circuit found that the Bureau of Prisons was entitled to judicial
deference. Since it was entitled to deference, the Bureau of Prisons' inter-
pretation of § 3621(b) was reasonable because the rule was "promulgated
with explicit reference to some of the five factors.""'' According to the
First Circuit, because the five factors were considered when the rule was
crafted, the Bureau of Prisons was acting in accord with § 3621(b), which
gave it the discretion to designate an inmate's place of imprisonment. 2
Apart from the statutory text, the First Circuit also credited the Bureau of
Prisons' effort at transparency."3
The court in Muniz acknowledged that the Bureau of Prisons has
the discretion to determine an inmate's place of imprisonment. The First
Circuit concluded that, in using its discretion, the Bureau of Prisons could
claim that it conducted an individualized assessment of each inmate and
found that no offender was eligible to be placed in a halfway house in
excess of the ten percent/six-month time limit. The agency could effec-
tively mask its policy of limiting placement by paying lip service to the
§ 3621(b) factors without actually engaging in an individualized assess-
ment. The First Circuit noted that, instead of forcing the Bureau of
Prisons to engage in this type of subterfuge by going through the motions
and then denying placement, it was better to know at the outset that the
agency exercised its categorical discretion to designate an inmate's place-
ment.' 4 Under the First Circuit's reasoning, the implication was that the
Bureau of Prisons was permitted to act contrary to its statutory authority
150. Muniz, 517 E3d at 36.
151. Id. at 39.
152. Id. at 39-40 ("§ 3621 requires [the] BOP to consider the five factors in a much
broader context: deciding what specific facility is the right one to house each prisoner....
This, then, is nothing more than a background rule of general applicability .... [T]he
2005 regulations were promulgated with explicit reference to some of the five factors....
Under the statute, other factors may be considered and may even be dispositive.... We
believe this is in accordance with the BOP's ability to make rules of general applicability
that guide its decisions.... Because the individualized consideration of the five factors
mandated by 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b) is directed at the overall placement decision, and be-
cause the question of the appropriateness of CCCs for inmates during the first ninety
percent of their sentences is an issue of general applicability within the scope of Lopez, the
2005 regulations are a reasonable exercise of the Bureau of Prisons' discretion in carrying
out its duties under 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b).").
153. Muniz, 517 E3d at 40 ("The 2005 regulations at least have the advantage of
transparency There is no dispute that, as long as the BOP 'considers' the five factors, it has
virtually unlimited discretion to place inmates wherever it deems appropriate. The BOP
could simply consider the five factors in each case but decide, in each case, not to place
each inmate in a CCC.").
154. Id.
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simply on the speculation that it might not ably or ethically perform its
task.' Despite the First Circuit's holding, mere speculation alone should
not absolve the Bureau of Prisons of its statutory authority to conduct an
individualized assessment of each inmate prior to placement.
The division in the circuit courts regarding whether the Bureau of
Prisons' categorical exercise of discretion was permissible did not last long.
With the passage of the Second Chance Act,'16 the 2005 Rule became
moot, causing the Bureau of Prisons to adopt a new rule. 7 This new rule
also limited halfway house placement to six months but included a new
exception intended to allow for longer placement. In short order, this rule
was also challenged repeatedly.
C. Post-Second Chance Act Placement Policy
The Bureau of Prisons promulgated a new rule following the pas-
sage of the Second Chance Act. Pursuant to the Second Chance Act's
amendment of § 3624(c), an eligible inmate can be placed in a halfway
house following an individualized assessment and for a period of time not
to exceed twelve months.5 5 The Bureau of Prisons was required to prom-
ulgate this new rule because Congress expanded the length of time that
an inmate could be placed in a halfway house to twelve months, and re-
moved the ten percent six-month time limit.' In providing guidance to
its personnel, the Bureau of Prisons interpreted the changes under the
Second Chance Act to permit capping an inmate's placement in a halfway
house to a maximum of six months, unless an extraordinary justification
existed and the Regional Director gave prior written approval (hereinaf-
ter the extraordinary justification exception rule). 60 Congress also made a




156. Second Chance Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-119, 122 Stat. 657 (2008) (codified
in scattered sections of 18 and 42 U.S.C.).
157. Community Confinement, 70 Fed. Reg. 1659 (Jan. 10, 2005) (codified as 28
C.ER. pt. 570) (2008) ("The Bureau published proposed rules on this subject on August
18, 2004 (69 FR 51213). In the proposed rule document, we explained that these rules
would, as a matter of policy, limit the amount of time that inmates may spend in commu-
nity confinement (including Community Corrections Centers (CCCs) and home
confinement) to the last ten percent of the prison sentence being served, not to exceed six
months."); see also Conley & Kenney Memo, supra note 14, § III(D) (instructing Bureau of
Prisons personnel on the new policy and how to apply it).
158. 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c) (2010).
159. 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c)(1) (2010). In addition, Congress separates out the provision
that relates to home confinement. Id. 3624(c)(2).
160. Conley & Kenney Memo, supra note 14.
161. 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c)(6) (2010).
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1. The Extraordinary Justification Exception Rule
In a memorandum to its personnel, the Bureau of Prisons presented
the agency's new halfway house placement policy that it had promulgated
pursuant to the Second Chance Act.' 62 Under the new policy, the maxi-
mum amount of time available for an inmate to be placed in a halfway
house doubled from six to twelve months;'63 the individualized determi-
nations and consideration of the five factors were still required;'64 judicial
requests for direct placements were not binding;'6 s and the "categorical
timeframe limitations" in the 2005 Rule were no longer valid.'66 The
Bureau of Prisons explained that, if an inmate were eligible for a twelve-
month placement, the agency's experience demonstrated that a maximum
of six months was sufficient to prepare an inmate to reenter society
successfully."'6
The extraordinary justification exception rule was then submitted
for notice and comment. 66 Similar to the 2005 Rule, the feedback did
not support the Bureau of Prisons' position.'69 Various stakeholders em-
phasized that the six-month limitation would serve as a barrier to
162. Conley & Kenney Memo, supra note 14. See Sacora v. Thomas, 628 F3d 1059,
1069 (9th Cir. 2010) (concluding that the Conley & Kenny Memo was an interpretive
rule and not subject to notice and comment requirements under the APA. "Under the
APA, a federal administrative agency is required to follow prescribed notice-and-comment
procedures before promulgating substantive rules. However, these notice and comment
requirements are not applicable to 'interpretive rules, general statements of policy, or rules
of agency organization, procedure, or practice. ") (citations omitted).
163. Conley & Kenney Memo, supra note 14, § I(A) at 2.
164. Id. § I(B), at 2.
165. Id. I (C),at 2.
166. Id. I I(B), at 2. The Bureau of Prisons also informed its personnel that the pro-
cess of evaluating inmates for placement would begin seventeen to nineteen months
before their release date rather than eleven to thirteen months. Id. § Il(B), at 3.
167. Id. 5 III (D) at 4 ("While the [Second Chance] Act makes inmates eligible for a
maximum of 12 months pre-release Residential Reentry Center placements, Bureau ex-
perience reflects inmates' pre-release Residential Reentry Center needs can usually be
accommodated by a placement of six months or less.").
168. Pre-Release Community Confinement, 73 Fed. Reg. 62440 (Oct. 21, 2008)
(codified at 28 C.F.R. 5 570.20-.22 (2008)). The Bureau of Prisons promulgated the new
rule as an Interim Final Rule because it had exceeded the ninety day period within which
Congress had requested that a rule be created to reflect the changes made by the Second
Chance Act.
169. S. David Mitchell, Impeding Reentry: Agency andJudicial Obstacles to Longer Ha!fway
House Placements, Soc. Sc. RESEAiCH NETWORK, n.10 (Aug. 23, 2010) (Univ. of Mo. Sch.
Of Law Legal Studies, Research Paper No. 2010-20), http://papers.ssrn.com/
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successful reentry,' and urged the Bureau of Prisons to reconsider the
rule. Those with firsthand knowledge of the impact of placing an inmate
in a halfway house, inmates.7' and their families,' all pled with the Bu-
reau of Prisons to amend its rule. Organizations that play an integral role
in providing reentry assistance to inmates also urged the Bureau of Pris-
ons to drop the six-month limitation.13 The Bureau of Prisons did not
acquiesce.
Inmates challenged the Bureau of Prisons' position on the follow-
ing grounds: the Second Chance Act required placement in a halfway
house for the maximum period of twelve months; 174 the extraordinary
justification exception rule was an impermissible exercise of discretion;
and the Bureau of Prisons exceeded its statutory authority. The chal-
lenges have only achieved partial success. 7 To date, the appellate courts
170. Id. at n.178. ("During the comment period, there were one hundred and forty-
seven comments entered regarding the Bureau of Prisons' decision to change its halfway
house placement policy.").
171. Id. at n.175. ("Public conurents submitted by inmates request that the Bureau
of Prisons not restrict Residential Reentry Center placement to six months absent an
extraordinary justification.").
172. Id. at n.176. ("Public comments submitted by individuals requested that the
Bureau of Prisons not restrict Residential Reentry Center placement to six months absent
an extraordinary justification.").
173. Id. at n.177. (The American Bar Association stated that "[t]he interim rule states
in general terms that BOP will comply with the requirements of the Second Chance Act
with respect to pre-release community confinement. However, it does not adopt a pre-
sumption in favor of a full 12 months' pre-release conmmunity placement, as we believe
Congress intended in enacting the Second Chance Act, or otherwise specify the circum-
stances under which a prisoner will spend a full 12 months in a community placement."
The Federal Public Defender of the Western District ofWashington explained, that "[T]he
Bureau continues to apply a presumption against optimizing the use of community
confinement ... [T]he Bureau should adopt a presumption in favor of twelve months' pre-
release placement in halfway house absent identifiable circumstances indicating that a
lesser period will be sufficient .... "The American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC)
noted that "Although the interim rule for community confinement appears to satisfy stat-
utory requirements on its face, ALEC believes that the interim rule should be rewritten
and bolstered to ensure that halfway house placement be more readily available for the full
twelve months contemplated in the law, rather than six months". Other groups that voiced
their disagreement included the Families Against Mandatory Minimums, Prison Fellow-
ship,Justice & Mercy, Inc., and the Mentor Corps.").
174. Daraio v. Lappin, No. 3:08CV1812(MRK), 2009 WL 303995, at *4 (D. Conn.
Feb. 9, 2009) ("[Daraio] contends that the BOP rarely, if ever, grants pre-release commu-
nity confinement in excess of 180 days, although specifically authorized to do so under
the express terms of the Second Chance Act."); Stanko v. Rios, No. 08-4991(JNE/JJG),
2009WL 1303969, at *1 (D. Minn. May 8, 2009) ("Mr. Stanko ... asserts that, under pro-
visions of the recently passed Second Chance Act, he is entitled to home detention and to
early placement at a halfway house.").
175. See, e.g., Strong v. Schultz, 599 F. Supp. 2d 556 (D.N.J. 2009); Carmichael v.
Holinka, No. 09-cv-388-slc., 2009 WL 2512029 (W.D. Wis. Aug. 17, 2009) (ordering
the Bureau of Prisons to transfer the petitioner to a halfway house or re-evaluate the
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have tended to agree with the Bureau of Prisons or found the petitions
nloot.
17 6
2. Challenges to the Extraordinary Justification Exception Rule
Inmate challenges to the extraordinary justification exception rule
have achieved mixed success.
a. Successful Inmate Challenges
Douglas Strong was convicted of bringing undocumented immi-
grants into the United States and was sentenced to thirty-three months
imprisonment. 7 7 After reviewing his case, the Bureau of Prisons indicated
that Strong was eligible to serve a maximum of sixty days in a halfway
house.'78 He challenged the placement on the grounds that it was contra-
ry to % 3621(b) and 3624(c) as amended by the Second Chance Act,'79
and that he was entitled to a full twelve months in a halfway house.
Strong asserted that he should receive this length of placement be-
cause he was non-violent, had serious medical conditions, and had
extensive substance abuse treatment needs.8 He argued that the six-
month placement designation, as expressed in the Bureau of Prisons'
internal memorandum,""1 "contradict[ed] Congress's directive that CCC
placement time be of sufficient duration to provide the greatest likelihood
of successful reintegration into the comnunity."'' 2 He further argued that
the determination of his placement "deprive[ed] [him] of the statutory
opportunity to be individually considered for CCC placement for a peri-
od of up to one year on the basis of the neutral criteria identified by
Congress in 18 U.S.C. 3621(b). ' ' 183
placement designation using the five factors in 5 3621(b)); Krueger v. Martinez, 665 F.
Supp. 2d. 477 (M.D. Pa. 2009).
176. See Sacora v. Thomas, 628 E3d 1059, 1066 (9th Cir. 2010) ("In delegating the
authority to the BOP to adopt regulations implementing the SCA [Second Chance Act],
the space between 'sufficient duration' and '12 months' was expressly left to the BOP to
fill.The BOP's policy-that six months in a RRC constitutes a 'sufficient duration' in most
cases, but that each inmate is eligible for a 12-month placement and must be considered
for placement in a RRC on an individual basis-is facially consistent with the statute."). See
also Lovett v. Hogsten, No. 09-5605, 2009 WL 5851205 (6th Cir. Dec. 29, 2009); Cioc-
chetti v.Wiley, 358 F. App'x 20, 24 (10th Cir. 2009).
177. Schultz, 599 F Supp. 2d at 557.
178. Id. at 558.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Conley & Kenney Memo, supra note 14.
182. Schultz, 599 F Supp. 2d at 560.
183. Id.
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In regard to the extraordinary justification exception rule, petitioner
Strong stated, "Instead of striving to implement the intent of Congress 'to
provide the greatest likelihood of successful reintegration into the com-
munity,' the BOP, in a bit of institutional arrogance, announced that,
notwithstanding the will of Congress, the presumptive norm would con-
tinue to be a maximum of six months RRC placement."' 184 The Bureau of
Prisons responded that its policy adequately reflected the changes that the
Second Chance Act required. 8
Following an amended judgment of conviction, the Bureau of Pris-
ons increased the length of Strong's placement.8 6 The agency stated that
half a year was enough time for Strong to successfully reintegrate into
society.' The Bureau of Prisons contended that the revised placement
had been "determined pursuant to the Second Chance Act,"'88 and that
the petition should therefore be dismissed on the merits.'89
The district court disagreed, holding that the Bureau of Prisons
should reconsider Strong for placement in a halfway house for the dura-
tion of his sentence.' 90 Due to the time remaining on his sentence, it
would only have been for a maximum of nine months.' 9' The court's rea-
soning was based upon a Chevron analysis of % 3621(b) and 3624(c).
According to the court, Congress limited the Bureau of Prisons' dis-
cretion to determine the duration of an inmate's placement in a halfway
184. Id.
185. Id. at 559.
186. Id. at 558 ("[O]n August 20, 2008, United States District Judge Dana M. Sabraw
amended Petitioner's judgment of conviction to provide for two years of supervised re-
lease and to delete the supervised release condition requiring Petitioner to reside in a
CCC for 120 days ... Petitioner's Unit Team reconsidered Petitioner's CCC placement
date in light of this development. On October 2, 2008, Warden Schultz signed a second
Institutional Referral for CCC Placement, which provides for a six-month placement.").
187. Id. at 558-59 ("The Referral form states that ... '[i]nmate Strong is being re-
ferred for Residential Reentry Center placement for a period of 180 days, pursuant to the
Second Chance Act. The Unit Team has determined the recommended placement is of
sufficient duration to provide the greatest likelihood of successful reintegration into the
community. He will be able to use this time to establish employment and enhance family
ties! ").
188. Conley & Kenney Memo, supra note 14.
189. Schultz, 599 E Supp. 2d at 559. The Bureau of Prisons also argued that Strong
failed to exhaust his administrative remedies after the second referral. Id. at 560-61. The
court, rightfully so, dismissed that claim on the grounds that it would not have been expe-
dient for Strong to submit to a second appeal process given the five months it took to
complete the first appeal. Id. ("Given that it took five months to exhaust administrative
remedies the first time around, dismissal of the Petition as unexhausted would effectively
moot Petitioner's § 2241 claim through no fault of his own.... [T]he purposes of exhaus-
tion would not be served by requiring a second round of exhaustion, since Strong is
challenging the validity of the BOP's April 14, 2008, guidance, not its application. This
Court will therefore excuse the failure to exhaust achninistrative remedies.").
190. Id. at 563.
191. Id. at 563 n.4.
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house with the language that "each placement is [to be] 'of sufficient du-
ration [not to exceed 12 months] to provide the greatest likelihood of
successful reintegration into the community "192 The court explained that
with the increase in the period of time in conjunction with the "sufficient
duration" requirement, "Congress intended that each inmate ... be con-
sidered for a placement of the longest duration-12 months .... ,193 The
court based its holding on the premise that Congress amended % 3621(b)
and 3624(c) in an effort to provide inmates with the best opportunity to
reenter society successfully. The court stated that," [o]bviously, an underly-
ing premise of these amendments is that the more time an inmate spends
in a CCC before he or she is released from BOP custody, the more likely
it is that his or her community reintegration will be successful."' 94 The
court therefore concluded that Congress never intended that an inmate's
stay in a halfway house be restricted to six months. Not every court
agreed with this conclusion.
b. Unsuccessful Inmate Challenges
In Miller v. Whitehead, four inmates with varying amounts of time
remaining on their sentences wanted to be transferred to a halfway house
for more than six months.9 s However, each inmate was denied the trans-
fer because he failed to establish an extraordinary justification for a
placement in excess of six months.'96 The inmates contended that the ex-
traordinary justification requirement was impermissible because it ignored
the § 3621(b) factors, thus failing to provide each with an individualized
assessment. Moreover, the inmates argued that the extraordinary justifica-
192. Id. at 562.
193. Id. at 562. The court readily acknowledged that not every placement would be
for the full twelve months, but that the Bureau of Prisons was required to conduct an
individualized assessment. Id. ("[T]he ultimate placement may be less than 12 months, if
warranted by application of the § 3621(b) factors, i.e., the nature and circumstances of the
offense, the inmate's history and pertinent characteristics, and any statement by the sen-
tencing court.").
194. Id.
195. Miller v. Whitehead, 527 E3d 752, 755 (8th Cir. 2008) ("Inmate Gary Miller
requested transfer to an RRC for the last 73 months of his ten-year sentence. Fernando
Lovato requested transfer for the final 16 to 18 months of his ten-year sentence. Kenneth
Howard initially requested transfer for the last 8 to 10 months of his nine-year sentence,
and later, with 20 months remaining in his sentence, Howard requested immediate place-
ment in a Residential Reentry Center. David Lauer, Sr., requested transfer for the final 30
months of his 70-month sentence.").
196. Id. ("The Bureau of Prisons rejected the various requests. The warden advised
Miller, Lovato, and Lauer that each had not established an 'extraordinary justification' for
serving more than 180 days in an RRC.").
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tion requirement was an additional factor that Congress did not obligate
the Bureau of Prisons to consider. 197
The Eighth Circuit, which previously found the categorical exercise
of agency discretion to be impermissible, agreed with the lower court that
the Bureau of Prisons was authorized to require an extraordinary justifi-
cation for a longer halfway house placement.' 8 Citing Lopez, the Eighth
Circuit explained that the Bureau of Prisons, as the decision maker, had
the authority to engage in this type of rulemaking "to resolve certain is-
sues of general applicability unless Congress clearly expresses an intent to
withhold that authority"'99 The extraordinary justification requirement
was a permissible exercise of agency discretion because it resolved a statu-
tory ambiguity of applicability.
The Eighth Circuit stated that the extraordinary justification re-
quirement was not a non-statutory factor that was being improperly
considered, but was instead a standard for deciding whether an inmate
should be placed in a halfway house for more than six months.2 0 The
court found that while "ordinarily a placement of more than [six months]
is not appropriate under [section] 3621(b) ... a particular inmate still has
the opportunity to show that in the individual circumstance of his case, a
longer placement would be justified."2 1' Hence, the reasoning of the court
was that the mere existence of the opportunity to receive a placement
longer than six months made the extraordinary justification exception
rule different from the categorical exercise of discretion rule. Other courts
also agreed with the Eighth Circuit, paying particular attention to the
extraordinary justification requirement and reemphasizing that it was a
proper exercise of discretion. 212
197. Id. at 757.
198. Id. at 756. The extraordinary justification for placement in excess of six months
has been a part of the Bureau of Prisons' practice and policy dating back to the 1998 Pro-
gram Statement. FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, PROGRAM STATEMENT 7310.04, supra note 15.
According to the program statement, "[a]n inmate may be referred up to 180 days, with
placement beyond 180 days highly unusual, and only possible with extraordinary justifica-
tion. In such circumstances, the Warden shall contact the Regional Director for approval
and the Chief USPO in the inmate's sentencing district to determine whether the sen-
tencing judge objects to such placement." Id. at 8. The extraordinary justification rule was
not considered a violation because 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c) had the ten percent or six-month
timeframe limitations.
199. Miller, 527 E3d at 757.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 758.
202. See Johnson v. Hogsten, No. 6:09-82, 2009 WL 1010627 (E.D. Ky. Apr. 15,
2009); Reichenbach v. Outlaw, No. 4:08CV004186, 2009 WL 799021 (ED. Ark. Mar. 24,
2009); Somerville v. Dewalt, No. 5:09-CV-68-KKC, 2009 WL 1211158 (E.D. Ky. May 1,
2009); Snyder v. Angelini, No. 07-3073, 2008 WL 4773142, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 27, 2008)
("The Bureau of Prisons' policy still requires the Bureau of Prisons to consider all of the
factors set forth in Section 3621(b), and merely superimposes upon that consideration a
temporal standard which enables the Bureau of Prisons to prioritize inmate requests for
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The extraordinary justification exception rule firmly capped the
length of time that an inmate could be placed in a halfway house, a pro-
spect that Congress did not intend when it passed the Second Chance Act
and amended % 3621(b) and 3624(c). All inmates are treated alike under
the rule, which presumes that six months is a satisfactory length of time to
spend in a halfway house. The blanket treatment of all inmates ignores
Congress' intent that each inmate's placement be individualized in order
to maximize that inmate's chances at successful reentry.
Additionally, the extraordinary justification exception rule was
qualitatively no different than the 2005 Rule. The Bureau of Prisons
created a standardized length of placement of six months that was no
different from its previous categorical exercise of discretion, which several
courts found to be impermissible. The extraordinary justification excep-
tion rule allows the Bureau of Prisons to limit the placement of all
inmates, as a group, without having to conduct an individualized assess-
ment of each inmate before doing so. Both rules thus undermined
Congress' intent to have the Bureau of Prisons conduct an individualized
assessment of each inmate pursuant to § 3621(b).
The Bureau of Prisons' extraordinary justification exception rule is
an impermissible exercise of agency discretion because it disregards the
statutory mandates to conduct an individualized assessment of each in-
mate and to assure that each inmate has a reasonable opportunity to
reenter society successfully. The rule fails to give effect to Congress' intent
in amending the statutes when it passed the Second Chance Act.
1I. REVIEWING THE BUREAU OF PRISONS' PLACEMENT POLICY
Under either Chevron or hard look review,20 3 the Bureau of Prisons
engaged in an impermissible exercise of discretion that was not entitled to
judicial deference.
transfer to community confinement."); Yaeger v. Whitehead, No. 08-4020, 2008 WL
2330221 (D. S.D. June 3, 2008) (finding that the extraordinary justification rule is not
being improperly considered as a non-statutory factor); Bunn v. Angelini, No. 07-891,
2008 WL 648450 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 5, 2008); Fariduddin v. Morrison, No. 06-2866, 2007 WL
107678, at *1 (D. Minn. Jan. 10, 2007) ("Moreover, requiring 'extraordinary justification'
to extend CCC placement beyond six months does not violate § 3621(b) because it does
not preclude the completion of an individualized assessment.").
203. Food & Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120
(2000). But see Sacora v. Thomas, 628 F.3d 1059, 1066 (9th Cir. 2010) (stating that, "be-
cause Program Statement 7310.04 and the April 14 Memorandum 'do U not purport to
carry the force of law and [were] not adopted after notice and comment,' they are not
entitled to the level of deference provided for in Chevron."). However, the Interim Final
Rule, "Pre-Release Community Confinement" (73 C.ER. § 62440-01 (2008)), that the
Bureau of Prisons promulgated was submitted for notice and comment.
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A. Chevron Analysis
Under Chevron,2°4 the court uses a two-step test to determine
whether an agency's statutory construction is entitled to deference. °0 A
reviewing court in step one of Chevron analyzes the statutory language to
determine whether Congress spoke clearly to the precise issue in ques-
tion.0 6 If Congress clearly resolved the issue, the courts and the agency
are required to abide by the statutory language.2 7 If, however, the court
finds that the statute is ambiguous, it proceeds to the second step of Chev-
ron.2"' In step two, a reviewing court evaluates whether the agency's
statutory interpretation was reasonable.2" If the court determines that it
was reasonable, then the court must defer to the agency's interpretation." '
In assessing whether the agency's interpretation is proper, some courts
have been quite deferential,2" ' while others have applied a more rigorous
scrutiny, known as a hard look review.2 2
1. Step One-Did Congress Speak to the Precise Issue?
In step one of the Chevron analysis, the reviewing court determines
whether Congress spoke to the precise issue. The court, in making this
determination, will use "traditional tools of statutory construction," '2 3
such as an examination of the statutory text, dictionary definitions,214
204. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
205. Id. at 842-43.
206. Id. at 842.
207. Id. at 843; United States v. Haggar Apparel, Co., 526 U.S. 380, 392 (1999); Holly
Farms Corp. v. NLRB, 517 U.S. 392,398 (1996).
208. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
209. Id. at 843-44.
210. Id. INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 421 (1999);Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S.
452, 457 (1997). Courts rarely find an agency's actions unreasonable under the traditional
assessment, which mirrors the standards under the arbitrary and capricious test. With the
contemporary approach, courts have engaged in a more rigorous assessment of the agen-
cy's actions, a "hard look" approach to determine whether the agency's interpretation
comports with the intent of Congress.
211. See AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Bd., 525 U.S. 366 (1998).
212. See MotorVehicle Mfrs.Ass'n of the U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
463 U.S. 29 (1983). A number of lower courts also employ this approach. Arent v. Shalala,
70 E3d 610, 614 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Indep. Petroleum Ass'n of America v. Babbitt, 92 F3d
1248, 1258 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Animal Legal Def. Fund, Inc. v. Glickman, 204 E3d 229, 235
(D.C. Cir. 2000); Tex. Office of Pub. Util. Counsel v. FCC, 183 E3d 393, 410 (5th Cir.
1999) (noting that the two kinds of review are distinct).
213. NLRB v. Food & Commercial Workers, 484 U.S. 112, 123 (1987). See generally
A GUIDE TO JUDICIAL AND POLITICAL REVIEW OF FEDERAL AGENCIEs 58-82, % 3.0221-
2.0225 (John E Duffy & Michael Herz, eds.,American Bar Association 2005).
214. Smiley v. Citibank, 517 U.S. 735,746 (1996); Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of
Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 697-708 (1995).
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canons of construction, statutory structure, legislative purpose, 2  and leg-
islative history2'6 Under this approach, a court focuses on the statutory
language, 2  looking at individual words, sentence structure, and other
rules of syntax.2 ' But these are not the only sources that courts use to
determine whether Congress spoke directly to the issue.
In reviewing a statute, courts also review the statutory context.
21 9
Courts will look at other acts that may affect the statute, including those
that were passed contemporaneously with or subsequent to the statute
under review.22 ° Moreover, the reviewing court is also guided by common
sense. When determining whether Congress spoke to the precise issue, a
court will look at whether "Congress is likely to delegate a policy deci-
sion of such economic and political magnitude to an administrative
agency. 221 This approach of reviewing the statutory language and context
can best be summed up as taking a "gestalt approach" to determine
whether Congress was clear and unambiguous in expressing its intent.2
Using a gestalt approach, it is evident that Congress clearly and un-
ambiguously required Congress to consider the five factors and conduct
an individualized assessment of each inmate. Consequently, a reviewing
court should conclude that the Bureau of Prisons' extraordinary justifica-
215. AT&T Corp., 525 U.S. at 412 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part); Presley v. Etowah Cnty. Comm'n, 502 U.S. 591, 508-09 (1992);Your Home Visiting
Nurse Serv., Inc. v. Shalala, 525 U.S. 449, 452-57 (1998) (reviewing the statutory purpose
of a provision and its consistency with other provisions in the statute); Rust v. Sullivan,
500 U.S. 173, 184-85, 188-90 (1991).
216. See A GUIDE TO JUDICIAL AND POLITICAL REVIEW OF FEDERAL AGENCIES, supra
note 213, at 57. But see Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 527-29 (1989)
(Scalia,J. concurring) (refusing to consider legislative history).
217. Schreiber v. Burlington N., Inc., 472 U.S. 1, 5 (1985); Hughes Aircraft Co. v.
Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432, 438 (1999).
218. Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115,118 (1994).
219. Davis v. Mich. Dep't. ofTreasury, 489 U.S. 803, 809 (1989); Food & Drug Admin
v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132 (2000) ("[Reviewing] court
should not confine itself to examining a particular statutory provision in isolation."); Gard-
ner, 513 U.S. at 118.
220. United States v. Estate of Romani, 523 U.S. 517, 530-31 (1998); United States v.
Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 453 (1988).
221. Brown & Williamson Tobacco, 529 U.S. at 133. But cf. MCI Telecolmn. Corp. v.
American Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218, 231 (1994).
222. Alan K. Chen, Shadow Law: Reasonable Unreasonableness, Habeas Theory, and the
Nature of Legal Rules, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 535, 555 n.49 (1999); F. Philip Manns, Jr.,
Internal Revenue Code Section 162(0: When Does the Payment of Damages to a Government
Punish the Payor?, 13 VA. TAX REV. 271, 295 (1993) ("The sources of legislative intent
relied upon by each court did not declare that the penalty at issue was intended to punish.
Some decisions attached talismanic significance to the presence of the word 'penalty' in
legislative history or in court decisions construing the provision at issue without further
inquiry into whether there was a punitive intent behind the penalty. Others took a gestalt
approach to the legislative history and found an expression of punitive intent even though
such intent could not be derived from a summation ofa statute's parts.").
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tion exception rule is not in accord with its statutory mandates, and thus
exceeds its statutory grant of discretion.
a. The Statutory Language of 18 U.S.C . 3621(b)
Under § 3621(b), Congress mandated the Bureau of Prisons to act
and permitted it to exercise discretion.
The Bureau of Prisons shall designate the place of the prison-
er's imprisonment. The Bureau may designate any available
penal or correctional facility that meets minimum standards of
health and habitability established by the Bureau, whether
maintained by the Federal Government or otherwise and
whether within or without the judicial district in which the
person was convicted, that the Bureau determines to be ap-
propriate and suitable, considering--() the resources of the
facility contemplated; (2) the nature and circumstances of the
offense; (3) the history and characteristics of the prisoner; (4)
any statement by the court that imposed the sentence ... and
(5) any pertinent policy statement issued by the Sentencing
Commission .... 213
In the first sentence, Congress' use of the word "shall" indicates that the
Bureau of Prisons is required to perform this duty. 24 In the second sen-
tence, the use of the word "may" indicates that the Bureau of Prisons has
the discretion to determine the facility in which the inmate is placed.This
discretion, however, is qualified 22' by the requirement that the Bureau of
Prisons "consider" five factors. 226 Courts, reviewing the statute in response
to earlier policy changes, have disagreed about whether the five statutory
factors limit the Bureau of Prisons' discretion. 227 The majority of courts
223. 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b) (2010).
224. Id.; Levine v. Apker, 455 E3d 71, 80 (2d Cir. 2007) ("The statute ... employs the
word 'shall,' and thus obliges the BOP to 'designate the place of the prisoner's imprison-
ment.").
225. 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b) (2010); Levine, 455 F3d at 80 ("Congress's use of the lan-
guage 'may designate' in this provision seemingly endows the BOP with 'broad discretion'
... [T]he fact that the statute differentiates between the use of'may' and 'shall' in adjacent
sentences indicates the drafters' mindfulness of the significance of those terms.").
226. 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b) (2010); Muniz v. Sabol, 517 E3d 29, 35 (1st Cir. 2008)
("The plain language of [section 3621(b)] contains a grant of discretion and a command
that the BOP consider the five factors when exercising that discretion.").
227. Goldings v. Winn, 383 E3d 17, 33 (1st Cir. 2004) (Howard, J. concurring) ("In
making assignments and transfers, Congress suggested that BOP consider several factors
including the resources of the facility, the nature and circumstances of the offense, the
history and characteristics of the prisoner, any recommendations by the sentencing court,
and pertinent policy statements from the Sentencing Commission. These factors are non-
exclusive and do not bind or limit BOP's exercise of its discretion.").
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that have reviewed § 3621(b) have determined that the Bureau of Prisons
is required to assess an inmate's placement according to these factors.28
The position of this Article is that their assessment is the correct one.
By using the word "considering," which means "taking into ac-
count, Congress indicated its intent. Congress wanted the Bureau of
Prisons to take the factors into account when determining an inmate's
place of imprisonment. Apart from the definitions of the words, the sen-
tence structure also indicates that Congress intended the Bureau of
Prisons to use the factors. Congress' intent in this regard is plainly evident
when the second sentence is read without the subordinate clauses. "The
Bureau may designate any available penal or correctional facility that
meets minimum standards of health and habitability established by the
Bureau ... considering .... 230 It is readily apparent that Congress intend-
ed the designation of an inmate to "any available penal or correctional
facility," including a halfway house,2 31 to be made after the Bureau of Pris-
ons considered the five factors.
An alternative reading that may be proffered by the Bureau of Pris-
ons is that the word "considering" and the five factors modify the
preceding subordinate clause. That reading, however, is incorrect. Those
inclined to find that the Bureau of Prisons' discretion is unfettered are
likely to raise the argument that Congress inserted the word "consider-
ing" and the five factors to modify the phrase "that the Bureau
determines to be appropriate and suitable. ' 232 This phrase, however, modi-
fies the phrase "whether maintained by the Federal Government or
otherwise and whether within or without the judicial district in which
228. Rodriguez v. Smith, 541 E3d 1180, 1186 (9th Cir. 2008); Wedelstedt v. Wiley,
477 F3d 1160, 1166 (10th Cir. 2007); Levine, 455 E3d at 82; Woodall v. Fed. Bureau of
Prisons, 432 E3d 235, 245 (3d Cir. 2005); Fults v. Sanders, 442 E3d 1088, 1092 (8th Cit.
2006). But see Muniz, 517 E3d at 35.
229. Considering, MEmuMA-WEBSTER DICIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/considering. See Ellen PAprill, The Law of the Word: Diaionary Shopping in the Supreme
Court, ARiz. ST. LJ. 275 (1980) (discussing the issue of dictionary shopping); Note, Looking It
Up: Dictionaries and Statutory Interpretation, 107 H~Av. L. Rav. 1437 (1994). In deciding whether
the Bureau of Prisons is required to apply the five factors, the analysis has focused on specific
language.Yet, it has been argued that jurists search for a definition that suits their own ends.
230. 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b) (2010).
231. The issue as to whether a halfway house constituted a penal or correctional
facility was contested earlier by the Office of Legal Counsel. It was decided that a halfway
house was a place of imprisonment. Statutory Authority to Contract with the Private
Sector to Secure Facilities, 16 Op. O.L.C. 65, 1992 WL 479543 (Mar. 25, 1992). But see
Goldings, 383 E3d at 25 (The defendants "argue that a CCC is not a 'place ... of impris-
onment' as required by the first sentence of § 3621(b) .... "). In subsequent appeals,
however, the Bureau of Prisons dropped this argument. Rodriguez, 541 E3d at 1185 n.5
("[T]he BOP itself has acknowledged that § 3261(b) [sic] grants it the authority to 'place
offenders sentenced to a term of imprisonment in [RRCs].' ").
232. 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b) (2010).
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the person was convicted."233 Congress sought to ensure that the facility
that was selected to place an inmate was "appropriate and suitable. 2 34 The
five factors modified the discretion on the designation of placement, thus
qualifying the Bureau of Prisons' discretion.
A review of the plain text of the language and the sentence struc-
ture is definitive evidence that Congress intended that the designation of
an inmate's place of imprisonment be an individualized assessment con-
ducted in accord with the five factors, particularly since factors two and
three relate specifically to the individual inmate.2 3 Although the core of
3621(b) has remained relatively unchanged since its adoption,3 6 Con-
gress did amend it in the Second Chance Act, addressing direct judicial
placements.
2 37
Congress amended § 3621(b) by adding the following sentence at
the end of the paragraph after the fifth factor: "Any order, recommenda-
tion, or request by a sentencing court that a convicted person serve a
term of imprisonment in a community corrections facility shall have no
binding effect on the authority of the Bureau under this section to de-
termine or change the place of imprisonment of that person.."23 The
sentence clarified the issue of direct judicial placement, proclaiming that
no "order, recommendation, or request by a sentencing court" was bind-
ing. Reviewing this sentence in light of the 2002 Rule, it appears as if
Congress approved of the Bureau of Prisons' exercise of discretion to
cease accepting direct judicial placement recommendations. That, howev-
er, was not the case. The statement merely codified the agency's
longstanding practice with regard to direct judicial placements. While the
Bureau of Prisons complied with eighty percent of the judicial recom-
mendations, these placement requests were not granted automatically and
were not binding on the agency.234 In the same way that the existing poli-
cy of direct judicial placements was reaffirmed, Congress was explicit
about the application of the five factors in § 3621(b).
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. 18 U.S.C. 5 3621(b)(2)-(3) (2010). See, e.g., Bowers v.Warden, Fed. Prison Camp,
Yankton, No. Civ. 10-4066, 2011 WL 795546, at *7 (D.S.D. Feb. 25, 2011) (stating that
pursuant to § 3621(b) the unit team reconmended a placement of 120-150 days);
McDowell v. Scism, No. 10-2817, 2011 WL 184013, at *2-*3 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 20, 2011)
(stating that the unit team initially recommended a placement of 150-180 days in an
RRC, then reduced it to 90-120 days and then increased it once more to 121-150 days);
Graves v. Babcock, No. 3:10cv375/WS/MD, 2011 WL 818447, at *4 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 20,
2011) (stating that the unit team recommended a placement of 180 days).
236. 18 U.S.C. § 3621 (1984).
237. Second Chance Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-199, 122 Stat. 657 (2008) (codified
in scattered sections of 18 and 42 U.S.C.).
238. 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b) (2010).
239. Borges, supra note 31, at 189.
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The plain language of§ 3621(b) indicates that the Bureau of Prisons
was required to engage in an individualized assessment when determining
an inmate's place of imprisonment. 20 The extraordinary justification
exception rule is an a priori determination that created a blanket policy
that disregards § 3621(b)'s statutory mandate to conduct an individualized
assessment. Specifically, the new rule ignores two of the five factors-
"nature and circumstances of the offense" and "history and characteristics
of the prisoner"-that relate specifically to determining the proper
placement for each inmate. 24' It has been argued that, even if the agency
failed to consider the five factors in initially designating an inmate's place
of imprisonment, the extraordinary justification exception sufficiently
satisfies the requirements of § 3621(b). That exception does not, however,
salvage the rule.
Substantively, the extraordinary justification exception allows an in-
mate to receive a placement in excess of six months. The problem with
the exception is the timing of when it is considered. The statutory lan-
guage of § 3621(b) is clear. Congress required the Bureau of Prisons to
take the five factors into account prior to making its placement decision.24 2
Congress did not intend for the Bureau of Prisons to conduct a post hoc
assessment of evidence provided by an inmate in his effort to secure a
longer placement. The extraordinary justification exception rule operates
simply as a categorical exercise of discretion by a different name, and re-
mains a statutory violation. The Bureau of Prisons may offer similar
arguments that it raised in response to the challenges to the 2005 Rule,
relying once again on Lopez. 243 The same arguments that the court relied
upon to find Lopez inapplicable and distinguishable when evaluating the
2005 Rule are also applicable to the extraordinary justification exception
rule.244 Additionally, a court may conclude that the agency's interpretation
was incorrect using canons of construction.245
A court, after applying a particular canon of construction, may con-
clude that the agency's interpretation is not entitled to deference, even
240. Muniz v. Sabol, 517 F3d 29, 35 (1st Cir. 2008) ("The plain language of [section
3621(b)] contains a grant of discretion and a command that the BOP consider the five
factors when exercising that discretion. The BOP 'shall designate the place of the prison-
er's imprisonment.' 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b). The BOP is provided the discretion to choose
'any available penal or correctional facility that meets minimum standards of health and
habitability ... that the Bureau determines to be appropriate and suitable, considering' the
five factors.").
241. 18 U.S.C. %§ 3621(b)(2)-(3) (2010).
242. See id. § 3621(b); COMMITTEE REPORT ON SENTENCING REFORM ACT, supra note
36, at 142.
243. Lopez v. Davis, 531 U.S. 230 (2001).
244. See supra Part II.
245. Ronald Levin, The Anatomy of Chevron: Step Two Reconsidered, 72 CHI.-KE,/T L.
REV. 1253, 1279 & n.115 (1997).
[VOL. 16:235
HeinOnline  -- 16 Mich. J. Race & L. 274 2010-2011
Impeding Reentry
though the statutory language appears to be ambiguous. 216 The canons of
statutory construction upon which the courts have often relied are the
democratic process,247 the protection of under-enforced constitutional
norms,2 48 and the protection of social policies, including regulatory
norms.249 Of these three, the most pertinent canon of construction is the
social policy canon.20 This canon of construction aims to protect "certain
principles or groups,' '211 such as construing remedial statutes broadly or
interpreting laws to favor Native Americans. 212 In regard to the Bureau of
Prisons' placement policy, the social policies that are being advocated and
protected are twofold: reducing recidivism and increasing public safety.
246. Id. at 1283-84 ("In other words, although the court finds the statutory language
is ambiguous, it holds that a particular canon of construction rules out the agency's inter-
pretation because it is inconsistent with the statute as interpreted with the guidance [of]
the canon.").
247. The canons that are references with respect to the democratic process account
for problems in the environment in which legislation is drafted. Bernard Bell, Using Statu-
tory Interpretation to Inprove the Legislative Process: Can It Be Done in the Post-Chevron Era?,
13 J.L. & POL. 105, 132 (1997) (stating that allowing agencies to exercise their discretion
to apply or reject "interpretative methodologies" that are "designed to improve the legisla-
tive process may undermine their effectiveness."); Jane Schacter, Metademocracy: The
Changing Structure of Legitimacy in Statutory Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 593, 607-11
(1995).
248. See Lawrence Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional
Norms, 91 HARv. L. REV. 1212 (1978) (defining the concept of underenforced constitution-
al norms); DeBartolo Corp., v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S.
568, 578 (1988) (declining to defer to the NLRB when the statutory construction raised
First Amendment concerns); Qualcomm Inc. v. FCC, 181 E3d 1370, 1379 (D.C. Cir. 1999)
(applying the canon of constitutional doubt to the agency interpretation which raised
serious constitutional concerns).
249. Mich. Citizens for an Indep. Press v. Thornburgh, 868 E2d 1285 (D.C. Cir.
1989), aff'd, 493 U.S. 38 (1989); Pub. Citizen v.Young, 831 F2d 1108, 1113-18 (D.C. Cir.
1987). See also, CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST-BENEFIT STATE: THE FUTURE OF REGULATORY
PROTECTION 63-70 (2002) (favoring judicial deference to statutory interpretations by
agencies that seek to avoid absurd results, such as exorbitant expenditures to address trivial
risks).
250. The use of these canons at step one is not universally accepted. "[T]he proper
use of these canons is often intertwined with the sort of policy decisions for which agen-
cies are better suited than courts. Some courts therefore do not apply them at step one ...
On the other hand, if courts view these canons as relatively settled default rules that pro-
vide an interpretive scheme against which Congress legislates, they may feel comfortable
using them at step one to ascertain congressional intent." A GUIDE TO JUDICIAL AND Po-
LITICAL REVIEW OF FEDERAL AGENCIES, supra note 213, § 3.02253. See e.g., King v. St.
Vincent's Hosp., 502 U.S. 215, 220-21 & n.9 (1991) (noting a presumption that Congress'
legislation is enacted with these interpretive rules in mind).
251. A GUIDE TO JUDICIAL AND POLITICAL REVIEW OF FEDERAL AGENCIES, supra note
213, § 3.02253. King, 502 U.S. at 220-21 n.9 (1991) (noting a presumption that Con-
gress' legislation is enacted with these interpretive rules in mind).
252. Ariz. Pub. Serv. Co. v. EPA, 211 Ed 1280, 1294 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Ramah Nava-
jo Chapter v. Lujan, 112 Ed 1455, 1462 (10th Cit. 1997).
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The reentry movement, with the Second Chance Act as its signature
piece of legislation, is focused on improving the reentry prospects of in-
mates following release from incarceration. Current data demonstrate that,
within the first year after release, approximately one-third of inmates will
re-offend, and within three years, approximately two-thirds will do so. 213
The new offenses will have new victims, thus endangering the public and
decreasing public safety. In this context, non-correctional stakeholders
have focused on post-release assistance programs that provide housing,
education and job training, among other services."' Upon release, the Bu-
reau of Prisons no longer has the authority to impact the lives of inmates.
Hence, it must address reentry at the pre-release custodial stage. Because
of the changing demographics2"' of inmates and the increase in need for
longer and more comprehensive residential reentry programming, the
Bureau of Prisons' rule, which caps placement at six months and fails to
conduct individual assessments, is inconsistent with the social policy ad-
vocated by the statute.
Although § 3621(b) directed the Bureau of Prisons to designate the
place of imprisonment, the contextualization of the statute further
demonstrates that Congress' intent was clear and unambiguous.
b. The Statutory Context of 18 US. C. 5 3621(b)
In the Second Chance Act, Congress made several substantial
changes to § 3624(c), the companion statute to § 3621(b), that indicate
the Bureau of Prisons is not presumptively entitled to limit an inmate's
placement to six months. Congress continued to require the Bureau of
Prisons to provide a set of conditions for each inmate to foster successful
253. See Travis, et al, supra note 7. See also, e.g., MInEs D. HARER, FED. BURtAu OF PRISONS,
REcniViSM AMONG FEDERAL PmSONERS RELEASED uI4 1987 21-22 (1994), available at
http://www.bop.gov/news/researcl-projects/pubhished-reports/recidivism/oreprrecid87.pdf,
Michael Pinard, Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions: Confronting Issues of Race and Dig-
nity, 85 N.YU. L. REv. 457, 483 (2010); California Defends DNA Sampling Law in 9th Circuit,
Haskell v. Brown, 7 WESriAWJ. EXPERT & ScIENTIRC EVIDENCE 3 (2010); THE SENTENCING PRO-
JEcT, REciDIvisM OF STATE PRISONERS: IMPLICATIONS FOR SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS POLICY
(2002), available at http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/inc-recidivstate.pdf
(finding nearly two thirds recidivate).
254. Editor's Notes, 20 FED. SENT'G REP. 74 (2007) ("Policy makers have increasingly
come to recognize the importance of providing greater support to offenders throughout
the reentry process, as illustrated, for instance, by passage of the Second Chance Act in the
House of Representatives in November 2007. Growing attention to the challenges of
successful reentry may ultimately affect the work not only of social services agencies but
also of the court system and law enforcement agencies. For instance, some communities
are now experimenting with specialized reentry courts that give judges a pivotal, coordi-
nating role in managing reentry.").
255. There has been an increase in the number of female prisoners entering the sys-
tem and an increase in the number of elderly prisoners in the system. PETERSILIA, supra
note 98, at 21-54.
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reentry.25 6 In the first sentence of § 3624(c), similar to prior versions,
Congress used the word "shall" to obligate the Bureau of Prisons to pro-
vide a set of "conditions that will afford that prisoner a reasonable
opportunity to adjust to and prepare for the reentry of that prisoner into
the community."27 Although the Bureau of Prisons has this duty, Con-
gress, recognizing that there may be limitations, was not "tying the hands
of administrators in deciding where prisoners are to be placed. 252 Hence,
Congress included the phrase "to the extent practicable." 29 By inserting
this phrase as a modifier of the mandatory requirement, Congress
acknowledged that the Bureau of Prisons may not be able to fulfill this
duty at all times, thereby creating a qualified affirmative obligation. 26" The
more controversial parts of the sub-section, however, are the time limits,
contained in § 3624(c), on the Bureau of Prisons' placement discretion. 261
256. 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c) (2010).
257. Id. ("The Director of the Bureau of Prisons shall, to the extent practicable, en-
sure that a prisoner serving a term of imprisonment spends a portion of the final months
of that term (not to exceed 12 months), under conditions that will afford that prisoner a
reasonable opportunity to adjust to and prepare for the reentry of that prisoner into the
community. Such conditions may include a community correctional facility."); Goldings v.
Winn, 383 E3d 17, 23 (1st Cit. 2004) (interpreting old § 3624(c): "By its plain language,
§ 3624(c) provides that the BOP 'shall take steps' to 'assure' that prisoners serve a reasona-
ble part of the last ten percent of their prison terms 'under conditions that afford the
prisoner a reasonable opportunity to adjust to and prepare for the prisoner's reentry into
the community.' This language imposes an affirmative obligation on the BOP to take steps
to facilitate a smooth re-entry for prisoners into the outside world. It is true that this obli-
gation is qualified. Section 3624(c) does not mandate placement in a CCC prior to release,
and it requires the BOP to assure that a prisoner spends the last part of his sentence under
pre-release conditions only if practicable. However, a qualified obligation differs from a
grant of discretion."); Prows v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 981 F2d 466, 470 (10th Cir. 1992)
("§ 3624(c) [operates] as a legislative directive focusing on the development of conditions
to facilitate an inmate's adjustment to free society, whatever the institution of pre-release
confinement.").
258. Goldings, 383 E3d at 20-21 ("Under § 3624(c), the BOP must ensure placement
under pre-release conditions except where no such placement is practicable.... The
provision thus reflects Congress's intent to impose upon the agency a duty to prepare
prisoners for reentry into the community, without tying the hands of administrators in
deciding where prisoners are to be placed. The BOP is not free to disregard that duty.").
259. 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c) (2010).
260. Wedelstedt v.Wiley, 477 E3d 1160, 1166 (10th Cir. 2007); Goldings, 383 E3d at
23; Monahan v. Winn, 276 E Supp. 2d 196, 210 (1st Cir. 2003) ("The plain language of
§ 3624(c) places no curbs on BOP discretion as to place of confinement prior to the last
six months or 10% of confinement. The provision's purpose is not to set strict conditions
on when the BOP can designate a prisoner to community confinement. The statute in fact
burdens the BOP with a duty (albeit a "qualified" one):"). See also Prows v. Fed. Bureau of
Prisons, 981 E2d 466, 469 (10th Cit. 1992); Ferguson v.Ashcroft, 248 E Supp. 2d 547, 572
(D. La. 2003).
261. Wedelstedt, 477 F3d at 1165-66; Muniz v. Sabol, 517 E3d 29, 36-38 (1st Cir.
2008); Fults v. Sanders, 442 E3d 1088, 1090-92 (8th Cir. 2006); Levine v.Apker, 455 E3d
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Prior to the passage of the Second Chance Act, § 3624(c) contained
the following language:
The Bureau of Prisons shall, to the extent practicable, assure
that a prisoner serving a term of imprisonment spends a rea-
sonable part, not to exceed six months, of the last 10 per
centum of the term to be served under conditions that will af-
ford the prisoner a reasonable opportunity to adjust to and
prepare for the prisoner's re-entry into the community.
262
Some interpreted this as a limitation on the Bureau of Prisons' placement
discretion, 263 while others viewed it as having no effect at all.2 64 In the Se-
cond Chance Act, Congress specifically increased the overall maximum
amount of placement time in any community correctional facility to
twelve months261 while simultaneously limiting an inmate's placement in
home confinement 266 to the lesser of ten percent or six months.26 The
plain text of the statute made it clear that an inmate is eligible to be
placed in a community correctional facility, which includes a halfway
house, for up to twelve months.268 The six-month limitation is reserved
solely for home confinement, which Congress made explicit by setting
the home confinement provision apart.2 69 Congress clearly expressed its
intent that home confinement is the only condition under which an in-
mate's time in a community correctional facility is limited to the final ten
percent of the inmate's sentence or a maximum of six months.
Another textual change that is instructive as to Congress' intent is
3624(c)(6). In this sub-section, Congress required the Bureau of Prisons
71, 85-87 (2d Cir. 2007);Woodall v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 432 E3d 235, 249-51 (3d Cir.
2005), Elwood v.Jeter, 386 E3d 842, 846-47 (8th Cir. 2004); Goldings, 383 E3d at 25-26.
262. 18 U.S.C. 5 3624(c) (2006).
263. The Bureau of Prisons' position prior to 2002 was that its placement discretion
was not limited. After the Office of Legal Counsel's memorandum proclaiming that the
Bureau of Prisons' interpretation was unlawful, the Bureau of Prisons changed its position.
Previous courts have ruled that the time limits restrict the Bureau of Prisons' consideration
of transferring an inmate to a halfway house until ten percent of the sentence remains.
They have also held that the statute limits the amount of time that an inmate can serve in
a halfway house to the lesser of either six months or ten percent of the sentence. For an
in-depth recounting of the numerous changes and legal maneuverings, see supra Part I.
264. Other courts have held that time limits do not place any barriers on when and
for how long a placement can be. For an in-depth recounting of the numerous changes
and legal maneuverings, see supra Part II.
265. 18 U.S.C. 5 3624(c) (2010).
266. MAcus NIETO, THE CHANGING ROLE OF PROBATION IN CALIFORNIA'S CRIMINAL
JusTicE SYSTEM 53 (1996) ("Home confinement is a judicial or administratively imposed
condition that requires an offender to remain in his or her residence for any portion of the
day.").
267. 18 U.S.C. 5 3624(c) (2010).
268. See id. § 3624(c)(1).
269. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c)(2006), with 18 U.S.C. 5 3624(c) (2010).
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to issue regulations that complied with the amendments in the Second
Chance Act. The sub-section reads,
The Director of the Bureau of Prisons shall issue regulations
pursuant to this subsection not later than [ninety] days after
the date of the enactment of the Second Chance Act of 2007,
which shall ensure that placement in a community correction-
al facility by the Bureau of Prisons is-(A) conducted in a
manner consistent with section 3621(b) of this title; (B) de-
termined on an individual basis; and (C) of sufficient duration
to provide the greatest likelihood of successful reintegration
into the community
°0
Congress required the Bureau of Prisons to adopt a set of regulations that
would provide the greatest opportunity for an inmate to reenter society
successfully. Moreover, this sub-section stated unequivocally that the Bu-
reau of Prisons' placement was to be an individualized process 27 ' and "of
sufficient duration to provide the greatest likelihood of successful
reintegration into the community '2 2 Most importantly, this sub-section
mandated that the Bureau of Prisons' regulations were to be "conducted
in a manner consistent with 3621(b)."2 3 This sub-section offers the most
compelling evidence of Congress' intent that halfway house placement is
not only to be individualized, but also that the Bureau of Prisons is to use
the five factors in § 3621(b).274 It is clear from the text alone that the Bu-
reau of Prisons exceeded the bounds of its discretion. The extraordinary
justification exception rule as promulgated did not adhere to 55 3621(b)
and 3624(c). This conclusion is bolstered even further by looking at the
purpose of the Second Chance Act.
The overall purpose of the Second Chance Act was to reduce recid-
ivism and to increase public safety.275 In an effort to address these dual
concerns at the federal level, Congress dedicated a section in the Second
Chance Act to improving federal reentry initiatives276 and providing in-
centives to prisoners to participate in reentry skill development.
7 7
Congress also recommended that the Bureau of Prisons use the
270. 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c) (2010).
271. Id. § 3624(c)(6)(B).
272. Id. § 3624(c)(6)(C).
273. Id. § 3624(c)(6)(A).
274. Cf Lopez v. Davis, 531 U.S. 230, 237 (2001) ("The statute [(Section
3621(e)(2)(B))] grants no entitlement to any inmate or class of inmates, the Court of Ap-
peals noted, and it does not instruct the Bureau to make 'individual, rather than
categorical, assessments of eligibility for inmates convicted of nonviolent offenses.' ").
275. 42 U.S.C. § 1 7501(a)(1) (2010) ("The purposes of this Act are- (1) to break the
cycle of criminal recidivism, [and] increase public safety.").
276. Id. § 17541.
277. Id. §17541(a)(2).
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maximum amount of time allotted for halfway house placement as an
incentive to encourage inmates to take advantage of reentry program-
ming.2 78 Congress further recognized that the federal reentry initiative
should tailor reentry programs to the individual and not consider reentry
as a one-size-fits-all approach.2 9 Thus, while Congress could have accept-
ed the Bureau of Prisons' statutory interpretations reflected in the 2002
and 2005 Rules, it did not.
It is safe to assume that Congress was aware of the lack of support
from the judiciary, the defense bar and other reentry stakeholders that
accompanied the Bureau of Prisons' prior rule changes, and could have
easily retained the ten percent, six-month policy.2° By doing so, Con-
gress would have authorized the Bureau of Prisons' practice of limiting
halfway house placement to six months, and given tacit approval of the
Bureau of Prisons' categorical exercise of discretion in designating an
inmate's place of imprisonment. It did not. In the alternative, Congress
could have elected to give the Bureau of Prisons unfettered discretion.
Congress chose neither of these options. Instead, Congress increased the
time limit for placement.2 8 ' Congress also stated that the maximum
amount of time in a halfway house should be offered as an incentive for
inmates to participate in "reentry and skills development," thus demon-
strating the importance that Congress placed on the usefulness of such
facilities.282 As previously noted, Congress explicitly required the Bureau
of Prisons to issue regulations that were consistent with § 3621(b) 2 3 and
highlighted the need for individual assessments prior to placement. 84
278. Id. ("Incentives for a prisoner who participates in reentry and skills develop-
ment programs which may, at the discretion of the Director, include-(A) the maximum
allowable period in a community confinement facility.").
279. Id. § 17541(a)(1) ("The establishment of a Federal prisoner reentry strategy to
help prepare prisoners for release and successful reintegration into the community, includ-
ing, at a minimum, that the Bureau of Prisons- (A) assess each prisoner's skill level ... at
the beginning of the term of imprisonment of that prisoner . . . ; (B) generate a skills de-
velopment plan for each prisoner . . . ; (D) ensure that priority is given to the reentry
needs of high-risk populations . . . ; [and] (F) collect infornation about a prisoner's family
relationships ... and support systems during incarceration and after release from custo-
dy.") (emphasis added).
280. The Bureau of Prisons policy was changed in 2002 and then amended in 2005.
In the interim, there were numerous legal challenges as well as scholarly commentary
about the impact of the policy. See Bussert et al., supra note 29; Borges, supra note 31.
281. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c) (2010) with 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c)(1) (1984). In each
version of the statute prior to 2008, the statute capped the maximum length of time at six
months.
282. 42 U.S.C. § 17541(a)(2)(A) (2010).
283. 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c) (2010). Congress' directive to the Bureau of Prisons was to
adopt a practice and policy that did not conflict with 18 U.S.C. § 3621 (i.e., failing to
conduct individualized assessments using the five factors).
284. 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c) (2010).
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The extraordinary justification exception rule does not accomplish
those goals.
Lastly, a reviewing court would likely determine that Congress did
not intend for the Bureau of Prisons to enact a policy that would limit
placement, thereby undermining the goals of reentry. The Court has
stated that "we must be guided to a degree by common sense as to the
manner in which Congress is likely to delegate a policy decision of such
economic and political magnitude to an administrative agency. '285 The
economic importance of halfway house placement is clear. Inmates that
are placed in halfway houses are more likely to succeed and not recidi-
vate. 286 The more time that an inmate spends in a halfway house, the
greater the reduction in incarceration costs, which means that limited
resources can be diverted elsewhere.287 The restricted use of halfway
houses under the extraordinary justification exception rule keeps incar-
ceration costs high because it caps the length of time that an inmate can
spend in a halfway house. 288 In addition to these economic issues, there
is also a political component. Reentry as a social policy has achieved
national importance and continues to garner attention. 289 The fact that
Congress amended the provisions that govern halfway house placement
in the Second Chance Act is a strong indication that Congress intended
the placement of federal inmates in such facilities to be commonplace,
not limited. In omitting a specific time limit for placement, Congress
allowed the Bureau of Prisons to place an inmate in a halfway house for
a period of time that satisfies the statutory demands of § 3624(c). Con-
gress did not intend for the Bureau of Prisons to create a presumption
limiting an inmate's placement to six months.
The question of whether the Bureau of Prisons has the discretion
to restrict an inmate's halfway house placement to six months was
285. Food & Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133
(2000).
286. FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, PROGRAM STATEMENT 7310.04, supra note 15 ("Partici-
pating in community-based transitional services may reduce the likelihood [that] an
inmate with limited resources [will] recidivat[e], whereas an inmate who is released direct-
ly from the institution to the community may return to a criminal lifestyle.").
287. See Bussert et al., supra note 29, at 26 ("In its 2004 comments, the ABA noted
that, in August 2002, the House of Delegates approved the 20-Point Blueprint for Cost-
Effective Pretrial Detention, Sentencing and Corrections Systems. The blueprint promotes the use
of community corrections among other reasoned, cost-effective measures.").
288. In addition to increasing reentry costs, the Bureau of Prisons' repeated attempts
to change its rule to avoid judicial review has resulted in numerous challenges for almost a
decade. Those resources could have been put to better use. See Cooksey & Erlewine
Memo, supra note 17; Conley & Kenney Memo, supra note 14.
289. Reentry and the disabilities that ex-offenders suffer due to a conviction contin-
ue to be both a national and international topic of discussion. See supra Part I; see also, e.g.,
BARRIERS TO REENTRY?:THE LABOR MARKET FOR RELEASED PRISONERS IN POST-INDUSTRIAL
AMERICA (Bushway et al. eds., 2007); CIVIL PENALTIES, SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES (Christo-
pher Mele et al. eds., 2005); Clear,Waring & Scully, supra note 8.
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addressed in clear and unambiguous statutory language. Inmate chal-
lenges to the Bureau of Prisons' limiting of an inmate's placement in a
halfway house to six months has not been met with much success.
20
The fact that the Bureau of Prisons has conducted its assessment pursu-
ant to the five factors in § 3621(b) has been considered as satisfying its
statutory mandate under the Second Chance Act.29 ' The problem with
this assessment is that it disregards the Bureau of Prisons' lack of evi-
dence that six months is a sufficient amount of time to accomplish the
goals of reentry.2 2 The placement recommendations thus become rela-
tive. If a unit team is aware that placements are capped at six months,
especially in light of the sentiment that such resources are scarce and
should be used sparingly, then all other placements are made relative to
the maximum. 29
3
If, however, a court were to find that Congress was not clear and
ambiguous, the court would proceed to review the rule under step two
of Chevron, assessing whether the Bureau of Prisons' interpretation was
reasonable. Although courts rarely disagree with an agency's interpreta-
tion of an ambiguous statute, 2 the Bureau of Prisons would not prevail
in this instance.
290. See Sacora v. Thomas, 628 F.3d 1059 (9th Cir. 2010); Stanko v. Obama, 393 F.
App'x. 849 (3dCir. 2010); Garza v. Davis, 596 F.3d 1198 (10th Cir. 2010).
291. See cases cited supra note 290.
292. Sacora, 628 F.3d at 1068-69 ("The court has said that while statistical evidence
would be beneficial it is not warranted because of an agency's experience. In this instance,
however, the agency's own actions prior to the policy change in 2002 indicated other-
wise. In this case, the BOP relied on 'Bureau experience' to explain its choice to require
unusual circumstances and additional checks before placing prisoners in RRCs for longer
than six months. It may have been preferable for the BOP to support its conclusions with
empirical research. However, it was reasonable for the BOP to rely on its experience,
even without having quantified it in the form of a study."). See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs.
Ass'n of the U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)
("Normally, an agency rule would be arbitrary and capricious if the agency... offered an
explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so
implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency
expertise.").
293. Rosario v. Scism, No. 1:10-CV-2600, 2011 WL 398200, at *8 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 20,
2011); Vicaretti v. Ziegler, No. l:10cv9l, 2010 WL 4876608, at *5 (N.D. WVa. Oct. 27,
2010); Banks v. Ziegler, No. 5:10cv69, 2010 WL 3521586, at *5 (N.D.WVa. Sept. 7, 2010)
("[I]t is the BOP's experience that inmate's re-entry needs can usually be met with 6
months or less in an 1JRC. An RRC placement beyond 6 months will only be approved
upon a showing of an inmate's extraordinary and compelling re-entry needs. The BOP
will continue to balance each inmate's individual needs with the agency's duty to use its
limited resources judiciously and to provide re-entry services as to many inmates as possi-
ble.").
294. Jack M. Beermann, End the Failed Chevron Experiment Now: How Chevron Has
Failed and Why It Can and Should be Overruled, 42 CoNN. L. REv. 779, 810-11 (2010); Don-
ald S. Dobkin, The Rise of the Administrative State: A Prescription for Lawlessness, 17 KAN. J.L.
& PuB. POL'Y 362, 373-74 (2008) ("To date, an agency's decision has not been invalidated
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2. Step Two-Unreasonable Interpretation
After having concluded that a statute's language is either silent or
ambiguous as to a particular question, under step two of Chevron, a
court will review an agency's interpretation to determine whether it
was reasonable. If the court finds the interpretation to be reasonable, the
court will defer to the agency.295 This deference reflects the court's
acknowledgement of the agency's expertise and legitimacy, which de-
rives from agencies' democratic accountability.29 6
In conducting a step-two analysis, courts will look to statutory
materials and the agency's reasoning process.2 17 Because the reliance up-
on statutory materials resembles the analysis undertaken at step one, it
by the Supreme Court under step two of Chevron (though several Courts of Appeal have
done so)' (citing STEVEN G. BREYER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY
289-90 (5th ed. 2002))); Claire R. Kelly, The Brand X Liberation: Doing Away With Chev-
ron's Second Step as Well as Other Doctrines of Deference, 44 U.C. DAvIs L. REv. 151, 172-73
(2010).
295. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844-45,
865-66 (1984). Cf CSX Transp. v. United States, 867 F2d 1439, 1445 (D.C. Cir. 1989)
(Edwards, J., dissenting) (finding judicial deference under Chevron to be inconsistent with
the traditional role of the courts to determine federal law); John F DufFy, Administrative
Common Law in judicial Review, 77 TEX. L. REv. 113, 193-94 (1998) (concluding that
courts should not defer to agencies when there is a question of statutory interpretation,
stating: "The first sentence of Section 706 ofthe APA requires a reviewing court to 'decide
all relevant questions of law' and to 'interpret constitutional and statutory provisions.' The
legislative history of the APA leaves no doubt that Congress thought the meaning of this
provision plain. As Representative Walter, Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Ad-
ministrative Law and author of the House Committee Report on the bill, explained to the
House just before it passed the bill, the provision 'requires courts to determine inde-
pendently all relevant questions of law, including the interpretation of constitutional or
statutory provisions' ... The plain language alone suggests de novo review of statutory
issues."); Cynthia Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Administrative
State, 89 CoLuM. L. REv. 452, 457 (1989) (discussing that Chevron expanded the definition
of deference); Thomas Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969,
997-98 (1992) (noting that the courts are responsible for constraining agency action. 'In
the end, the primary protection against arbitrary or aggrandizing action by agencies must
remain the fundamental constitutional limitation on all executive action-that it 'comport
with the terms set in legislative directives.' And the only effective institutional mechanism
for preserving this constraint is judicial review.").
296. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844-45, 865-66. See also Food & Drug Admin. v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132 (2000). See generally A GUIDE TO JUDICIAL
AND POLITICAL REVIEW OF FEDERAL AGENCIES, supra note 213, § 3.031 at 85.
297. Provided that the agency interpretation is reasonable, the court has recognized
that "legislative delegation" to an agency is often "implicit" and will not replace the agen-
cy's interpretation with its own. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844; NationsBank of N.C. v.Variable
Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251,257 (1995)).
SPRING 2011]
HeinOnline  -- 16 Mich. J. Race & L. 283 2010-2011
Michigan Journal of Race & Law
has been suggested that such analysis only take place at step one. 98 This
Article adopts that position and will limit the step-two analysis of the
reasonableness of the Bureau of Prisons' actions to the agency's reason-
ing process. To determine reasonableness, courts assess whether the
agency's interpretation is supported by a reasonable explanation and is
logically coherent. 299 Although it is rare that a court will determine an
agency's actions to be unreasonable, it is not unprecedented.3 "' This type
of examination is also known as arbitrary and capricious review, 0'
which is the review conducted under the Administrative Procedures
Act.302
Step-two review is not restricted to a single methodology.30 3 The
Chevron Court noted that a court must affirm the agency's interpretation
298. Levin, supra note 245, at 1279-80; A GUIDE TO JUDICIAL AND POLITICAL REVIEW
OF FEDERAL AGENCIES, supra note 213, at 87 (agreeing with Professor Levin's assessment of
examining statutory materials at Chevron step-one).
299. Ronald M. Levin, A Blackletter Statement of Federal Administrative Law, 54 ADMIN.
L. REV. 1, 37-38 (2002) (discussing the principles under which courts review an agency's
action and logical coherence is but one).
300. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Schecter Poultry at the Millennium:A Delegation Doc-
trine for the Administrative State, 109 YALE L.J. 1399, 1400 n.5 (2000).
301. Arbitrary and capricious review has been described in a variety of ways, which
leaves the standard of review unclear. See, e.g., Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v.
Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971) (describing the arbitrary and capricious review as "search-
ing and careful" but maintaining that it is "a narrow one." By referencing that the court
must not substitute its own judgment for the agency, the standard of review approximates
the reasonableness standard); FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1823
(2009) ("Congress passed the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) to ensure that agencies
follow constraints even as they exercise their powers. One of these constraints is the duty
of agencies to find and formulate policies that can be justified by neutral principles and a
reasoned explanation. To achieve that end, Congress confined agencies' discretion and
subjected their decisions to judicial review. If an agency takes action not based on neutral
and rational principles, the APA grants federal courts power to set aside the agency's action
as 'arbitrary' or 'capricious.' For these reasons, agencies under the APA are subject to a
"searching and careful" review by the courts.") (citations omitted); Angelica Textile Servs.,
Inc. v. United States, 95 Fed. Cl. 208, 218 (2010) ("When a court reviews a challenge to
agency action that is alleged to be arbitrary or capricious or an abuse of discretion, it is
obliged to 'determine whether the contracting agency provided a coherent and reasonable
explanation of its exercise of discretion' ") (citations omitted).
302. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2010) ("The reviewing court shall ... hold unlawful and
set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be ... arbitrary, capricious, [or]
an abuse of discretion .... ").
303. Michael Herz, The Rehnquist Court and Administrative Law, 99 Nw. U. L. REV.
297, 315 (2004); Beermann, supra note 294, at 815-22; Bressman, supra note 300, at 1411-
15. For an evaluation of lower courts' unwillingness to invalidate an agency's interpreta-
tion, see generally Orin S. Kerr, Shedding Light on Chevron: An Empirical Study of the Chevron
Doctrine in the US. Courts ofAppeals, 15 YALE J. ON REG. 1 (1998). But see, e.g.,Whitman v.
Am.Trucking Ass'm, 531 U.S. 457, 481 (2001) (finding that the statute was ambiguous and
that the "agency's interpretation goes beyond the limits of what is ambiguous and contra-
dicts what in our view is quite clear."); AT&T v. Iowa Util. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 387-92
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even if it is not convinced that the agency's interpretation is the only one
or the interpretation that the court would have reached) °3 The agency's
interpretation is therefore not impermissible merely because it differs
from other potential interpretations. 3s Under this review, the Court has
stated:
[A]n agency rule would be arbitrary and capricious if the
agency has relied on factors which Congress has not intended
it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of
the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs
counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible
that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the
product of agency expertise.
30 6
The Bureau of Prisons has arbitrarily and capriciously selected six months
as the presumed maximum length of placement for all inmates.
307
To briefly reiterate, the Bureau of Prisons claimed the following.
First, based upon agency experience, six months was enough time for an
inmate to adequately prepare for reentry."8 Second, the extraordinary jus-
tification exception rule incorporated the five factors required under
§ 3621(b).30 9 Third, the extraordinary justification exception did not
(1998) (discussing that the commission did use a "rational basis" in its interpretation of the
statute).
304. Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.l
(1984). See also Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. and Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704,
713 (2011); Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 665
(2007); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 184 (1991).
305. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n. 11.
306. MotorVehicle Mfrs.Ass'n of the U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S.
29, 43 (1983).
307. Regional Hearing on the State of Federal Sentencing, W.D. Tex. (Nov. 20, 2009)
(statement of Harley G. Lappin, Director, Fed. Bureau of Prisons), 9-10 ("Most in-
mates with short sentences are appropriately placed in federal prison camps, which are
minimum security, much less costly than RRCs and offer a wide variety of inmate
programs; and most releasing offenders receive the necessary transitional assistance in
three to four months at an RRC"); see also Proceedings from the Symposium on Alterna-
tives to Incarceration, U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 272 (July 14-15, 2008), http://
www.ussc.gov/Research/Research-Projects/Alternatives/20080714-Alternatives/1
4_FINALFocusReentry.pdf (finding that the Bureau of Prisons has indicated that
inmates do not need more than six months and has expressed that four months may
be enough to accomplish the goals of reentry).
308. Proceedings from the Symposium on Alternatives to Incarceration, supra note 306, at
272 (Summary) (" .. . BOP studies indicate that an inmate can receive the full benefit of a
Residential Reentry Center after only six months.").
309. Woodall v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 432 E3d 235, 247-48 (3d Cir. 2005) ("The
BOP has stated, and the District Court agreed, that it considered the statutory factors in
promulgating the 2005 rules.").
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restrict an inmate's placement. 3" And fourth, the interpretation of
S3621(b) should be considered the same as the interpretation of
3621(e), which was held to be valid in Lopez.3 1' The Bureau of Prisons'
reasons are inaccurate.
The Bureau of Prisons' data appear to be anecdotal and unsupport-
ed. Discovery requests seeking supporting additional statistical
information have gone unanswered.31 2 The Bureau of Prisons' rule prom-
ulgated pursuant to the Second Chance Act exceeds its statutorily granted
discretion. Congress delegated the discretion to designate the place of
imprisonment and to provide reentry programs for an inmate. Congress
did not grant the Bureau of the Prisons the authority to incorporate the
five factors into its rule. A rule that requires an additional factor and caps
the maximum amount of time contravenes the agency's statutory man-
date.
The policy also contravened the Bureau of Prisons' pre-2002 statu-
tory interpretation. To be sure, a change in an agency's statutory
interpretation does not signify that the new interpretation is unreasona-
ble. 313 In other words, a change in an agency's statutory interpretation
should not indicate that the agency did not initially use proper reasoning
when interpreting the statute. The OLC motivated the initial change in
the policy 34 and found the Bureau of Prisons' statutory interpretation to
be erroneous, thus unlawful.315 In addition to the legal basis for finding
the Bureau of Prisons' interpretation illegal, there was also the perception
that the policy was applied disproportionately to white collar offenders,
thus benefitting them more often than other offenders. 316 By extension, it
was perceived that this type of placement indicated a practice of bias in
310. See Daraio v. Lappin, No. 3:08CV1812(MRK), 2009 WL 303995, at *5 (D.
Conn. Feb. 9, 2009) ("[I]t is permissible for the BOP to search for 'extraordinary justifica-
tion' before granting an RRC placement in excess of 180 days provided that the BOP
considers the five-factor statutory list. This is so because 'extraordinary justification' essen-
tially acts as a 'standard for deciding whether to grant a request for extended placement in
an RRC.' ") (citations omitted)); Fariduddin v. Morrison, No. 06-286, 2007 WL 107678, at
*1 (D. Minn. Jan. 10, 2007) ("[R]equiring 'extraordinary justification' to extend CCC
placement beyond six months does not violate 5 3621(b) because it does not preclude the
completion of an individualized assessment. Indeed, it implies that an individualized de-
termination is necessary to determine whether CCC placement beyond six months is
warranted.").
311. Lopez v. Davis, 531 U.S. 230, 232 (2001).
312. See Memorandum in Support of Amended Petition, supra note 88, at Attach-
ment A.
313. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 186-87 (1991); Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Res. Def. Council, Inc. 467 U.S. 837, 863-64 (1984); see also Indep. Bankers Ass'n v. Farm
Credit Admin., 164 F3d 661,668 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
314. OLC Memo, supra note 46.
315. Id.
316. Bussert et al., supra note 29, at 22-23.
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favor of class status and gender."17 Although that may have been the per-
ception, it was unfounded." ' Most notably, the change in the policy will
have a negative impact on female inmates, specifically African American
women.
319
The Bureau of Prisons' halfway house placement policy was hi-
jacked by politics and bad press, not proof.32 ° Rather than maintain its
open transfer policy, the Bureau of Prisons conceded, adopted a new rule
in 2002, and promulgated a policy that was contrary to its statutory man-
dates and contrary to congressional intent.
The Bureau of Prisons stated that its discretion under § 3621(b) was
similar to that exercised under § 3621(e), which was upheld in Lopez.3 21
Several courts held correctly that the language of § 3621(e) was ambigu-
ous, enabling the Bureau of Prisons to provide an interpretation to fill the
statutory gap left by Congress. That is not the case with § 3621(b), which
has no such gap. Congress laid out the five factors to be used and repeat-
edly emphasized their importance for conducting individualized
assessments. Given the language of § 3621(b), any policy that would place
an inmate in a halfway house for a set period of time prior to evaluating
that inmate under the statutory factors is arbitrary and capricious and
therefore does not deserve deference.
317. See Eric Lichtblau, Criticism of Sentencing Plan for White-Collar Criminals, N.Y
TIMES, Dec. 26, 2002, at C2; Bussert et al., supra note 29, at 23 ("[M]ore than a third of the
prisoners designated to serve their entire sentences in CCCs at the time the policy
changed were female, even though women comprise less than 7 percent of the general
federal prison population." (citing Cutler v. United States, 241 E Supp. 2d 19, 23 n.3 (D.
D.C. 2003)).
318. Bussert et al., supra note 29, at 23. ("[BOP] officials said that halfway houses have
been used for nonviolent offenders for at least 20 years. 'The point is that it's not just
white-collar offenders who have benefited from this longstanding practice .... There are a
lot of drug offenders, single moms and ordinary folks who aren't wealthy people who have
benefited from this. It's not just Enron types.'" (citation onitted)).
319. See Bussert, supra note 57; Borges, supra note 31, at 142 ("It is important to note
that most of the prisoners affected by the policy [see supra Part I.B. for a discussion of the
2002 Policy] are not corporate tycoons, but rather, single mothers on welfare, low-end
drug dealers, check forgers, and student loan offenders.").
320. Pre-2002 news reports provide indication that halfway houses are for white
collar offenders only and may be too lenient. Jim Morrill, Culp's Term Reduced by Drug
Rehab Cut Termed 'Unwarranted', CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Sept. 14, 2000, at 1B; Dwight
Ott & Angela Couloumbis, Milan Sent to a Prison in Penna; He Will Serve Time at a Facility
Several Hundred Miles from His Family. The Site Meets an Accessibility Guideline, PHILA. IN-
QUIRER, July 14, 2001, at BO ("Convicted former Mayor Milton Milan was transferred
yesterday to a low-security federal prison in Loretto, Pa., 252 miles-and a 4 1/2-hour
drive-away from here. Milan, 38, who was sentenced last month to serve seven years
and three months on corruption charges, was transferred to Loretto from the federal pris-
on in Fairton, Cumberland County. The Loretto facility, a converted monastery in a
small town near Altoona, houses 1,085 inmates, most of whom are nonviolent offenders
convicted of white-collar crimes, said Thomas Webber of the U.S. Bureau of Prisons").
321. Lopez v. Davis, 531 U.S. 230, 232 (2001).
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A court evaluating the Bureau of Prisons' reasoning process should
determine that the agency's statutory interpretation of § 3621(b) was un-
reasonable. Past challenges, especially to the 2005 Rule,3 22 indicate that
courts are likely to be divided. In fact, the Eighth Circuit, which sided
with the petitioners when challenging the 2005 Rule, has since reversed
course with respect to challenges to the new extraordinary justification
exception rule.3 23 A review under step two may result, incorrectly, in an
affirmation of the extraordinary justification exception rule depending
upon the circuit because courts are less rigorous and more deferential at
step two. In an effort to increase the rigor of judicial review of agency
interpretation, courts have applied a hard look review.3 24 Under this doc-
trine, there is no question that the extraordinary justification exception
rule would be found to be an impermissible exercise of discretion and
struck down.
B. A Hard Look at the Bureau of Prisons' Placement Policy
In reviewing whether an agency's policy determination was reason-
able, courts employ a hard look review, 3 5 which is a more stringent
analysis of an agency's actions than a determrination of whether the inter-
pretation was reasonable. Under this type of review, courts tend to look
more closely at the "substantive rationality" of the agency's actions and
322. 28 C.F.R. 570.21(a) (2010).
323. Miller v. Whitehead, 527 F.3d 752, 756 (8th Cir. 2008) ("The inmates here
argue that like the regulation in Fults, the program statement categorically excluded a class
of inmates from the opportunity to be transferred. We reject this contention .... ").
324. Mark Seidenfield, Cognitive Loafing, Social Conformity, and Judicial Review of
Agency Rulemaking, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 486, 518 (2002) ("On its face, arbitrary and ca-
pricious review, as currently implemented under the 'hard-look' . . . rubric is almost
entirely a process-based evaluation. It does not compare the outcome to some ideal that
the judge has in mind, and eschews inquiring whether the agency decision, in fact, turned
out to be wise. It essentially asks the agency to explain why it reached the outcome it did
in light of data available to the agency, alternatives to the outcome, and arguments pre-
sented to the agency by those whom the rule will affect."); see also Motor Vehicle Mfrs.
Ass'n of the U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43-44 (1983); Greater
Bos. Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski
& Cynthia R. Farina, Cognitive Psychology and Optimal Government Design, 87 CORNELL L.
REV. 549, 588-89 (2002); Cass R. Sunstein, Deregulation and the Hard Look Doctrine, 1983
Sup. CT. REV. 177, 181-84 (1983); Harold Levanthal, Environmental Decisionmaking and
the Role of the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 509, 511 (1974).
325. Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 112-13 (1992); State Farm, 463 U.S. at
43-44; Bering Strait Citizens for Responsible Res. Dev. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs,
511 F.3d 1011, 1020 (9th Cir. 2008) ("Judicial review of agency decision-making under
NEPA is limited to the question of whether the agency took a 'hard look' at the proposed
action ... "); Ethel Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cit. 1976) (en banc); Sidney A.
Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, Heightened Scrutiny of the Fourth Branch: Separation of Powers
and the Requirement of Adequate Reasons for Agency Decisions, 1987 DUKE L.J. 387, 419
(1987).
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also "more broadly at the agency's reasoning process. 3 26 The purpose of a
hard look review is to ensure that an agency has taken a critical look at
the issue before it,327 and has employed a reasoned process in its decision-
making.3
28
In practice, courts have looked at the relationship between the statu-
tory purposes or requirements and the agency's interpretation.3 29 Courts
seek to determine whether there has been a "clear error in judgment" on
the agency's part,3 0 or whether the agency's interpretation "is so implausi-
ble that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of
agency expertise."3 31 Moreover, courts will also look at whether the agen-
cy has failed to consider key aspects of the issue presented, such as the
impact, 3 32 cost, 333 or "full range of facts affecting its policy decision."34
Furthermore, courts have looked to whether the agency has failed to re-
spond to relevant arguments or comments. 335 With this type of review,
courts are not merely deferring to the agency's judgment and thus abdi-
cating judicial responsibility, but rather the court is adhering to its role of
critically analyzing the agency's actions. 336 When courts engage in a hard
look review, the admonition that the court is not to substitute its own
judgment for that of the agency is still applicable.337 A hard look review of
326. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43 n.9; KEITH WERHAN, PRINCIPLES OF ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW 356 (Thomson/West ed., 2008).
327. Nat'l Lime Ass'n v. EPA, 627 F.2d 416, 451 n.126 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Greater
Bos. Television Corp., 444 F.2d at 851.
328. Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def Council, Inc., 435 U.S.
519, 549 (1978) (explaining that the focus of judicial review of an agency's action under
the Administrative Procedure Act should be on "the propriety" of the agency's "contem-
poraneous explanation" of its decision); United States v. N.S. Food Prods. Corp., 568
F.2d 240, 249 (2d Cit. 1977); Etlhel Corp., 541 F.2d at 1; Greater Bos. Television Corp., 444
F.2d at 851; Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
329. See, e.g., Verizon Commc'ns, Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 542 (2002) (Breyer,
J., concurring and dissenting) (citing State Farm, 463 U.S. at 56); Athens Cmty. Hosp.,
Inc. v. Shalala, 21 F.3d 1176 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Dugan v. Ramsay, 727 F.2d 192 (1st Cir.
1984); Conway v. Watt, 717 F.2d 512 (10th Cir. 1983).
330. Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc., 401 U.S. at 416.
331. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43.
332. See, e.g., P.R. Sun Oil Co. v. EPA, 8 F.3d 73 (1st Cir. 1993); Am. Iron & Steel
Inst. v. EPA, 115 F.3d 979 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
333. Timpinaro v. SEC, 2 F.3d 453 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
334. A GUIDE TO JUDICIAL AND POLITICAL REVIEW OF FEDERAL AGENCIES, supra note
213, at 187.
335. United States v. N.S. Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 252-53 (2d Cir. 1977).
But see Am. Mining Cong. v. EPA, 907 F.2d 1179, 1187-91 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (noting
that an agency is not required to discuss every fact or opinion offered); Thompson v.
Clark, 741 F.2d 401, 408 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
336. Jim Rossi, Redeeming Judicial Review: The Hard Look Doctrine and tile Federal Regu-
latory Efforts to Restructure the Electric Utility Industry, 1994 Wisc. L. REV. 763, 825-26
(1994).
337. See Conner v. Burford, 848 F.2d 1441, 1446 (9th Cir. 1988).
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the Bureau of Prisons' presumptive six-month placement policy with ex-
traordinary justification exception rule would uncover that the Bureau of
Prisons acted improperly and exceeded the boundaries of its discretion by
creating an a priori rule that limits an inmate's halfway house placement
time to six months.
1. The Bureau of Prisons Uses Impermissible Factors
Courts will set aside an agency's action if the agency relied upon
factors that are not to be considered or ignored those that must be con-
sidered.338 The extraordinary justification exception rule is an example of
the Bureau of Prisons' failure to consider the five factors, as is required
under 5 3621(b). 339 The implementation of a policy that presumes that a
six-month halfway house placement is sufficient to achieve an inmate's
reentry needs based upon undocumented agency statements disregards
Congress' intent under 5 3621(b), and ignores the stated purposes and
goals of the Second Chance Act.
An agency's action will be set aside if it was a "clear error in judg-
ment.""34  The purpose of 5 3621(b) was to ensure individualized
assessments prior to any placement. The extraordinary justification excep-
tion rule does not allow that to occur. It undermines the purpose and
requirement of 5 3621(b) because it presumes the length of an inmate's
placement in the absence of an individualized assessment. Recognizing
that the Bureau of Prisons may be faced with certain constraints, such as
limited facility space or resources, Congress allowed the agency to desig-
nate "any available penal or correctional facility" for placement.34 And yet,
while Congress delegated the authority to determine in which facility an
inmate would be placed, it also provided a set of guidelines to be used.
The Bureau of Prisons is expected to use these guidelines to match an
inmate to a specific facility and to determine an inmate's length of stay in
338. Natural Res. Def. Council v. Kempthorne, 506 F. Supp. 2d 322, 347 (E.D.
Cal. 2007); Defenders of Wildlife v. Babbitt, 958 F. Supp. 670, 685 (D.D.C. 1997) ("Alt-
hough the Court must defer to an agency's expertise, it must do so only to the extent that
the agency utilizes, rather than ignores, the analysis of its experts. Here, the FWS has
consistently ignored the analysis of its expert biologists as to each of the five statutory
factors, basing its decision on unsupported conclusory statements as well as facts which are
directly contradicted by undisputed evidence in the Administrative Record. The FWS
decision not to list the Canada Lynx and grant it the protections of the ESA is arbitrary
and capricious, applied an incorrect legal standard, relied on glaringly faulty factual prem-
ises, and ignored the views of its own experts. Consequently, it must be set aside.")
(citation omitted).
339. 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b) (2010).
340. Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971)
("[Tihe court must consider ... whether there has been a clear error ofjudgment.") (ci-
tations omitted).
341. 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b) (2010).
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that particular facility. To assume that each inmate is well-served with a
six-month stay in a halfway house ignores the underlying purpose and
requirement of the statute to place each inmate according to an individu-
alized assessment. The same can be said for the companion statute,
3624(c).
The purpose of § 3624(c) is to ensure that an inmate has a reasona-
ble opportunity to reenter society successfully.342 The presumptive six-
month rule thwarts the purpose and requirements of this statute as well.
Under this statute, Congress purposefully lengthened the maximum
amount of time that can be spent in a halfway house. Congress recognized
the inherent difficulties that inmates face upon release and provided a
mechanism for increased pre-release assistance. The Bureau of Prisons'
rule is contrary to that purpose. The rule theoretically adheres to the re-
quirement that the Bureau of Prisons provides a set of conditions for
successful reentry, but the time limit that it has decided is appropriate does
not provide a "reasonable opportunity."34 Apart from a finding that the
rule is inconsistent with the statutory purpose and requirements, the Bu-
reau of Prisons also has failed to consider key aspects of offender reentry.
2. The Bureau of Prisons Disregards Key Aspects
of Offender Reentry
A reviewing court will determine that an agency's action is to be set
aside if it did not properly consider specific criteria. 34  Courts have in-
voked this basis for reversing an agency's decision as a means to invalidate
an agency's policy decision.The Bureau of Prisons has stated that the ex-
traordinary justification exception rule is based upon its experience that
six months is enough time for an inmate to achieve the goals of reentry.345
In estimating the amount of time necessary for halfway house placement,
the Bureau of Prisons failed to consider an important aspect of the
placement issue. The time that an inmate spends in a halfway house is part
of a larger legislative overhaul of reentry.34 6 The longer the placement time
342. Id. § 3624(c) (describing the Bureau's affirmative duty to a prisoner); id.
3621(b) (describing the Bureau's discretionary authority).
343. Id. § 3624(c).
344. A GUIDE TO JUDICIAL AND POLITICAL REVIEW OF FEDERAL AGENCIES, supra note
213, at 187 ("An agency action will be set aside if the agency failed, without adequate
justification, to give reasonable consideration to an important aspect of the problems pre-
sented by the action, such as the effects or costs of the policy choice involved, or the
factual circumstances bearing on that choice.").
345. Memorandum in Support ofAmended Petition, supra note 88, at 52.
346. See Second Chance Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-199, 122 Stat. 657 (2008)
(codified in scattered sections of 18 and 42 U.S.C.).
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in such a facility, the greater the likelihood that an offender will be suc-
cessful in his bid to break the cycle of recidivism.
347
Halfway houses provide an environment where offenders can en-
gage in law-abiding behavior while continuing to be in a structured
environment that provides support. 4 The placement affords the offend-
ers the opportunity to participate in law-abiding activity without
thrusting them back into the community, without structure and assis-
tance, to the very place where they may have committed their original
offense. 349 The halfway house acts as a buffer between prison and the
community and provides a controlled environment to address the defi-
cits that may have existed prior to conviction.3 These conditions afford
the inmate a period of readjustment that allows him the opportunity to
mitigate the negative effects of prison,3"' and to find stable employ-
ment."2 Research indicates that ex-offenders that are unemployed fol-
following release are more likely to recidivate.31 3 Hence, any additional
time that provides ex-offenders the opportunity to secure and maintain
stable employment is beneficial both to the offender, because it reduces
recidivism, and to society, because the former offender will be less likely
347. Memorandum in Support of Amended Petition, supra note 88, at 22.
348. RICHARD L. PHILLIPS & JOHN W. ROBERTS, QUICK REFERENCE TO CORREC-
TIONAL ADMINISTRATION 192 (2000) ("Halfway house programs provide an excellent
transitional environment for inmates nearing the end of their sentences."); ANTHONY C.
THOMPSON, RELEASING PRISONERS, REDEEMING COMMUNITIES: REENTRY, RACE AND
POLITICS 173 (2008); see generally TRAVIS, supra note 96, at 241-42.
349. PHILLIPS & ROBERTS, supra note 348, at 192 ("The level of structure and super-
vision ensures accountability and provides opportunity in employment counseling and
placement, substance abuse, and daily life skills."); TRAVIS, supra note 96, at 241-42.
350. See PHILLIPS & ROBERTS, supra note 348, at 192.
351. DONALD CLEMMER, CORRECTIONAL CONTEXTS: CONTEMPORARY AND CLASSICAL
READINGS ch. 8 (Edward J. Latessa & Alexander M. Holsinger, eds., 3d ed. 2006); Dennis J.
Stevens, The Impact of Time-Served and Regime on Prisoners'Anticipation of Crime: Female Pris-
onisation Effects, 37 How. J. CRIM. JUST. 188 (1998); William Thomas Edwards, How Do
Variations in Social Support Resources of Prisoners Correlate with Psychological Distress?, 69 DIs-
SERTATION ABSTRACTS INT'L, THE HUMANITIES AND SOC. SCI. 1995 (2008).
352. Lappin statement of March 10, 2009, supra note 12, at 9 ("We use residential
reentry centers (RRCs) ... to place inmates in the community prior to their release from
custody in order to help them adjust to life in the community and find suitable post-
release employment."). See generally RICHARD P. SEITER, ET AL., NAT'L INST. OF LAW EN-
FORCEMENT & CRIMINAL JUSTICE, HALFWAY HOUSES: NATIONAL EVALUATION PROGRAM
PHASE I SUMMARY REPORT (1977); see also U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS,
ABOUT THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS (2001), available at http://www.hawaii.edu/
hivandaids/About theFederaLBureau-of Prisons.pdf ("The Bureau places most inmates
in community corrections centers (halfway houses) prior to their release from custody in
order to help them adjust to life in the community and find suitable post-release employ-
ment.").
353. COMM'N ON EFFECTIVE CRIMINAL SANCTIONS, AM. BAR Ass'N, SECOND CHANCES
IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: ALTERNATIVES TO INCARCERATION AND REENTRY STRATE-
GIES 27 (2007).
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to victimize others. Time spent in a halfway house gives inmates the op-
portunity to reconnect with family and to restore relationships.354 Inmates
placed directly in halfway houses have the opportunity to remain con-
nected with family without being subject to the negative impact of being
incarcerated in a traditional penal facility.3 5 Thus, an increase in the max-
imum length of time that an inmate can be placed in a halfway house is
more likely to provide the inmate with a greater opportunity to be suc-
cessful upon reentry.
In preparing inmates for release, reentry programming accomplishes
two related goals. First, the inmate must undergo a transition process of
de-prisonization or de-institutionalization.356 In other words, it is neces-
sary for the inmate to move beyond the psychology of survival associated
with being incarcerated where every move is constricted. Second, the
halfway house must assist the inmate in acquiring a skill set that may have
never existed or that atrophied while he was incarcerated. By increasing
the length of time that an inmate can spend in a halfway house and not
retaining the Bureau of Prisons' 2005 Rule interpretation, Congress rec-
ognized that a longer placement is useful and integral to improving an
'inmate's reentry prospects. It follows that Congress did not contemplate
that the Bureau of Prisons would create a policy to limit placement, par-
ticularly in light of the fact that neither the 2002 Policy nor the 2005
Rule was affirmed. Congress expressly selected a time limit that was twice
as long as that provided in the Bureau of Prisons' policy.357 Moreover, the
Second Chance Act cleared up confusion surrounding the numerous
changes to the Bureau of Prisons' placement policy. 8 In the Congres-
sional Record, the importance of reentry and the reduction of recidivism
are repeatedly referenced.3s9 This language makes it clear that Congress
354. Damian J. Martinez & Johanna Christian, The Familial Relationships of Former
Prisoners: Examining the Link between Residence and Informal Support Mechanisms, 38 J. oF
CONTEMP. ETHNOGRAPHY 201, 205 (2009).
355. Borges, supra note 31, at 142 ("Now, the Bureau of Prisons has been ordered by
the Justice Department not to accommodate judicial recommendations. As a result, non-
violent offenders will be sent to prisons where they will be placed with hardened crimi-
nals.").
356. Much has been written about prison culture and that the tools necessary to
survive while incarcerated are antithetical to free society. See, e.g., LYNN S. BRANHAV, THE
LAW AND POLICY OF SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS: IN A NUTSHELL 220 (8th ed. 2010)
("During what is known as the 'prisonization process,' prisoners ... become highly de-
pendent on others to make choices for them, leaving them ill-equipped to initiate the
steps that will help them turn their lives around when they return to their communities.").
357. See FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, PROGRAM STATEMENT 7310.04, supra note 15 (in-
terpreting 18 U.S.C. 3624(c) (2010)).
358. See supra Part II.
359. See 150 CONG. REC. 10717 (2004) (statement of Sen. Biden); 153 CONG. PEC.
4430 (2007) (statement of Sen. Kennedy); 153 CONG. REC. 5691 (2007) (statement of
Congressman Davis); 153 CONG. REC. 8280 (2007) (statement of Congressman Davis); 153
CONG. REC. 1644 (2007) (statement of Congressman Rangel); 153 CONG. REC. 12717
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sought to provide a holistic approach to reentry that benefits the individ-
ual offender, the children and family of offenders, and the community at
large.36 The extraordinary justification exception rule is in direct opposi-
tion to Congress' intended purpose.
3 6
'
3. Failure to Respond to Relevant Arguments or Comments
A reviewing court seeking to determine whether an agency's inter-
pretation is reasonable will look at whether the agency's actions are
responsive to relevant arguments or comments." 2 In accord with the di-
rective in the Second Chance Act, the Bureau of Prisons promulgated an
interim rule, which it submitted for public notice and comment.3 63 The
public comnents contended that a six-month placement was not enough
time for an inmate to readjust to law-abiding society and thus be success-
ful upon reentry back into society. 64 The comments requested that the
Bureau of Prisons reconsider and change the rule before it became final.
Various stakeholders, including inmates, the families of inmates, and or-
ganizations,365 requested a rule that provided for longer halfway house
placements." ' Of the more than one hundred entries, not a single com-
ment supported the presumptive six-month placement absent an
extraordinary justification.367
(2007) (statement of Congressman Jackson-Lee) (2007). But see 153 CONG. REC. 5283
(2007) (statement of Congressman Gohmert).
360. Second Chance Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-199,122 Stat. 657 (2008) (codified
in scattered sections of 18 and 42 U.S.C.).
361. Federal Bureau of Prisons Oversight Hearing: The Bureau of Prisons Should Fully In-
plement Ameliorative Statutes to Prevent Wasted Resources, Dangerous Overcrowding, and Needless
Over-Ihcarceration Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Sec. of the H.R.
Comm. On the Judiciary, 111th Cong. (2009) (statement of Stephen R. Sady, Chief Deputy
Fed. Pub. Defender for the Dist. of Or.).
362. A GUIDE TO JUDICIAL AND POLITICAL REVIEW OF FEDERAL AGENCIES, supra note
213, at 191 ("An agency decision will be set aside if the agency failed to consider submit-
ted arguments, or respond to relevant and significant conflents, made by the participants
in the proceeding that gave rise to the agency action.").
363. 73 C.ER. § 62440-01 (2008).
364. Comments in BOP Docket No. 1151-I, Interim Rule Change on Pre-Release
Community Confinement, REGULATIONS.GOV (Feb. 11, 2011, 4:15 PM), http://
www.regulations.gov/#!docketDetail%3Bdct=FR+PR+N+O+SR+PS%3Brpp= 10%3Bs
o=DESC%3Bsb=postedDate%3Bpo=0%3BD=BOP-2009-0005.
365. Id. The organizations that submitted comments in opposition to the rule were:
the American Bar Association; the Federal Public Defender, Western District of Washing-
ton; the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers; Families Against Mandatory
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Although the information that was submitted appears to be anecdo-
tal and not supported by evidence, the same can be said of the Bureau of
Prisons' reliance upon agency experience as the basis for the rule. Each
offered its opinion that the extraordinary justification exception rule was
flawed because it failed to provide an adequate amount of time, meaning
that the rule was not individually based. The public notice and comment
period offers the Bureau of Prisons ample opportunity to respond to each
comment and demonstrate its reasoning behind the promulgation of the
rule. However, the Bureau of Prisons has not responded to the com-
ments.368 This lack of attention and failure to address the public comments
is a factor that courts should consider in evaluating the reasonableness of
the actions of the Bureau of Prisons.369 The remedy for failing to answer
the public comments has been to remand to the agency for "further pro-
ceedings. 37 The Bureau of Prisons' rule also ignores relevant arguments
about the importance of halfway house placements.
The Second Chance Act is not a run-of-the-mill piece of legislation.
Each of the last three presidents has addressed reentry.371 The legislation
has survived three Congresses. 372 Eventually, it was passed as a bipartisan
legislative effort with the express purpose of responding to the growing
concerns about the increase in the number of inmates exiting correctional
facilities annually, and the increase in the cumulative number of former
inmates in communities. 37 3 Congress was well aware that practices with
368. The Bureau of Prisons' last action was the Proposed Rule on October 21, 2008
requesting comments. See 73 Fed. Reg. 5 62440-01 (2008).
369. Merrick B. Garland, Deregulation and Judicial Review, 98 HAav. L. REv. 505, 509
(1985) ("[A] host of other now-familiar elements also became part of the hard look: an
agency had to demonstrate that it had responded to significant points made during the
public comment period, had examined all relevant factors, and had considered significant
alternatives to the course of action ultimately chosen:"). See Home Box Office, Inc. v.
FCC, 567 E2d 9, 35 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (requiring agency to respond to significant public
comments).
370. David S. Rubenstein, "Relative Checks": Towards Optimal Control of Administra-
tive Power, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2169, 2238-39 (2010) ("The deleterious effects of a
judicial substitution of judgment for that of the agency under hard-look review may be
partially offset by the remedy chosen by the court. Rather than overturn an agency policy
that it finds inadequate, courts may simply remand the matter to the agency for further
proceedings. This approach seems especially appropriate when the agency's failure under
the hard-look standard was its failure to adequately consider public comments or to ade-
quately explain why it chose the policy it did.").
371. See Herckis & Seeger, supra note 9; Thompson, supra note 10, at 260; Presi-
dent George W Bush, Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of
the Union (Jan. 20, 2004), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/
getdoc.cgi?dbname=2004-presidential-documents&docid=pd26jaO4_txt-10; Larry M.
Fehr, Reentry Matters, CORRECTIONS TODAY, Dec. 2009, at 6 (discussing President
Obama's funding for reentry).
372. See Herckis & Seeger, supra note 9;Thompson, supra note 10, at 260.
373. Clear, Waring & Scully, supra note 8, at ch. 7; TRvls, supra note 96, at ch. 11
(discussing the impact of mass incarceration on community life); TODD R. CLEAR,
SPRING 201 1]
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respect to reentry were ineffective. Therefore, Congress expressly increased
the length of time that an inmate was eligible to spend in a halfway
house.374
Halfway houses, which are valuable resources for reentry, are struc-
tured, yet less restrictive than prison settings. 31 Inmates are able to
transition gradually from incarceration back to society.376 These facilities
reduce the burden and stress associated with that transition, thereby allow-
ing inmates to readjust, not only to living freely in society, but also to
performing basic and necessary societal functions, such as maintaining
employment and paying rent and other bills. 377 Moreover, halfway houses
provide an in-house support network for the full range of obstacles that
offenders may face upon release, including finding suitable and steady
employment, and providing counseling for substance abuse and mental
health issues. Unlike traditional correctional facilities, halfway houses are
designed to house inmates whose release dates are near and thus mentally
prepared for reentry. As already discussed, halfway houses also benefit the
inmate's family and the community at large.
Halfway houses allow inmates and families the opportunity to re-
connect and to reestablish interpersonal relationships that may have been
impeded or severed outright due to the offender's incarceration. Because
of institutional space limitations, security designations, or other require-
ments, inmates are often housed in facilities that are far from their
communities and their families. Due to the distance and travel costs asso-
ciated with visitation, including transportation, housing, and food, families
IMPRISONING COMMUNITIES: How MASS INCARCERATION MAKES DISADVANTAGED NEIGH-
BORHOODS WORSE ch. 4 (2007) (discussing the concentration and impact of the formerly
imprisoned in certain communities).
374. 18 U.S.C. 3624(c) (2010).
375. See Borges, supra note 31, at 201 ("Halfway houses and community confinement
centers provide an effective alternative to prison for white-collar offenders because they
serve as a punitive sanction for offenders serving a short term of imprisonment. Further-
more, confinement centers make the transition back into the conmmunity easier for
offenders by allowing them to participate in work-release programs, conmmunity activities,
treatment, and maintain ties to family members, including children or ill parents.").
376. Id. at 142 ("Moreover, halfway houses have played a small, but important, role in
helping ex-offenders reintegrate into society.").
377. Roberts, supra note 31, at 56 ("While in CCCs, inmates prepare for release by
participating in specialized training programs stressing family and work adjustment, drug
treatment, and relapse prevention strategies and by securing post-release employment and
living acconmmodations. Community volunteers provide support in helping CCC residents
successfully reintegrate into the community."); see Borges, supra note 31, at 203 ("[I]t is
reasonable to conclude that halfway houses, offering work training, education, treatment,
employment, and connections to family ties for offenders, are better able to rehabilitate
and reintegrate the offender back into the community.").
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are often limited in their interactions with inmates.3 8 Halfway houses
provide a transitional space where inmates and families can become reac-
quainted with each other without the immediate pressures associated with
sharing the same living environment.
The Bureau of Prisons previously interpreted §§ 3621(b) and
3624(c) to allow early transfers or direct judicial placements into halfway
houses. 37 9 The Bureau of Prisons has expressly stated that such facilities
serve an important function in reducing recidivism, particularly for in-
mates who have "limited resources. '38' Halfway houses, according to the
Bureau of Prisons serve as an "excellent transitional environment" for in-
mates moving from more secure correctional environments to living free
in society.38 In acknowledging the important function that halfway
houses serve,382 the Bureau of Prisons remarked that eligible inmates
should be released into the community through such a transitional stage
rather than directly into the comnity.383 While the designation of
whether a halfway house was a place of imprisonment was contested, it
378. Stephanie S. Franklin, A Practitioner's Account of the Impact of the Adoption and Safe
Families Act (ASFA) on Incarcerated Parents and Their Families, in CIvIL PENALTIES, SOCIAL
CONSEQUENCES 102 (Christopher Mele and Teresa A. Miller eds., 2005).
379. Borges, supra note 31, at 174 ("Under the former policy, the Bureau of Prisons
had the authority pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b) to place low-level, non-violent offend-
ers in community confinement centers or halfway houses. Section 3621(b) gives the
Bureau of Prisons the sole authority to determine the placement of federal offenders sen-
tenced by federal judges, whether it is to prison or a halfway house ... Under the old
policy, federal judges had the ability to recommend, when appropriate, that non-violent
offenders serve their short terms of imprisonment in community confinement centers
rather than prisons. This practice was routinely honored. Thus, by its own initiative or by
judicial recommendation, the Bureau of Prisons had the authority under its former policy
to send low- level, non-violent offenders to community confinement centers.").
380. FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, PROGRAM STATEMENT 7310.04, supra note 15 ("Partici-
pating in community-based transitional services may reduce the likelihood of an inmate
with limited resources from recidivating, whereas an inmate who is released directly from
the institution to the community may return to a criminal lifestyle.").
381. Id.
382. The Bureau of Prisons pioneered the way by using halfway houses early in its
history as an effective tool. Roberts, supra note 31, at 55 ("The [Bureau of Prisons] was a
key player in the development of community corrections. In 1960, community corrections
was in its infancy. The three halfway houses that then existed in the United States were
operated by religious organizations to provide shelter for recently released ex-prisoners
who had nowhere else to live."); PAUL W KEVE, PRISONS AND THE AMERICAN CONSCIENCE:
A HISTORY Or U.S. FEDERAL CORRECTIONS 216 (1991) (In 1961 after his appointment as
Attorney General, Robert Kennedy implemented a "project to inaugurate prerelease guid-
ance centers, the Bureau's first move into the use of halfway houses."); ESCAPING PRISON
MYTHS: SELECTED TOPICS IN THE HISTORY OF FEDERAL CORRECTIONS 13, 15, 19 (John W
Roberts ed., 1994) (discussing the expansion and increased usage of halfway houses at
different points in time).
383. FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, PROGRAM STATEMENT 7310.04, supra note 15.
SPRING 2011]
HeinOnline  -- 16 Mich. J. Race & L. 297 2010-2011
Michigan Journal of Race & Law
has been determined that such facilities are places of imprisonment. 384
Halfway houses are more cost-effective than traditional penal facilities,
thus benefitting the entire community financially.385 Although the Bureau
of Prisons has identified such benefits, it continues to promulgate the six-
month rule with extraordinary justification exception rule citing agency
experience as the reason. After an appropriate assessment, the Bureau of
Prisons may come to the conclusion that a six-month length of stay is an
appropriate amount of time for an inmate to spend in a halfway house in
order to successfully reenter society."' However, the Bureau of Prisons
cannot fail to engage in an individualized assessment, which Congress has
explicitly stated must occur.387
In 2005, the appellate and district courts differed as to whether the
Bureau of Prisons' categorical exercise of discretion was proper.3"8 Unlike
the current rule, the issue of whether the Bureau of Prisons was entitled
to engage in a categorical exercise of discretion was left unresolved be-
cause the passage of the Second Chance Act mooted the question. The
question, however, has been resurrected and is ripe for judicial review. "It's
dj vu all over again.' ' 3 9 This time, however, the courts need to respond
with a definitive answer. Unfortunately, such a definitive answer is unlike-
ly to be forthcoming.
384. OLC Memo, supra note 4, at *5 ("In addition, consistent with the federal courts
of appeals' reading of section 5C1.1 . . . we do not believe that a community corrections
center or halfway house is a 'place of. . . imprisonment' within the ordinary meaning of
that phrase . . . [R]esidents of a community corrections center or halfway house, although
still in federal custody, are generally not confined to the facility throughout the day but
are instead able to pursue outside employment, training, and education."). Cf. Goldings v.
Winn, 383 F.3d 17, 26 n.9 (1st Cir. 2004) ("[T]he OLC itself previously recognized that
any correctional facility, including a community correctional facility, may be a place of
imprisonment pursuant to the plain meaning of 5 3621 (b): There is ... no statutory basis
in section 3621(b) for distinguishing between residential community facilities and secure
facilities ... [T]he subsequent deletion of the definition of 'facility' further undermines
the argument that Congress intended to distinguish between residential community facili-
ties and other kinds of facilities.").
385. See lacaboni v. US, 251 F Supp. 2d 1015 (D. Mass. 2003).
386. I would also disagree with the Bureau of Prisons' assessment. If the Bureau of
Prisons' placement of six months or less had been effective then the recidivism rates would
not have been as high within the first year or first three years of release. While the high
recidivism rates cannot be full attributed to placing inmates in halfway houses for a maxi-
mum of only six months, it begs the question why Congress expanded the time limit to
twelve months and why during the public and notice commnent period opponents rec-
ommended twelve-month placement.
387. S. R-sp. No. 98-225, at 142 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3325
("After considering these factors, the Bureau of Prisons may designate the place of impris-
onment in an appropriate type of facility, or may transfer the offender to another
appropriate facility."). See also supra Part II.A.1 (discussing the language in 18 U.S.C.
3621(b) (2010) that indicates that Congress requires this assessment to occur).
388. See infra Part I1.
389. BEma, supra note 2.
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The courts have consistently relied upon two doctrines to deny pe-
titioners judicial access: failure to exhaust administrative remedies39 and
mootness39' (although there are exceptions to both).3 92 In light of what is
at stake-decreasing recidivism and increasing public safety-the federal
courts should relax their adherence to the failure to exhaust an adminis-
trative remedy requirement and mootness doctrine.
III. DOCTRINAL OBSTACLES TO JUDICIAL REVIEW OF PLACEMENT POLICY
Courts have routinely denied inmate petitions seeking direct judicial
review of the Bureau of Prisons' placement policy either because of the
inmate's failure to exhaust administrative remedies or because the inmate's
case is moot. Consequently, these doctrinal constraints are preventing a
comprehensive review of the Bureau of Prisons' placement policy, and
thus preventing inmates from possibly receiving longer halfway house
placements.
390. A sample of the petitions that have been denied because of the inmate's failure
to exhaust administrative remedies: Torres v. Martinez, No. 3:09cv1070, 2009 WL
2487093, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 12, 2009); Sawyer v. Cozza-Rhodes, No. 09-1017
JNE/AJB, 2009 WL 2255766, at *2 (D. Minn. July 28, 2009); Breazeale v. Schultz, No.
09-2118, 2009 WL 1438236, at *3 (D. N.J. May 19, 2009) ("Because the face of the
Petition shows that Petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies and does not show
that Petitioner's failure to pursue administrative relief should be excused, this Court will
dismiss the [petition] without prejudice for failure to exhaust available administrative rem-
edies."); Wilson v. Keefer, No. 08-1961, 2009 WL 1230020, at *3 (W.D. La. May 5,
2009); Johnson v. Hogsten, No. 6:09-82-GFVT, 2009 WL 1010627, at *2 (E.D. Ky.
Apr. 15, 2009); Searcy v. Stansberry, No. 3:08CV50, 2009 WL 424344, at *2 (E.D. Va.
Feb. 19, 2009); D'Apice v. Woodring, No. CV 08-1526-MMM, 2009 WL 412111, at *2
(C.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2009); Kennedy v. Berkebile, No. 3:08-CV-2067-M, 2009 WL
151207, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 20, 2009); Dyer v. Mukasey, No. 08 C 6404, 2008 WL
5156111, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 8, 2008).
391. Stewart v. Gonzales, No. 1:07-00231, 2009 WL 669427, at *3 (S.D. W. Va.
Mar. 10, 2009) (finding petition is moot because of release from custody); Pierce v. Nel-
son, No. 1:07-00680, 2009 WL 261466, at *2 (S.D. W.Va. Feb. 4, 2009) (finding
petition is moot because of release from custody); Ashburn v. Eichenlaub, No. 07-13040,
2008 WL 5244413, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 16, 2008) (finding petition is moot because
petition challenges 2005 Rule); Bell v. Berkebile, No. 3:08-CV-0011-M ECF, 2008 WL
5100118, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 2, 2008) (finding petition is moot because petition chal-
lenges 2005 Rule); Keys v. Outlaw, No. 2:07CV00137 JTR, 2008 WL 3062935, at *1
(E.D. Ark. Aug. 1, 2008) (finding petition is moot because of transfer); Motz v. Zuercher,
No. 08-cv-1062, 2008 WL 4414511, at *1 (C.D. Ill. Sept. 22, 2008) (finding petition is
moot because of release from custody).
392. Fournier v. Zickefoose, 620 F. Supp. 2d 313, 317 (2009) ("Although the court
is well-aware that exhaustion is generally required before an action may be brought under
section 2241, given the circumstances of this case-including ... the obvious urgency of
her Application and the near certainty that forcing her to pursue administrative remedies
will render this case moot-the court excuses Fournier's failure to exhaust administrative
remedies."); Snyder v. Angelini, No. 07-CV-3073, 2008 WL 4773142, at *3 (E.D.N.Y.
Oct. 27, 2008). See iifra Parts III.A & III.B.
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Inmates have invoked the futility exception, which allows a peti-
tioner to bypass the administrative remedy process when pursuing judicial
review.393 Courts have overwhelmingly rejected this exception.394 The Di-
rector of the Bureau of Prisons and other officials have stated repeatedly
that a six-month placement is sufficient.39 Given these official statements,
legal action is inevitable.
Inmates who are eligible for halfway house placement will consist-
ently expect the longest placement that is statutorily available. The Bureau
of Prisons, on the other hand, is not convinced that placements in excess
of six months are necessary, except for "extraordinary justifications." Im-
portantly, the Bureau of Prisons repeatedly has rejected attempts by
prisoners to invoke the extraordinary justification exception.396 As neither
party is likely to change its opinion, inmates will continue to file petitions
challenging the placement decisions and the time lost awaiting an admin-
393. The court balances the individual's interest with the procedural exhaustion re-
quirement. McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 146 (1992) ("[A]dministrative remedies
need not be pursued if the litigant's interests in immediate judicial review outweigh the
government's interest in the efficacy or administrative autonomy that the exhaustion doc-
trine is designed to further.").
394. See supra note 390 for examples of courts denying the futility exception.
395. See Regional Hearing on the State of Federal Sentencing, supra note 307, at 9-10
(statement of Harley G. Lappin, Dir., Fed. Bureau of Prisons) ("[T]he Bureau of Prisons
rarely uses RRCs for direct court commitments and rarely transfers inmates to RRCs for
prerelease services for more than 6 months .. . most releasing offenders receive the neces-
sary transitional assistance in three to four months at an RRC."); U.S. Dept. of Justice
Before the H.R. Comm. on the Judiciary, Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Securi-
ty: Federal Bureau of Prisons Oversight (July 21, 2009) (statement of Harley G. Lappin, Dir.,
Fed. Bureau of Prisons) ("The use of residential reentry centers is a topic of significant
interest, especially with the enactment of the Second Chance Act. We understand the
interest in placing inmates in halfway houses for periods of time longer than the current
average of 4 months.") [hereinafter Lappin statement of July 21, 2009]; Symposium on
Alternatives to Incarceration, supra note 307, at 272 ("BOP studies indicate that an inmate
can receive the full benefit of a Residential Reentry Center after only six months."); Id. at
283 (statement of Jerry Vroegh, Adm'r, Cmty Corr. and Det. Services Branch, Fed. Bu-
reau of Prisons).
396. Hayes v. Grayer, No. 1:09-CV-2501-RWS, 2009 WL 4906864, at *8 (N.D.
Ga. Dec. 17, 2009) (affirming the Bureau of Prisons' decision that no extraordinary justi-
fication existed); Esters v. Jett, No. 09-1667 (MJD/AJB), 2009 WL 3417900, at *4 (D.
Minn. Oct. 21, 2009) ("Based upon the criteria considered by the unit team, along with
the absence of extraordinary or compelling circumstances to justify a longer RRC place-
ment, a maximum halfway house release of 180 days was reconmended."); Daraio v.
Lappin, No. 3:08CV1812(MRK), 2009 WL 303995, at *7 (D. Conn. Feb. 9, 2009) (in
which petitioner offered several extraordinary justifications for a longer placement, each
of which was denied); Johnson v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, No. 07-3292-RDR, 2008 WL
2648996, at *3 (D. Kan. June 27, 2008) (in which petitioner raised an extraordinary justi-
fication exception claim, but the court denied for failure to exhaust administrative
remedies); Fisher v. Morrison, No. 06-2775, 2007 WL 4441180, at *1 (8th Cir. Dec. 20,
2007) (declining to hear appeal regarding extraordinary justification exception claim).
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istrative decision will continue to diminish the amount of time that in-
mates would be able to spend in a halfway house.3 97
Courts have continued to adhere to the exhaustion doctrine in the
face of statements made by the Bureau of Prisons' officials"' and existing
placement data3 99 that the pursuit of an administrative remedy (i.e., receiv-
ing a longer placement after being reviewed) would be useless.400
Under the mootness doctrine, federal courts are technically con-
strained from hearing cases in which they can no longer provide the
remedy that is sought. In the absence of a case or controversy, the peti-
tioner's case is dismissed. 41 There are exceptions to this doctrine,4 2 such as
when an issue is "capable of repetition, yet it evades review" because the
397. Strong v. Schultz, 599 F Supp. 2d 556, 561 (D.NJ. 2009) ("This Court notes that
Strong is currently scheduled to be placed in a CCC for the final six months of his sen-
tence .... Given that it took five months to exhaust administrative remedies the first time
around, dismissal of the Petition as unexhausted would effectively moot Petitioner's § 2241
claim through no fault of his own .... [T]he purposes of exhaustion would not be served
by requiring a second round of exhaustion, since Strong is challenging the validity of the
BOP'S April 14, 2008, guidance, not its application. This Court will therefore excuse the
failure to exhaust administrative remedies."; Id.; at 563 n.4 ("Because Strong only has nine
months left on his sentence, the BOP shall consider his designation to a CCC for the
remainder of his term of incarceration."); Padilla v. Wiley, No. 09-cv-0 111 1-BNB, 2009
WL 2447394, at *3 (D. Colo. Aug. 6, 2009). But see Wolff v. Cruz, No. 09-CV-0437
PJS/AJB, 2009 WL 2143692, at *3-4 (D. Minn. July 14, 2009) ("[T]he prisoner's calcula-
tion as to the amount of time required to complete the three-tier administrative remedy
process is based upon his own use of the entire available time to submit successive appeals,
along with unsupported assumptions that the warden, the BOP Regional Director, and
the Central Office would each take the maximum amount of time to render their respec-
tive decisions, and that such decisions would be adverse to the prisoner .... [T]he court
concludes that the petitioner is not entitled to the benefit of the substantially arbitrary
presumptions upon which he relies with regard to either the time for appeals or the likeh-
hood of success, and the futility argument therefore fails.").
398. See supra note 364 and accompanying text.
399. Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2007), Request No. 2010-
00330 from S. David Mitchell to Wanda M. Hunt (Oct. 14, 2009). In response to the au-
thor's request for information regarding the length of time that inmates are placed in a
Residential Re-entry Center the Bureau of Prisons provided incomplete data showing
that two percent of prisoners received placements longer than six months.
400. Some courts have proceeded to address the merits of a petition even though the
petitioner has failed to exhaust the administrative remedies. See Lueth v. Beach, 498 F.3d
795, 797 n.3 (8th Cit. 2007) (stating that a court may address the merits of a petition
despite alleged failure to exhaust administrative remedies because the "exhaustion prereq-
uisite for filing a 28 U.S.C. 5 2241 petition is judicially created, not jurisdictional");
Torres v. Martinez, No. 3:09cv1070, 2009 WL 2487093, at *10 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 12,
2009) (addressing the merits with respect to halfway house placement).
401. See, e.g., Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1 (1998); Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811
(1997); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
402. One exception, the voluntary cessation of the challenged practice, is inapplicable
and will not be discussed. City News & Novelty, Inc. v. City ofWaukesha, 531 U.S. 278,
284 n.1 (2001); Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S.
167, 189 (2000).
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time between the conduct and judicial review is too short."' In other
words, this exception allows a court to review a petition even though
such review would technically be precluded. Another exception that has
been recognized by state courts,40 4 the public importance exception, also
applies when an issue is significant and likely to recur.4 0 1 Although the
public importance exception has not been explicitly defined, it has been
referred to as a "great" or "substantial" issue.41 6 The specific issue of half-
way house placement and general issue of reentry is of such significance
4
11
that federal courts should adopt this exception4 .0 and declare once and for
403. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 895 (2010);
Friends of the Earth, Inc., 528 U.S. 167; Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974); S. Pac.
Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 515 (1911).
404. See Cinkus v.Village of Stickney Mun. Officers Electoral Bd., 886 N.E.2d 1011,
1017 (ill. 2008) ("[O]ne exception to the mootness doctrine allows a court to resolve an
otherwise moot issue if that issue involves a substantial public interest. The criteria for
application of the public interest exception are: (1) the question presented is of a public
nature; (2) an authoritative resolution of the question is desirable to guide public officers;
and (3) the question is likely to recur."); Lucas v. Lakin, 676 N.E.2d 637 (Ill. 1997); In reA
Minor, 537 N.E.2d 292 (Ill. 1989). A clear showing of each criterion is necessary to bring
a case within the public interest exception. Bonaguro v. Cnty Officers Electoral Bd., 634
N.E.2d 712 (I1. 1994).
405. Radazewski v. Cawley, 639 N.E.2d 141 (111. 1994).
406. In re Geraghty, 343 A.2d 737, 738-39 (N.J. 1975) ("[We have often recog-
nized that courts may hear and decide cases which are technically moot where issues of
great public importance are involved."); People ex rel. Guggenheim v. Mucci, 298
N.E.2d 109, 110 (N.Y. 1973) ("[A]n appeal should not be dismissed as moot if a question
of general interest and substantial public importance is likely to recur.").
407. See SABoL, WEST & COOPER, supra note 5; Fehr, supra note 58, at 5 ("Annually,
the Bureau returns 45,000 federal inmates to our communities, a number that will contin-
ue to increase as the population grows.").
408. William A. Fletcher, The "Case or Controversy" Requirement in State Court Adju-
dication of Federal Questions, 78 CAL. L. REv. 263, 300-01 (1990) (advocating for federal
courts to adopt the public importance exception. "In my view, the article III mootness
standard as presently formulated is too grudging. I would prefer that the Supreme Court
forthrightly adopt the 'continuing public importance' exception that is virtually universal
in state courts. In such cases, the state appellate court is deciding a matter that is of great
and current concern to the state's public officials, that was litigated and decided when the
case was indisputably live, and in which the parties retain sufficient interest to argue the
case in the appellate court. In such circumstances, it seems unlikely that the quality of
adjudication by the state appellate court-or by the United States Supreme Court, for
that matter-is so seriously threatened that the appeal must be considered nonjusticiable
under article III. Indeed, the Supreme Court's exception to article III moomess doctrine
for matters that are 'capable of repetition, yet evading review' appears to be close to an
open admission that this is so."). But see Thomas R. Bender, Rhode Island's Public Im-
portance Exception for Advisory Opinions: The Unconstitutional Exercise of a Non-Judicial Power,
10 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 123, 126, 157 (2004) (criticizing the public importance
exception as inconsistent and "inappropriate" in the context of providing advisory opin-
ions).
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all whether the Bureau of Prisons' policy is impermissible.4 9 The Bureau
of Prisons' policy not only exceeds the bounds of its statutorily mandated
discretion, but it also disregards Congress' intent to improve federal
reentry. The Bureau of Prisons needs to amend its policy and not limit the
placement of inmates in halfway houses to six months. Ideally, the Bureau
of Prisons should return to its pre-2002 open transfer policy.4 10
If a petitioner can convince a court to review the case, he at least has
a chance of prevailing and obtaining the sought after remedy of being
placed in a halfway house for a longer period of time. The problem,
however, is that courts are using two doctrines to block review: exhaus-
tion 41 1 and mootness.
A. Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies
An inmate who fails to exhaust the administrative process4"2 will not
be heard unless the court recognizes an exception that permits the inmate
409. See John W Roberts, The Federal Bureau of Prisons: Its Mission, Its History and Its
Partnership With Probation and Pretrial Services, 61 FED. PROBATION 53, 54 (1997) ("For the
first five decades of the BOP's existence, the number of prisons and the number of inmates
remained fairly stable. From the early 1940s through the early 1980s, for example, the
inmate population in the BOP's 25 to 30 facilities fluctuated within a narrow range of
17,000 to 25,000. By the mid-1980s, however, intensified prosecution of drug laws, the
introduction of sentencing guidelines, and the discontinuation of federal parole created a
period of unprecedented growth in the BOP."); FED. BUREAU OF PRSONS, U.S. DEPT. OF
JUSTICE, ABOUT THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS, supra note 352, at 3 ("The 1980's
brought a significant increase in the number of Federal inmates-the result of Federal law
enforcement efforts and new legislation that dramatically altered sentencing in the Federal
criminal justice system. Most of the Bureau's growth since the mid-1980's has been the
result of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (Which established determinate sentencing,
abolished parole, and reduced good time) and mandatory minimum sentences enacted in
1986, 1988, and 1990.").
410. See supra Part II.A.
411. Hall v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, No. 09-3052-RDR, 2009WL 2009007 (D. Kan.
July 9, 2009) (holding that petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies); Johnson v.
Fed. Bureau of Prisons, No. 07-3292-RDR, 2008 WL 2648996 (D. Kan. June 27, 2008);
Snyder v. Angelini, No. 07-3073, 2008 WL 4773142, at *3 (E.D.N.Y Oct. 27, 2008)
(noting that futility exception negates the petitioner's failure to exhaust administrative
remedies);Johnson v. Hogsten, No. 6:09-82, 2009 WL 1010627, at *2-3 (E.D. Ky. Apr. 15,
2009) (denying petition on the ground that the petitioner failed to exhaust administrative
remedies and the futility exception was inapplicable); Leung v. U.S., No. 01 CR.
366(RCC), 2003WL 3237637 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 17,2003).
412. See Darby v. Cisneros, 509 U.S. 137, 144 (1993). The exhaustion of administra-
tive remedies is a judicial doctrine that requires an individual to submit a grievance to the
agency's administrative remedy process before seeking relief from the courts. The purpose
of the requirement is to recognize that the agency has been delegated primary responsibil-
ity for enacting Congressional programs, to allow the agency an opportunity to remedy
the grievance without judicial interference, and to provide a record if judicial review is
warranted.
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to circumvent the administrative process.4t 3 The purpose of the exhaustion
doctrine is to provide the administrative agency the opportunity to re-
dress a party's grievance without judicial interference. 4' 4 The exhaustion
doctrine has several exceptions" ' that can be invoked to relieve the peti-
413. Esters v. Jett, No. 09-1667 (MJD/AJB), 2009WL 3417900, at *3 (D. Minn. Oct.
21, 2009) ("The BOP has established a three-tiered administrative remedy program to
address prisoner concerns relating to any aspects of confinement. The first tier of the pro-
cess requires that an inmate initially seek informal resolution of the grievance and, if there
is no informal resolution he must present the complaint to the warden of the facility of
confinement. Thereafter, at the second tier, an unsatisfactory response from the warden
may be appealed to the BOP Regional Director, and finally, the response of the Regional
Director may be appealed to the Central Office of the BOP at the third tier. A prisoner's
complaint has been exhausted, and is thereby subject to district court review, upon receipt
of the Central Office response.") (citations omitted); Williams v. Outlaw, No.
2:09CV00075 BSM, 2009 WL 5184329, at *6 (E.D. Ark. Dec. 22, 2009); Jones v. Zenk,
495 F Supp. 2d 1289 (N.D. Ga. 2007); Kennedy v. Berkebile, No. 3:08-CV-2067-M, 2009
WL 151207, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 20, 2009). See also FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, U.S. DEPT.
OF JUSTICE, LEGAL RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE FEDERAL BUREAU oF PRISONS 34-35 (2008),
http://www.bop.gov/news/PDFs/legal-guide.pdf (detailing the Administrative Remedy
Program and the time limits).
414. RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & PAUL R.VERKUIL, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW AND PROCESS 192-93 (3d ed. 1999) ("First ... the legislature creates an agency for the
purpose of applying a statutory scheme to particular factual situations. The exhaustion
doctrine permits the agency to perform this function, including in particular the oppor-
tunity for the agency to apply its expertise and to exercise the discretion granted it by the
legislature. Second, it is more efficient to permit the administrative process to proceed
uninterrupted and to subject the results of the process to judicial review only at the con-
clusion of the process. Three, agencies are not part of the judicial branch; they are
autonomous entities created by the legislature to perform a particular function. The ex-
haustion doctrine protects the agency autonomy. Fourth, judicial review of agency action
can be hindered by failure to exhaust administrative remedies because the agency may not
have an adequate opportunity to assemble and analyze the facts and to explain the basis for
its action. Fifth, the exhaustion requirement reduces court appeals by providing the agency
additional opportunities to correct its prior errors. Sixth, allowing some parties to obtain
court review without first exhausting administrative remedies may reduce the agency's
effectiveness by encouraging others to circumvent its procedures and by rendering the
agency's enforcement efforts more complicated and more expensive."). See McCarthy v.
Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 145 (1992) ("Exhaustion is required because it serves the twin
purposes of protecting administrative agency authority and promoting judicial efficien-
cy"); McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 193 (1969) ("A primary purpose is ... the
avoidance of premature interruption of the administrative process .... The courts ordi-
narily should not interfere with an agency until it has completed its action, or else has
clearly exceeded its jurisdiction."); Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41
(1938) (discussing the application of the exhaustion doctrine).
415. See Robert Layton & Ralph I. Fine, The Draft and Exhaustion of Administrative
Remedies, 56 GEo. L.J. 315, 322-331 (1967-68); McCarthy, 503 U.S. at 146-48 ("This
Court's precedents have recognized at least three broad sets of circumstances in which the
interests of the individual weigh heavily against requiring administrative exhaustion. First,
requiring resort to the administrative remedy may occasion undue prejudice to subsequent
assertion of a court action .... Second, an administrative remedy may be inadequate 'be-
cause of some doubt as to whether the agency was empowered to grant effective relief'
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tioner of his duty to navigate the established administrative process prior
to seeking judicial review. The exceptions that have previously been rec-
ognized are irreparable harm, reconsideration or administrative appeals,
express or implied waiver, futility, manifest violation of constitutional
rights, purely legal issue, procedural challenge, challenge of bias or pre-
judgment, exercise of judicial discretion, unreasonable delay,4"6 and those
expressly created by statute."7
An inmate challenging a Bureau of Prisons' action first submits an
informal request to the institutional staff regarding the issue.418 If that re-
quest is unsuccessful and the inmate is denied a longer placement, the
inmate then submits a formal written request for an administrative
remedy.4"9 Upon receipt of such a request, the warden of that facility has
twenty days in which to respond.420 If that response is still unsatisfactory,
the inmate is permitted to submit an appeal to the Regional Director
within twenty days.42 Following the submission of such an appeal, the
Regional Director has thirty days in which to respond.42 2 If the inmate is
still dissatisfied, the inmate has thirty days to file an appeal with the Bu-
reau of Prisons' General Counsel. Once the appeal is filed, the General
Counsel has forty days to respond. 23 The administrative remedy program
exists in order to allow the Bureau of Prisons to remedy the problem
without judicial intervention and to establish an appropriate record for
the court if judicial intervention is required. 24 Although the program is
important, the Supreme Court has acknowledged that there are circum-
stances in which a failure to exhaust the administrative remedies is
excusable.4 2
.... Third, an administrative remedy may be inadequate where the administrative body is
shown to be biased or has otherwise predetermined the issue before it.") (quoting Gibson
v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 575 (1973)). Embodied in the futility exception are two others
that have been separated out and are applicable here but will be discussed in the context of
the futility exception. They are a challenge of bias or prejudgment and unreasonable delay
WRIGHT & KOCH,JR. supra note 23, 5 8398.
416. Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973); Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. FCC, 138 F.3d 746
(8th Cir. 1998).
417. WRIGHT & KocH, JR., supra note 23, § 8398.
418. 28 C.FR. 5 542.13 (2002).
419. Id. § 542.14.
420. Id. § 542.18.
421. Id. § 542.15.
422. Id. § 542.18.
423. See id. § 542.10-542.19; Fournier v. Zickefoose, 620 E Supp. 2d 313, 316 (D.
Conn. 2009) (detailing the Bureau of Prisons' Administrative Remedy Program); Cooper
v. Grondolsky, No. 09-2970 (JBS), 2009 WL 2049168, at *2 (D. NJ. July 8, 2009) (detail-
ing the Bureau of Prisons'Administrative Remedy Program).
424. McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 144 (1992).
425. Id.
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Of these exceptions, federal inmates have relied primarily upon two:
futility and irreparable injury.126 Neither has proved overwhelmingly suc-
cessful. Curiously, inmates have not asserted the following exceptions,
which may be more successful, to obtain judicial review: challenge of bias
or prejudgment, unreasonable delay, and questions of law.
1. Futility: Adequacy of RemedyVersus Judicial Inevitability
In assessing whether the futility exception to the exhaustion re-
quirement is applicable, courts have interpreted the exception differently.
Some courts have focused on the "adequacy of the remedy," finding that
that the administrative agency must be able to provide the relief request-
ed.427 Others have focused on whether a judicial proceeding is
inevitable.428 Some courts that have denied the countless petitions chal-
lenging the Bureau of Prisons' placement policies have focused on
whether the Bureau of Prisons can provide an adequate remedy.4 29 The
courts' focus, however, is misplaced. Rather than deciding whether an
agency has the ability to provide a remedy, the court should be concerned
with whether the agency's policy is correct.
With regard to the Bureau of Prisons' halfway house placement pol-
icy, at least one court has maintained that it would be a waste of time to
follow through with the Bureau of Prisons' administrative remedy because
the agency has predetermined the outcome.4
0
426. The exhaustion requirement in the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C.
1997e(a) (2010), mandates that prisoners complete the administrative review process
before seeking a judicial remedy, Karen M. Blum, Local Government Liability Under Section
1983, 764 PLI/Lor 747, 821 (Oct. 25-26, 2007). Federal inmates challenging the Bureau
of Prisons halfway house placement policy can submit an exception to the requirement as
the numerous petitions challenging the new policies demonstrate.
427. Johnson v. Dept. of Corr., 635 N.W2d 487, 489 (Iowa Ct. App. 2001) (noting
that the administrative code provided an adequate administrative remedy to the innate
seeking parole); Moulton v. Napolitano, 73 P.3d 637, 645 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003) (focusing
on the power of the administrative agency to provide relief and not the probability of
providing such relief); Neiman v.Yale Univ., 270 Conn. 244, 260 (2004) (noting that the
possibility of an adverse decision does not constitute futility).
428. Kish v. Cohn, 756 A.2d 313 (Conn. App. Ct. 2000); 73 C.J.S. Futility § 91
(2010).
429. Schlenkert v. Garcia, No. 09-cv-01416-MSK, 2011 WL 116848, at *1 (D.
Colo. Jan. 13, 2011) ("Because Mr. Schlenkert is no longer in custody, it is impossible to
grant him an earlier RRC placement. Put simply, because Mr. Schlenkert has already
been released from custody, there is nothing for the Court to remedy."); Berry v. Sand-
ers, No. CV 08-1319-VBF (MAN), 2009 WL 789890, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 20, 2009);
Eagle v. Garcia, No. 09-cv-01293-WYD, 2010 WL 899939, at *2 (D. Colo. Mar. 11,
2010).
430. Ferguson v. Ashcroft, 248 F. Supp. 2d 547, 563 (M.D. La. 2003).
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The court finds that Ms. Ferguson need not exhaust adminis-
trative remedies that are mere apparitions. While the
Government is correct that the exhaustion doctrine normally
bars direct resort to the courts, that is not true where pursuing
administrative remedies would be futile "because it is clear that
the claim will be rejected." Where an agency has adopted a
new rule or policy and announced that it will follow that
policy, especially where that policy has its origin above the
Bureau's General Counsel Office, it is pointless to require a
complainant to follow the administrative procedure. The peo-
ple who would review Ms. Ferguson's claims in the Bureau
have absolutely no power to alter her designation. The new
'policy' was based on an interpretation that was handed down
from on high in the Department of Justice. Thus, an adminis-
trative appeal could only work to delay this matter.43 '
Federal inmates have claimed repeatedly that the Bureau of Prisons has
pre-determined that six months in a halfway house is a satisfactory length
of time for an inmate to be prepared for reentry.432 The extraordinary jus-
tification exception rule has its origins in a 2002 policy that was
recommended by the Office of Legal Counsel and supported by the
Department of Justice.433 It is pointless to require an inmate to comply
with the Bureau of Prisons' administrative remedy process.
The standard used to assess whether it would be futile to pursue the
review process is "when it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt ... that the
agency will not provide the relief requested. 434 An appeal is futile if the
Bureau of Prisons "refuses to reconsider its decisions or procedures, or has
stated a categorical rule to apply in a group of cases, or where further
administrative review would result in a decision on the same issue by the
same body."43 All of these are applicable with respect to an inmate seeking
a longer halfway house placement. It is readily apparent that the Bureau of
Prisons has no intention of changing its placement policy and transferring
offenders to halfway houses for more than six months.
Under the extraordinary justification exception rule, the Bureau of
Prisons has pre-determined how much time is satisfactory for each in-
mate. The increased "period of evaluation" merely reinforces the adopted
policy and pays lip service to the intent of Congress in § 3621(b) to con-
sider the five factors. Some inmates have been placed in halfway houses
for more than six months, but the placement itself is not the proper focus
for analysis. The Bureau of Prisons is not following the process set forth
431. Id.
432. See supra note 395.
433. See Thompson Memo, supra note 45; OLC Memo, supra note 46.
434. Weston v. Cassata, 37 P.3d 469,478 (Colo. App. 2001).
435. Little v. City of Lawrenceville, 528 S.E.2d 515, 518 (Ga. 2000).
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by Congress, thereby forcing inmates to challenge the agency's placement
decisions. By requiring exhaustion of the administrative remedy process,
the courts are implicitly supporting the Bureau of Prisons' continued and
willful disregard of the five factors in § 3621(b).The time spent navigating
an administrative remedy process whose outcome is pre-determined
wastes valuable time which could be devoted to preparing an inmate to
reenter society. Even if an inmate manages to navigate the administrative
remedy process and eventually prevails in court, the maximum amount of
placement time will no longer be available. The Bureau of Prisons' data
on halfway house placement underscore the futility of seeking redress
under the administrative remedy process.
In response to a Freedom of Information Act request, the Bureau of
Prisons provided the following data. Of the 8,945 inmates that were listed
on the Bureau of Prisons' website in October 2009 as being placed in a
halfway house, the Bureau of Prisons provided information on only 2,275
of them. 436 Of those prisoners, two percent, or fifty-six, inmates had re-
ceived a halfway house placement in excess of six months.437 The Bureau
of Prisons provided no rationale for the unaccounted inmates.The Bureau
of Prisons stated that the information pertaining to the extraordinary jus-
tification exception, the information needed to receive a halfway house
stay in excess of six months, was not centralized but kept at each individ-
ual facility. There was no explanation as to why only fifty-six inmates had
received longer placements.
One may posit that the Bureau of Prisons would argue that because
approximately two percent of these inmates were placed in a halfway
house for more than six months, the administrative review process works,
and its actions are not contrary to its statutory mandate.4 38 Thus, it is not
futile to require an inmate to adhere to the administrative process. This
argument is wide of the mark. The question is not whether the Bureau of
Prisons can provide the remedy sought, i.e., a longer placement, but rather
whether the exhaustion requirement is futile because the outcome has
been predetermined. It is in that light that courts need to acknowledge
the futility exception.
When the Bureau of Prisons adopted the 2002 Policy, the change
limited the placement of inmates to a period of either the last ten percent
of their sentence or six months, whichever was less. 439 Each subsequent
change to the Bureau of Prisons' policy and each rule that has been
adopted has reaffirmed the six-month limitation, with the Bureau of Pris-
436. Weekly Population Report, FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS (Oct. 9, 2009), http://
www.bop.gov/locations/weekly-report.jsp. The Bureau of Prisons has not yet indicated
what circumstances satisfy the extraordinary justification requirement.
437. Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Request No. 2010-00330, supra note 399.
438. See supra note 400 and accompanying text.
439. See Cooksey & Erlewine Memo, supra note 17, at 2.
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ons asserting different reasons for the policy's validity,40 including prior
erroneous statutory interpretation 441 or categorical exercise of discretion.
442
In addition, the Director of the Bureau of Prisons and other officials have
reiterated that six months in a halfway house is enough time for an in-
mate to reenter society successfully.4 4 3 If the Director has indicated that six
months is a sufficient amount of time44 4 and the Regional Directors must
provide written approval of longer placements, 45 it stands to reason that
the Bureau of Prisons' officials are more than likely to decline an adminis-
trative appeal challenging the placement determination. Hence, the
futility exception has been satisfied.
Inmates have also asserted that the requirement to exhaust the ad-
ministrative remedy results in an irreparable injury, but these assertions
have not been met with success.
2. Irreparable Injury: Larger Than the Individual
Under the irreparable injury exception, the petitioner must demon-
strate that "an award of damages at a later date will not adequately
compensate the aggrieved party.'4 46 However, courts have narrowly
construed this exception to prevent petitioners from claiming speculative
injuries as a means to evade administrative review, which would supplant
the agency's decision making with that of the courts.While that approach
may be proper in other contexts, it is shortsighted when applied to half-
way house placement, an important piece of the reentry puzzle.
440. See supra Part II.B.1-3 (discussing the adoption of the policy which limited
placement to six months based upon the OLC's determination that open transfer pohcy
was illegal, and asserting a categorical exercise of discretion which continued to limit the
placement to six months to insulate the 2005 Rule from challenges).
441. Id.
442. Id.
443. See supra note 307.
444. See Lappin statement ofJuly 21, 2009, supra note 395, at 2 (citing Symposium on
Alternatives to Incarceration, supra note 307, at 267). See also Symposium on Alternatives to
Incarceration, supra note 307, at 272 ("BOP studies indicate that an inmate can receive the
full benefit of a Residential Reentry Center after only six months.").
445. See Strong v Schultz, 599 F Supp. 2d 556, 562 (D.NJ. 2009) ("This Court finds
that, by instructing staff that pre-release placement needs can usually be accommodated by
a placement of six months or less and by denying staff the discretion to recommend a
placement longer than six months (Without advance written approval from the Regional
Director), the April 14, 2008, Memorandum is inconsistent with the Second Chance Act's
amendments to § 3624(c)"); Hayes v. Grayer, No. 1:09-CV-2501-RWS, 2009 WL
4906864, at *6 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 17, 2009) (citing Strong); Torres v. Martinez, No.
3:09cv1070, 2009 WL 2487093, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 12 2009) (citing Strong); see also 28
C.FR. % 570.20-22 (2008); Condey & Kenney Memo, supra note 14 (stating the proposi-
tion that approval is required); Bureau of Prisons, Program Statement 7310.04, supra note
15.
446. Gutierrez v. Laredo Indep. Sch. Dist., 139 S.W3d 363, 367 (Tex. App. 2004).
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The Second Chance Act was passed specifically to reduce recidivism
and to increase public safety.44 Congress expressly increased the amount
of time that an individual could be placed in a halfway house.448 Congress
also repeatedly stressed that, in order for reentry to be successful, it is nec-
essary to provide offenders with housing, employment, medical care, drug
treatment, and the opportunity to reunite with family.449 Transitioning
from a correctional facility to a free, law-abiding life requires more than a
change of address; it requires the inmate to acquire new skills and a new
attitude.-" Halfway houses provide an inmate with the opportunity to
make that transition. Moreover, the longer the period of transition, the
more likely an inmate can build an employment record, acquire lost or
never attained skills, reverse the effects of prisonization, 41 1 and positively
reconnect with famly.4 5
2
Apart from these two exceptions-futility and irreparable injury-
that have been unsuccessful, there are other exceptions, such as questions
of law, bias or predetermination, or unreasonable delay, that the courts
could invoke to grant federal inmates judicial access without first having
to exhaust the administrative remedy process.
3. Questions of Law: Additional Factors Considered
Under the question of law exception, a petitioner can avoid having
to exhaust the administrative remedy "where the agency disregards a spe-
cific and unambiguous statutory ... directive."4"3 By declaring that an
inmate will be presumptively placed in a halfway house for six months
absent an extraordinary justification is a question of law.
447. Second Chance Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-199, 122 Stat. 657 (2008) (codified
in scattered sections of 18 and 42 U.S.C.).
448. Some may suggest that the expanded time limit was to end the debate once and
for all as to the proper placement policy. Congress could have resolved the years of confu-
sion by declaring six months as the limit to halfway house placement. Yet, it specifically
increased the amount of time.
449. See supra note 447.
450. See supra note 348 and accompanying text.
451. See CLEMMER, supra note 351, at ch. 8; Stevens, supra note 351; Edwards, supra
note 351.
452. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
453. 73 CJ.S. Questions of Law § 93 (2010) (The exception in its totality reads as
follows: "A failure to exhaust administrative remedies may be justified when the only or
controlling question is one of law, or where the issue is one of facial validity or construc-
tion or interpretation of a statute or regulation. Similarly, the rule of exhaustion of
remedies will not usually apply where the validity of the administrative remedy itself is
challenged, or where the agency disregards a specific and unambiguous statutory, regulato-
ry or constitutional directive."). See Ind. State Dep't of Welfare, Medicaid Div. v. Stagner,
410 N.E.2d 1348, 1353 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980); State ex rel. Golembske v. White, 362 A.2d
1354, 1358 (Conn. 1975).
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Section 3624(c)(6) requires the Bureau of Prisons to act in a manner
that is consistent with § 3621(b). The Bureau of Prisons' a priori declara-
tion that a six-month placement is appropriate for reentry ignores two of
the five factors in § 3621(b), "the nature and circumstances of the of-
fense"4 4 and "the history and characteristics of the prisoner,"' thus
denying the statutorily mandated individualized assessment to each in-
mate.
The rule presumes that all federal inmates are similarly situated be-
fore the evaluation takes place. The pre-determined length of placement is
a presumption that guides the evaluation of each counselor at each insti-
tution; thus, it is unlikely that an objective evaluation occurs. Moreover,
there are potential costs to the inmate for challenging a placement of six
months or less. In at least one instance, an inmate claimed that merely
asking the question about receiving a placement in excess of six months
resulted in retaliation."6 Similar arguments can be made with regard to
the application of the bias or predetermination exception.
4. Bias or Predetermination Issue
The Supreme Court has stated that exhaustion is not necessary
where the agency is biased or has predetermined the issue.47 In deciding
that an agency is biased, prejudgment may be based on the fact that the
agency has ruled on the issue in another circumstance involving another
party. If so, then the exhaustion requirement may be satisfied.
The extraordinary justification exception rule has been repeatedly
challenged and repeatedly upheld. The fact that federal inmates have con-
tinuously challenged the policy and the agency has not changed suggests
that the Bureau of Prisons will retain the new rule unless it is required to
change it by the courts, as it was with the 2002 and 2005 Rules.4 8 Fur-
thermore, the Bureau of Prisons' failure to respond to comments when it
proposed the rule indicates that the agency is not willing to reconsider its
assessment that six months is necessary even though organizations and
individuals stated that the cap on halfway house placement would be det-
rimental to an inmate's prospects for successful reentry.
454. 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b)(2) (2010).
455. Id.
456. Bruce v. Apker, No. CV 08-619-TUC-FRZ (JCG), 2009 WL 2509170, at *3
(D. Ariz. Aug. 17, 2009); Morrow v. Rios, No. 08-320 (JRT/RLE), 2009 WL 924525, at *7
(D. Minn. Mar. 31, 2009); Wales v.Trung, No. 08-39 (JNE/JJK), 2009 WL 4906502, at *12
(D. Minn. Dec. 16, 2009).
457. McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 148 (1992).
458. The Interim Rule that the Bureau of Prisons proposed, 73 C.F.R. § 62440-01
(2008), with a request for comments, has neither become final nor has the Bureau of
Prisons responded to the comments.
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The requirement that an inmate must exhaust the administrative
remedy process serves no legitimate purpose when the agency has decid-
ed that six months is sufficient. Inmates who are forced to exhaust the
administrative remedy process are denied judicial access, as well as longer
time in halfway houses. Under such circumstances, inmates face an unrea-
sonable delay, another recognized exception to the exhaustion doctrine.
5. Unreasonable Delay
Under the unreasonable delay exception, a delay that ultimately
renders the administrative remedy inadequate will suffice for the court to
allow a petitioner judicial access in the absence of exhaustion. According
to the Supreme Court, exhaustion is not required when an unreasonable
administrative delay has rendered the administrative remedy inadequate.45 9
That is precisely the case when an inmate challenges the Bureau of Pris-
ons' extraordinary justification exception rule.
When the Bureau of Prisons determines that an inmate shall be
placed in a halfway house for a specified period of time that is less than
the maximum allowed under 5 3624(c), it is inevitably going to be chal-
lenged on the grounds that the length of stay is insufficient and the
process used to determine the placement is contrary to § 3621(b). The
remedy being sought by an inmate is placement in a halfway house for
the maximum length of time. The administrative remedy process cuts into
the twelve-month time period. Therefore, the delay will render the reme-
dy inadequate.
Reliance on the exhaustion doctrine to deny judicial access con-
tributes to the continued application of a misguided rule. Furthermore, it
undermines the legislative intent of % 3621(b) and 3624(c) to increase
the reentry prospects of inmates. Not only do the courts invoke this doc-
trine to deny access, but they also apply the mootness doctrine, which has
the same ultimate result of denying judicial review.
B. Mootness Doctrine Prevents Challenges
Following the changes to the Bureau of Prisons' halfway house
placement policy, numerous federal inmates filed habeas petitions but
were never heard because the inmates had been transferred to halfway
houses and thus the petitions had become moot. The application of the
mootness doctrine, which denies inmates the opportunity to obtain judi-
cial review of the Bureau of Prisons' halfway house placement policy,
implicitly reaffirms a misguided statutory interpretation. Without the
459. See Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 575 (1973)(noting that delay often renders
the administrative remedy inadequate); Smith v. Ill. Bell Tel. Co., 270 U.S. 587, 591-92
(1926) (noting that an applicant need not wait "indefinitely" before seeking relief).
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mootness doctrine preventing access, courts would make the determina-
tion under Chevron that the Bureau of Prisons' policy contravenes
congressional intent to utilize the five factors in 5 3621(b). Moreover,
courts would also determine that the Bureau of Prisons has exceeded the
discretion granted to the agency by Congress.
Federal courts will typically dismiss an action when there is no
longer a case or controversy for the court to decide, thus mootness pre-
vents a court from hearing a case when it is unable to provide the remedy
being sought.416 In the case of a federal inmate seeking a transfer to a
halfway house, if the inmate has been transferred and thus obtained the
remedy that the court would provide, there is no longer a case or contro-
versy. Although the inmate has been placed in a halfway house, this
remedy is unacceptable. It is not the placement that is important, but the
process for being considered for placement and the length of time that an
inmate is placed.
The statutory requirement of § 3621(b) requires the Bureau of Pris-
ons to consider five factors on an individual basis, which the
extraordinary justification exception rule does not. The statutory intent of
§ 3624(c) contemplates placements for up to twelve months, which the
extraordinary justification exception rule does not accomplish because of
the six-month cap. The mootness doctrine shields the Bureau of Prisons
from a substantive review of its actions, thereby allowing the Bureau of
Prisons to continue to improperly interpret % 3621(b) and 3624(c) and
deny inmates an opportunity for a longer halfway house placement. This
denial of a longer placement has real life implications on an inmate's pro-
spect of successfully reentering society and not recidivating, thus
jeopardizing the safety of others. Although the transfer to a halfway house
technically moots the petition, federal courts have recognized exceptions
to the doctrine, including the capable of repetition yet evades review ex-
ception. State courts have gone further and also adopted a public
importance exception to the mootness doctrine which the federal courts
should consider adopting as well.
1. Capable of RepetitionYet Evades Review
The capable of repetition yet evades review exception is an excep-
tion to the mootness doctrine that recognizes that the operation of a
challenged policy may be too short in duration for a proper review to
occur, but the party affected by the policy will likely be faced with the
460. Lea Brilmayer, The Jurisprudence ofArticle III: Perspectives on the "Case or Controver-
sy" Requirement, 93 HAuv. L. REV. 297, n.10 (1979) (citing C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 12, at 39 (3d ed. 1976) (stating there is no case or controversy
remaining once issue is moot)).
SPRNG 2011]
HeinOnline  -- 16 Mich. J. Race & L. 313 2010-2011
314 Michigan Journal of Race & Law [VOL. 16:235
same situation at a later date.4 6' The most celebrated example of this ex-
ception is when the Court ruled on the legality of abortion.4 62 In that
instance, a woman is likely to become pregnant again in the future and
will be faced with having to decide whether to terminate her pregnan-
cy.4 63 Because the resolution of the challenged action would last longer
than the nine-month gestation period, the legality of abortion would
never be able to be reviewed.
Under this exception, mootness will not preclude review when the
following two elements exist: "(1) the challenged action [is] in its duration
too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration, and (2)
there [is] a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party [will]
be subjected to the same action again." '464 For inmates seeking to challenge
the extraordinary justification exception rule, the length of time between
when the inmate is evaluated and receives placement is too short in its
duration, particularly if the inmate is forced to submit to the administra-
tive remedy process.
Courts have been reluctant to apply this exception to the criminal
justice context, such as when an individual is rearrested and subjected to
abuse by a law enforcement officer.46s The exception requires that there be
a "reasonable expectation" of facing the adverse agency action."' For in-
mates being released, there is a similar parallel. It is presumed that inmates
are unlikely to face the adverse agency action again.46 Courts may there-
fore want to reconsider this position in light of the evidence on
recidivism.468 The placement of an individual in a halfway house has a di-
rect impact on the success or failure of that individual upon release.469 As
the recidivism data indicate, one-third of individuals are likely to recidi-
vate within one year of release and approximately two-thirds will
461. See Trans Int'l Airlines, Inc. v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 650 E2d 949 (9th Cir.
1980); See also S. Pac.Transp. Co. v. St. Charles Parish Police Jury, 569 F Supp. 1174 (E.D.
La. 1983).
462. Roe v.Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
463. See id.
464. Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147 (1975) (citing Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393
(1975)).
465. See Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105 (1983) (noting that harm is depend-
ent on police's arresting plaintiffagain and subjecting him to chokehold).
466. Allred v.Webb, 641 So. 2d 1218, 1220 (Miss. 1994).
467. Pierce v. Thomas, No. 09-35781, 2010 WL 4130911, at *1 (9th Cir. Oct. 21,
2010)("[W]e conclude that there is no reasonable expectation that Pierce will be subject
to these RRC policies again, and that Pierce's claims are not 'capable of repetition, yet
evading review.'"). The presumption however ignores the recidivism data that almost
two-thirds of inmates will recidivate within the first three years upon release. See supra
note 7 and accompanying text.
468. See LANGAN & LEVIN, supra note 7.
469. See Memorandum in Support ofAmended Petition, supra note 88, at 53-54.
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recidivate within three years.47 Inmates that are released without some
form of pre-release custody are more likely to re-offend than those who
have a less abrupt transition from incarceration to freedom.' With the
increased attention devoted to reentry, courts should adopt the public im-
portance exception to the mootness doctrine that is applied in some state
courts.
2. Adopting a Public Importance Exception
The public importance exception permits a court to resolve an oth-
erwise moot issue if that issue involves a substantial public interest. For the
exception to apply, it is necessary to demonstrate a "clear showing" of
each of the following: "(1) the question presented is of a public nature; (2)
an authoritative resolution of the question is desirable to guide public
officers; and (3) the question is likely to recur. 412 The length of time that
a federal inmate should be placed in a halfway house satisfies each of these
elements and is discussed below.
a. Public Nature of the Question
The Bureau of Prisons' halfway house placement policy is of public
nature because it is central to the successful reentry of federal inmates.
Moreover, the initial change in its policy and the current extraordinary
justification exception rule altered a longstanding practice that enabled an
inmate to be transferred or to be placed directly into a halfway house at
any point in the sentence and for any length of time.
470. LANcA & LEVIN, supra note 7, at 1, 3.
471. See Ferguson v. Ashcroft, 248 F Supp. 2d 547, 572 (M.D. La. 2003).
472. Cinkus v. Stickney Mun. Officers Electoral Bd., 886 N.E.2d 1011, 1017 (I11
2008) (presenting the elements necessary to establish the public importance exception to
the mootness doctrine); see also In re Shawn P, 916 A.2d 399, 406 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
2007) ("A court may decide a moot question where is an imperative and manifest urgency
to establish a rule of future conduct in matters of important public concern, which may
frequently recur, and which, because of inherent time constraints, may not be able to be
afforded complete appellate review."); Dyer v. Securities and Exch. Comm'n, 266 E2d 33,
47 (8th Cir. 1959) ("In still wider horizon, there also is a recognized right ofjudicial dis-
cretion, in the public interest, to deal with the validity or propriety of administrative
regulations and actions, where they have justiciably been brought into court, even though
they may perhaps have ceased thereafter to have a direct significance in the particular sit-
uation. This does not mean that a court is required or has the right to engage in a decision
of this character in every such situation; but it is judicially entitled to do so where it ap-
pears that some general benefit may public-wise, or in relation to the possibility of further
similar litigation, come from having it established whether the administrative agency has
acted within or without its authority."). In Cinkus, the case deals with an interpretation of
a statute that impacts elections. In In re Shawn P, the issue is about a juvenile defendant.
See supra Part I.
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Reentry is an issue of public concern that has regained the national
spotlight. It has been highlighted in three successive presidential admin-
istrations.47 3 It was the impetus for one of the most far-reaching bipartisan
legislative efforts, the Second Chance Act,474 which is dedicated to creat-
ing a holistic response to assisting ex-offenders as they transition from
incarceration to freedom.47' For federal inmates, a key component for suc-
cessful reentry is the halfway house, on which various stakeholders,
including judges, attorneys, and inmates have come to rely.
With the increased focus on reentry and providing inmates with the
best opportunity to be successful upon release and the numerous changes
in policy, this issue has become one of public interest. Moreover, with the
growth of prison populations, halfvay houses will become an increasingly
important tool for rehabilitation. 41
6
The halfway house provides an opportunity to reduce criminal jus-
tice administration costs. The placement of inmates in halfway houses is
less expensive than in traditional penal facilities. Further, if inmates reenter
society successfully and become law-abiding, they are less likely to re-
offend, thus reducing the costs of re-prosecution or re-incarceration. For
the exception to apply, the issue must require an authoritative resolution
to guide the many public officers that must implement the policy.
473. See supra Part I; Herckis & Seeger, supra note 9, at 9; Thompson, supra note 10, at
260.
474. See supra Part II.A.
475. Second Chance Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-199, 122 Stat. 657 (2008) (codified
in scattered sections of 18 and 42 U.S.C.).
476. See Fehr, supra note 58, at 5 ("In contrast, in 1940, the federal prison population
was 24,360. That number did not change significantly for 40 years, so that in 1980, the
population was 24,640. From 1980 to 1989, the inmate population more than doubled to
almost 58,000. During the 1990s, the population more than doubled again, reaching
134,000 at the end of 1999. The current population is expected to increase to over
215,000 by the end of 2011. Annually, the Bureau returns 45,000 federal inmates to our
communities, a number that will continue to increase as the population grows."); See also
U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, ABOUT THE FEDERAL BuREAu OF PssoNs, supra note 352 at 3 ("Most
of the challenges affecting the Bureau today relate to the agency's growth. At the end of
1930 (the year the Bureau was created), the agency operated 14 institutions for just over
13,000 inmates. In 1940, the Bureau had grown to 24 institutions with 24,360 inmates.
Except for a few fluctuations, the number of inmates did not change significantly between
1940 and 1980 (When the population was 24,252); however, the number of institutions
almost doubled (from 24 to 44) as the Bureau gradually moved from operating large insti-
tutions confining inmates of many security levels to operating smaller, more cost effective
facilities that each confined inmates with similar security needs.").
[VOL. 16:235
HeinOnline  -- 16 Mich. J. Race & L. 316 2010-2011
Impeding Reentry
b. Authoritative Resolution is Desirable to Guide Public Officers
The Bureau of Prisons' policy requires an authoritative resolution to
guide its public officers. 477 Bureau of Prisons' staff are guided by a policy
statement, 478 which identifies the significant changes to the policy follow-
ing the passage of the Second Chance Act, such as an increase in the
evaluation period and the capping of placement to six months absent an
extraordinary exception and prior written approval.4 79 The issue with the
policy statement is not clarity, but whether the Bureau of Prisons' actions
are in accord with its statutory mandate and whether the evaluators have
a clear understanding of what constitutes an extended placement.
In a couple of cases, a Bureau of Prisons' staff member in the facility
where the inmate is housed (i.e. the unit team member) evaluated and
recommended placement in excess of six months, only to be overruled by
another actor in the chain of command.480 With either denials or reduc-
tions of recommended placement time, lower-level officers are unclear as
to what constitutes an appropriate placement. On the one hand, the stat-
ute states that an inmate can receive as much as twelve months in a
halfway house. On the other hand, the Bureau of Prisons' stated policy
provides inmates with only six months. These institutional actors are
therefore caught between the statutes, % 3621(b) and 3624(c), and the
Bureau of Prisons' policy.4"1 Hence, a resolution from the courts clarifying
that the placement is statutorily mandated and permitted along with
providing a non-exhaustive list of extraordinary justifications would serve
as a better guide.
477. Cinkus v. Stickney Mun. Officers Electoral Bd., 886 N.E.2d 1011, 1017 (1Il.
2008).
478. See FED. BURAU OF PRISONS, PROGRAM STATEMENT 7310.04, supra note 15.
479. Id.
480. Garrison v. Stansberry, No. 2:08cv522, 2009 WL 1160115, at *2 (E.D. Va., Apr.
29,2009) ("On May 13, 2008, Garrison's Unit Team at FCI-Petersburg considered him for
pre-release placement in an RRC. After review, the Unit Team recommended Garrison be
placed in an RRC for more than six months. That recommendation was forwarded to the
warden at FCI-Petersburg, who in turn wrote a memorandum, on June 12, 2008, to the
BOP's Mid-Atlantic Regional Director. That memorandum requested approval for Garri-
son to be given more than six months in an RRC. On June 23, 2008, the Regional
Director denied the warden's request."); Roman v. Berkebile, No. 3-08-CV-0002-N, 2008
WL 4559825, at * 2 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 6,2008).
481. See Strong v. Schultz, 599 E Supp. 2d 556, 563 (D. N.J. 2009) ("This Court finds
that, by instructing staff that pre-release placement needs can usually be accommodated by
a placement of six months or less and by denying staff the discretion to recommend a
placement longer than six months (Without advance written approval from the Regional
Director), the April 14, 2008, Memorandum is inconsistent with the Second Chance Act's
amendments to § 3624(c). The April 14, 2008, Memorandum impermissibly constrains
staff's discretion to designate inmates to a CCC for a duration that will provide the great-
est likelihood of successful reintegration into the community, contrary to
§ 3624(c)(6)(C).").
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The Bureau of Prisons would likely argue that administrators who
have oversight responsibility of the entire placement process provide
greater consistency for applying the policy than the courts. This interpre-
tation overlooks the inconsistency and changes in policy over the last ten
years for both staff and inmates. A placement policy that has been judicial-
ly reviewed to determine whether it adheres to Congress' mandate or
contravenes it would guide the Bureau of Prisons' staff to craft a place-
ment plan that adequately reflects the dual goals of the Second
Chance-reducing recidivism and increasing public safety. The last re-
quirement for the public importance exception is whether the question is
likely to recur.
c. Question is Likely to Recur
The Bureau of Prisons' halfway house placement policy has been an
unresolved question following the 2002 change in policy, which has re-
mained unresolved through subsequent legislation. Moreover, the policy
lacks support from criminal justice agencies and entities invested in the
issue, and will continue to be subject to inmate challenges. Instead of
postponing judicial review of whether the agency is properly engaging in
the placement of federal inmates in halfway houses, it would behoove the
court to entertain the issue and resolve it once and for all.
Halfway house placement has long been deemed important for in-
mates for many reasons. It provides an inmate with an opportunity to
establish an employment record for future employers to consider. This is
especially valuable given that a substantial percentage of inmates were un-
employed prior to incarceration4 82 and have been out of the "workforce"
while incarcerated. 483 It also allows an inmate to reconnect with and to
resurrect family relationships that may have suffered because of the in-
mate's absence.
84
482. Joan Petersilia, From Cell to Society: 4ho Is Returning Home?, in PRISONER
REENTRY AND CRIME IN AMERICA 26-27 (Jeremy Travis & Christy Visher eds., 2005);
TRAVIS, supra note 96, at 157-60.
483. Inmates are often required to work while incarcerated. See LEGAL RESOURCE
GUIDE TO THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS, 14-15 (2008). ("The BOP is authorized to
require inmates transferred to RRCs to pay a portion or all of the costs of their confine-
ment, and with few exceptions, all employed offenders confined in RRCs must make
payments toward their housing costs.").
484. See lacaboni v. United States, 251 E Supp. 2d 1015, 1022-23 (D. Mass. 2003)
("[1[Reliance on the availability of a community confinement designation derived not just
from the statute ... but also on the undisputable fact that ... such a designation makes
eminently good sense. When one remembers that persons placed in community correc-
tions are generally minor offenders, with minimal or no criminal records, and no history
of violence, the decision to entirely eliminate community corrections as an optional im-
prisonment designation becomes even more astonishing.").
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Impeding Reentry
[F]or the defendant ... [i]mprisonment in a halfway house
usually means the inmate will be residing closer to his or her
home community, can continue employment outside the fa-
cility during the day, and can maintain ties with vulnerable
family members, such as children or ailing parents . .. For in-
nocent third parties, particularly children, the economic and
emotional devastation caused by a parent's distant incarceration
can be, to some extent, palliated. With the inmate employed,
families can stay off welfare; with a parent available, children
can avoid placement in foster homes. For the Government
wishing to recognize substantial assistance provided by a coop-
erating defendant this option also holds out advantages during
plea negotiations, and at sentencing. Finally ... the Number
One beneficiary of community corrections is the American
Taxpayer, since the cost of community confinement, when it
serves the interests of justice, is far less than the price tag on
more conventional forms of imprisonment.4 5
Halfway houses have long been recognized, even by the Bureau of Pris-
ons, as a tool for reentry.86 Inmates that are not transitioned back to
society via a halfway house are more likely than their halfway house
counterparts to re-offend. Every inmate that is sentenced to a federal
prison, a first timer or recidivist, will be considered for halfway house
placement, unless the inmate has committed a more violent crime, thus
making him fully ineligible. Hence, it is imperative that the courts review
the halfway house placement policy of the Bureau of Prisons.
Although this Article makes the argument that judicial review is
needed to determine whether the Bureau of Prisons' policy has exceeded
its discretion, the Bureau of Prisons should designate all eligible inmates
to halfway houses for a full twelve months. After an im-nate has served six
months in a halfway house, the halfway house staff will conduct an eval-
uation of the inmate's progress in adapting to life as a law-abiding citizen.
If at that time the inmate does not pose a threat to others, then the in-
mate can be transferred to home confinement as dictated by § 3624(c)(2).
If the inmate is not ready for that responsibility, then the inmate can re-
main in the halfway house. Either way, the inmate receives the necessary
amount of time in a halfway house to gain the skills needed to reenter
society successfully, as well as the structured support to readjust to life
outside of a penal facility.
485. Id.
486. See TRAVis, supra note 96, at 241 ("Corrections agencies sometimes provide
housing as a buffer between prison life and life in the free world. Typically called 'halfway
houses,' these facilities offer prisoners near the end of their sentences a structured and
regulated environment as they adjust to life in the conmmunity.").
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CONCLUSION
Reducing recidivism and increasing public safety are twin goals of
the Second Chance Act. The Second Chance Act resurrects the concept
of rehabilitation by providing a holistic response to the needs of ex-
offenders as they attempt to reenter society following incarceration. The
Second Chance Act provides reforms across state, federal, and tribal juris-
dictions. It targets juveniles, adults, and elderly offenders, and it provides
alternatives for first-time offenders. Of the numerous changes made by
the Second Chance Act, the provision devoted to reforming existing cor-
rectional policies at the federal level, particularly the length of time that
federal inmates spend in halfway houses, is of paramount importance. The
Second Chance Act increased the amount of time that an inmate may
spend in such facilities to twelve months, but the Bureau of Prisons has
resisted placements in excess of six months without an extraordinary jus-
tification and prior written approval of a Regional Director. This
requirement, which is contrary to the statutes that guide the Bureau of
Prisons' placement policy, is an impermissible exercise of discretion and an
unreasonable interpretation of the statute. Inmates have been overwhelm-
ingly precluded from changing the agency's actions because of the judicial
doctrines of exhaustion and mootness. Given the importance of reentry
for the individual and the community at large, courts should relax the
standards of access by recognizing that the Bureau of Prisons has pre-
determined the placement decision. Moreover, reentry is of such im-
portance that the courts should also adopt a public importance exception
to overcome the mootness doctrine. Judicial review would reveal that the
Bureau of Prisons is not entitled to deference, and that its policy is an im-
permissible exercise of discretion.
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